Lovligheten av krigen i Irak.

[ulrikft]

Jeg tenkte man kunne ta en litt informativ diskusjon rundt lovligheten av krigen i Irak. Det synes å være et aksiom at den IKKE er lovlig, så for å være litt Advocatus Diabolis vil jeg gjerne fremme synspunkter i motsatt retning.

 

 

Første poeng

 

http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0678.htm

 

Legg her merke til:

 

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

 

1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwil, to do so;

 

Altså, at alle etterfølgende, relevante resolusjoner etterfølges.

 

Så kommer:

 

http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0687.htm

 

Legg her merke til:

 

8. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:

 

(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities;

 

(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities;

 

I media blir som oftest punkt (a) hauset opp som den eneste grunnen, men her ser man tydelig av (b) at også ballistiske raketter med en gitt rekkevidde også kan ligge til grunn som brudd på resolusjonen. Kan noen si "scud"..?

 

 

Som avsluttende "innlegg" kan man se på:

 

http://www.un.int/usa/sres-iraq.htm

 

og

 

http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issue.../0307advice.htm

 

For argumenter og "logikk" rundt disse problemstillingene.

 

 

Som et lite forbehold: Jeg ser gjerne at "USA er jo slemme!"-tendenser holdes ute og at rent saklige, rasjonelle og godt begrunnede innlegg blir lagt inn her. Har man ikke kjennskap til folkerett på noe vis kan man heller lese og lære. Håper det kommer matnyttige innspill!

[Kubin]

Har man ikke kjennskap til folkerett på noe vis kan man heller lese og lære.

7957368[/snapback]

 

Jeg har ikke kjennskap til det. Så jeg skal ikke gå i debatt om dette. Bare gi link til noen som har andre tanker :

 

"Blix: Iraq War Was Illegal"

http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0305-01.htm

 

"Iraq War was Illegal and Breached UN Charter, Says Annan"

http://www.commondreams.org/headlines04/0916-01.htm

[JuGeun]

FN-pakten innholder et generelt forbud mot bruk og trussel om bruk av makt av en stat mot en annet, jf. art. 2.4. Det er to unntak fra denne regelen. Det ene er selvforsvar overfor et "armed attack" jf. art 51. Det er umulig å hevde at USA var utsatt for noe "armed attack" i betydningen i artikkel 51. Følgelig kan ikke dette unntaket tjene til å legitimere krigen. I den anledning kan det følgende virke klargjørende, spesielt ettersom USA gjorde en ulovlig pre-emptiv en del av sin NSS. Om forkjøpskriger:

 

The United States has no right, however, to invade another state because of speculative concerns about that state's possible future actions. The current international order does not support a special status for the United States or a singular right to exempt itself from the law. To maintain a legal order that restrains other states and to uphold the rule of law, the United States should continue its conservative commitment to limits on the unilateral use of force, and reject a reckless doctrine of preemptive self-defense.

http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf

 

Det er et annet unntak. Det er ved en sikkerhetsresolusjon som autoriserer bruk av makt under kapittel syv, jf. art. 42, se også art. 39. Det går for øvrig frem av artiklene at det naturligvis er sikkerhetsrådet som avgjør når maktbruk skal autoriseres. Noen slik autorisering forelå ikke, og USA og Storbritannia forsøkte febrilsk å skaffe det før krigen. De lyktes ikke. Sikkerhetsrådet var i mot krigen i Irak, og autoriserte den ikke. Kravene i kapittel syv av FN-pakten var ikke oppfylt, spesielt de prosessuelle (dette var også Bondevik og UDs noe ambiguøse holdning).

 

Det offisielle argumentet fra amerikansk side er en merkelig konstruksjon hvor man gjenoppliver autorisasjonen som ble gitt til å kaste Irak ut av Kuwait ved irakiske brudd på våpenhvileavtalen, men helt hvordan det skal tillate regimeendring, som var USAs uttalte krav da man eksplisitt krevde at Saddam måtte forlate landet innen 48 timer, vites ikke. Uansett er argumentet på alle måter uholdbart og ikke i tråd med resolusjonen. Jeg vil primært benytte meg av juridisk ekspertise når dette skal forklares ekstensivt. Begrunnelser følger:

 

III THE LEGALITY OF THE MILITARY ACTION IN IRAQ

 

The 2003 coalition military action in Iraq is the most recent example of the use of force based on self-defence grounds. Although the coalition primarily justified its military action by relying on the combined effect of UNSC resolutions 678, 687 and 1441, the Australian and US governments also relied on the right to act pre-emptively in self-defence.[25] Resolutions 678, 687 and 1441 were adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and their intended effect is summarised below.

 

A Effect of Resolutions

 

1 Resolution 678[26]

 

This resolution, adopted 29 November 1990, authorised the use of force against Iraq to eject it from Kuwait and to restore peace and security in the area. It authorised the use, by United Nations (‘UN’) members, of ‘all necessary means’ for the specific purpose of upholding Resolution 660 and all subsequent relevant resolutions.[27] The broad authorisation granted by the phrase ‘all necessary means’ included military action.

 

2 Resolution 687[28]

 

This resolution, adopted 3 April 1991, set out ceasefire conditions and imposed continuing obligations on Iraq to eliminate its weapons of mass destruction (‘WMD’) in order to restore international peace and security. It suspended but did not terminate the authority to use force under Resolution 678. The wording of this resolution empowered the UNSC to decide ‘uch further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area’.

 

3 Resolution 1441[29]

 

This resolution, adopted 8 November 2002, was a further and more detailed response to Iraq’s failure to comply with the obligation to destroy all WMD as required by Resolution 687. This resolution left open the issue of what would occur if Iraq failed to comply with its terms, implying that the UNSC would need to consider the matter when further evidence appeared. The resolution gave Iraq a ‘final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations’ and warned of ‘serious consequences’ if it did not.

 

B Arguments Advanced by the Coalition

 

The Australian government has officially relied on the revival of authorisation under Resolution 678, as a result of the failure of Iraq to comply with all the provisions of the ceasefire, to justify the use of force. Prime Minister Howard also suggested that Australia was prepared to act pre-emptively against terrorist targets[30] and that attacks could be justified by humanitarian arguments.[31] The United Kingdom (‘UK’) government also argued that Iraq’s material breaches of Resolution 687 revived the use of force under Resolution 678.[32] Although the UK asserted a right of humanitarian intervention to justify its use of force, it did not rely on any alleged right to act pre-emptively in self-defence.

 

The US has relied on both revival of the use of force under Resolution 678 and the right to act pre-emptively in self-defence. This position was made clear by the US Ambassador to the UN, John Negroponte, in a statement to the UNSC after the vote on Resolution 1441, where he stated that:

 

If the Security Council fails to act decisively in the event of a further Iraqi violation, this resolution does not constrain any member state from acting to defend itself against the threat posed by Iraq or to enforce relevant UNSC resolutions and protect world peace and security.[33]

 

This statement implies that even without express authorisation for the use of force, the US was prepared to exercise military force either in self-defence or to enforce relevant UNSC resolutions, albeit unilaterally.[34] Importantly, the question of whether the principle of unilateral enforcement of UNSC resolutions is sustainable in international law, in the opinion of the writer, should not be answered in the affirmative. Accordingly, the argument that the proposed doctrine of pre-emptive or anticipatory self-defence is sufficiently consistent with international law to justify military action by the US, UK and Australia, cannot be sustained.[35]

 

Importantly, Resolution 1441 did not expressly authorise the use of force against Iraq even if it was considered, by the UNSC or any state, to have committed a material breach, that is, it does not confer an ‘automatic trigger’ on member states.[36] However, the statement by Ambassador Negroponte quoted above, makes clear that the US considered unilateral military action an option even in the absence of UNSC authorisation.

 

C Legality of the Action

 

It could potentially be argued that had Iraq re-invaded Kuwait, the authorisation for UN members to use force under Resolution 678 might have been revived, although a more cautious approach would be that because the resolution was tied to a particular event in history, a new resolution would have been needed.[37] However, in the absence of such an invasion, it is unlikely that Resolution 678 operated as standing authorisation for the use of force against Iraq.

 

Furthermore, the obligations imposed on Iraq under Resolution 687 do not appear to be linked to authorisation of the use of force under Resolution 678 in that the former resolution gives the UNSC the power to decide ‘uch further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area’. This resolution therefore, makes no provision for the consequences of failure to comply with the resolution. Rather, it implies that further UNSC consideration will be exercised if and when required under international law. Moreover, it is noteworthy that neither Resolution 687 nor 1441 contain the phrase ‘all necessary means’ as Resolution 678 does. This observation alone provides considerable support for the proposition that neither Resolution 687 nor 1441 authorised the use of force by the coalition against Iraq.

 

The proposition that Iraq’s failure to comply with the ceasefire agreement allowed member states to use force in response to those violations without additional authorisation is arguably unfounded. The ceasefire was between the UN and Iraq and therefore, the claim that member states can respond unilaterally is an unsustainable view of international law.[38] Furthermore, it must be appreciated that although there have been 17 UNSC resolutions dealing with Iraq since 1990, the number of resolutions does not change the plain wording of the text adopted by the UNSC, nor does the cumulation of resolutions justify the use of force.[39]

 

The overwhelming view of independent commentators is that the military action was illegal based upon the interpretation of UNSC Resolutions. Furthermore, the majority of published independent legal analysis has rejected the claim that existing resolutions justify the use of force or that there is any other basis under international law to justify the use of force against Iraq.[40] Many also argue that the coalition’s legal advisers distorted the words of the resolutions in their claim to be acting on behalf of the international community. This paper will now discuss the principal arguments against and in support of the legality of the military action in Iraq, specifically in the context of opinions of leading commentators on these issues.

 

1 A Distorted Reading of the Resolutions

 

Byrnes and Charlesworth propose that the government’s legal justification to go to war was fatally flawed because the interpretation placed on the relevant UNSC resolutions depends upon a distorted reading of their language and undermines the context in which they were adopted.[41] They further argue that the government’s arguments neglect the rationale of the role of the UNSC under the UN Charter in dealing with threats to international peace and security.[42] To support their arguments, Byrnes and Charlesworth rely on a quote of Christine Gray, a leading international law commentator, in which she states:

 

It is no longer a case of interpreting euphemisms such as ‘all necessary means’ to allow the use of force when it is clear ... that force is envisaged: the USA, the UK and others have gone far beyond this to distort the words of resolutions ... in order to claim to be acting on behalf of the international community.[43]

 

The views of these commentators are primarily based upon a literal reading of the relevant UNSC resolutions. A careful and restricted interpretation of the resolutions is entirely warranted when the exercise of military force is in contemplation. As discussed earlier in this paper, there has been very little academic consideration of the principles relevant to such interpretation and therefore, the coalition relied on rules and principles relevant to treaty interpretation to afford the resolutions a formulation in accordance with its arguably pre-determined intentions.

 

The coalition’s argument that the authorisation for the use of force under Resolution 678 was revived or continued completely ignores the plain wording of this resolution which is explicitly tied to an historical event. Furthermore, Byrnes’ and Charlesworth’s argument that such justification is entirely inconsistent with the terms of this resolution and the whole structure of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, is cogently framed. Ultimately, the legality of the military action turns on the interpretation of the UNSC resolutions, and despite the coalition’s attempts, it is difficult to interpret them in a way that supports the military action.

 

http://beta.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/QUT...html#Heading134

 

 

En analyse av det offisielle argumentet for invasjonen av Irak på litt over 170s konkluderer slik:

 

The legal theory advanced in 2003 by the United States and its allies to justify the invasion of Iraq is not persuasive. Neither the language of the relevant resolutions, nor the practice of the Security Council with respect to those resolutions, supports the use of force against Iraq, especially in light of the extensive opposition of most of the members of the Security Council over the course of 2002-2003.

 

Interesserte kan selv klikke seg inn og lese artikkelen (jeg tror den er fritt tilgjengelig)

http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abs...61&download=yes

 

Flere analyser:

Thus, there were two types of legal justification for war. The first — the sole legal argument put forward by the UK and Australia — was that existing Security Council resolutions provided enough legal authority for war.45 The second, favoured by the US, was that the war represented a continuation of the war against terror and was therefore legal because it constituted a legitimate act of self-defence.

 

(...)

Recourse to Resolution 678 and Resolution 687 may be the most compelling legal argument in support of the war, but it has not been widely accepted by the international community. Operation Desert Fox allowed the US and UK to test the argument in order to set a precedent, but this line of legal reasoning failed to convince a majority of states on the Security Council. This was despite the fact that both intervening states indicated to the Security Council their belief that they had sufficient authority to use force. In 1998, the US and the UK were clearly restrained by their inability to justify their actions in terms of international law. Military action was restricted to air strikes that were limited in scope and duration. Moreover, when the US and the UK concluded the campaign, Saddam Hussein had still not agreed to UNSCOM’s return, and it was nearly four years before weapons inspectors would return to Iraq. In 2002, mindful of the weakness of a legal case based on Resolution 678 and Resolution 687, which had been exposed by international responses to Operation Desert Fox, the US and UK proposed a new Security Council resolution that would provide authority for the use of force if Iraq refused to comply.

(...)

The question concerning who had competence to declare Iraq to be in material breach of Resolution 1441 was more problematic. The US and UK initially sought a resolution that permitted member states to declare Iraq in material breach and bring the matter back before the Security Council. France and Russia, however, argued that only the weapons inspectors should have the right to report breaches to the Security Council and that member states had a responsibility to assist the inspectors. However, the final version of the resolution is ambiguous on this question. Paragraph 11 directs the head of UNMOVIC to report breaches immediately to the Security Council, but the resolution does not prohibit member states from also reporting breaches. According to the US Ambassador, UNMOVIC, the IAEA and individual member states each had a right to report breaches to the Security Council.76 Other delegations disagreed. Sir Jeremy Greenstock, the British Ambassador to the UN, who co-sponsored the resolution, argued that an immediate Security Council meeting would be convened only if the head of UNMOVIC or IAEA reported Iraq to be in material breach of the resolution.77 Sergei Lavrov, the Russian Ambassador to the UN, put the matter more bluntly. He argued that Resolution 1441 clearly stated that ‘it is the heads of UNMOVIC and of the IAEA who will report ... [breaches] to the Security Council, and ... it is the Council that will consider the situation that has developed’.78

 

The question of competence to declare Iraq to be in material breach was intimately related to the question of ‘automaticity’ of the use of force. If member states were able to find Iraq to be in material breach, with Resolution 1441 warning Iraq that it would face ‘serious consequences’ if this happened, was it the case that Resolution 1441 authorised the use of force? (...) From the statements made in the Security Council immediately after the passage of Resolution 1441, it is clear that there was general consensus that the resolution did not constitute implied authorisation for the use of force. The US Ambassador explained that ‘as we have said on numerous occasions to Council members, this resolution contains no “hidden triggers” or “automaticity” with respect to the use of force’.86 Similarly, the British Ambassador insisted that ‘there is no “automaticity” in this resolution’.87 The other members of the Security Council were also clear on this point. Of the remaining permanent members, Russia pointed out that ‘the resolution just adopted contains no provisions for the automatic use of force’.88 China insisted that ‘the text no longer includes automaticity for authorizing the use of force’,89 and France welcomed the fact that ‘all ambiguity on ... all elements of automaticity have disappeared from the resolution’.90 The non-permanent members were equally clear in their interpretation of the meaning of Resolution 1441 in relation to the use of force. Mexico stated that ‘we reiterate the belief reflected in the agreed text that the possibility of the use of force is valid only as a last resort, with prior explicit authorization required from the Security Council’.91 Ireland insisted that ‘this resolution was [meant] to achieve disarmament through inspections, and not to establish a basis for the use of military force ... [a]s far as Ireland is concerned, it is for the Council to decide on any ensuing action’.92 The representatives of Bulgaria, Syria, Norway, Colombia, Cameroon and Mauritius all made very similar statements, referring to the fact that Resolution 1441 did not give a tacit ‘nod of approval’ to the use of force.93 The remaining two members of the Security Council, Singapore and Guinea, did not address the question of the use of force in their statements.94 It is evident from these statements that the question of whether or not the resolution authorised the use of force was the focus for the debate that preceded it. It is also clear that the idea that Resolution 1441 constituted a tacit ‘nod of approval’ for military action was rejected by the Security Council. Eleven members chose to state categorically that nothing in the resolution should be read as constituting such approval — a point that the resolution’s co-sponsors were forced to concede in their own statements to the Security Council. Any use of force against Iraq cannot, therefore, be legitimately justified by recourse to Resolution 1441 alone. Even a ‘purposive’ interpretation of the resolution that focuses on the Security Council’s expressed aim (that is, Iraqi disarmament), rather than its precise wording, would lack substance in this case because of the clear expression of the will of the Security Council in the statements outlined above.

 

The British and Australian legal arguments were not, therefore, compelling. The fact that Resolution 1441 cannot be read as authorising the use of force places the burden on the reactivation of Resolution 678. Given that there is no precedent in the post-1945 legal order for the reactivation of Security Council resolutions, advocates of this position need to demonstrate either that the wording of the resolutions provides continuing authority for the use of force or that it was the intended will of the Security Council that the resolutions be so interpreted. Neither case can be convincingly put. Resolution 687 does not authorise member states to use force to implement it, nor does it suggest that Resolution 678 remains in force. Moreover, when Resolution 687 was passed no Security Council member implied this to be the case. In 1998, the US and UK failed to persuade the Security Council to accept this understanding and a majority of Security Council members explicitly rejected it.

 

(...)

 

From this discussion it appears that the war against Iraq was illegal. Arguing that the war was authorised by the Security Council runs contrary to the ICJ’s suggestion that the wording, context and intent of the Security Council be carefully examined when interpreting resolutions. If we instead follow the ICJ’s approach, it is clear that the Security Council never intended to mandate the use of force to ensure compliance with Resolution 687. Moreover, it is increasingly evident that Iraq was not committing gross material breaches of Resolution 1441 immediately prior to the invasion.

http://mjil.law.unimelb.edu.au/issues/arch...)/06Bellamy.pdf

 

Synet deles av norske eksperter:

 

Man har påberopt seg tre resolusjoner som hjemmel, nr. 678 og 687 fra den forrige Gulf-krigen og den enstemmige resolusjon nr. 1441 fra november 2002.

 

De første to er imidlertid klart uaktuelle. Når det gjelder den siste, truer den i og for seg Irak med "serious consequences", hvis landet ikke følger opp tidligere pålegg. Men "konsekvensene" omfatter ikke krig. Dersom Sikkerhetsrådet skal gi hjemmel for krig, må det sies uttrykkelig.

 

Det vises også av den videre utvikling i FN-diplomatiet. USA og UK forsøkte å få utvirket et slikt vedtak med klar hjemmel for krig, men de trakk forslaget da det ble klart at det ikke ville få flertall i Rådet.

 

Dessuten - som Hans Blix fremholdt i et intervju nylig med den spanske avisen El Pais og som er gjengitt ellers i verdenspressen - hadde Irak oppfylt alle pålegg i sluttfasen før angrepet.

 

Opplegget fra amerikansk side må hele tiden ha vært klart. De ønsket krig. En godkjennelse fra FN - eventuelt NATO - ville være bra. Men det var ikke nødvendig.

 

DET FREMHEVES I DEBATTEN at den folkerettslige vurdering av spørsmålet ikke skulle være entydig. Således har den engelske regjeringsadvokat gitt uttrykk for at angrepet har hjemmel i de nevnte resolusjoner. Dette har også gitt enkelte tvilrådige hos oss grunnlag for argumenter for sin tvil, at spørsmålet er "komplisert".

 

Som jurist står man ofte overfor tvilsomme rettslige spørsmål. Men det er ikke tilfellet har. På kongressen i The International Society of Military Law and the Law of War i Roma i de første dagene av april var dette spørsmålet sentralt i programmet. Bortsett fra veltalende, offisielt utsendte amerikanere var oppfatningen blant de øvrige deltagere entydige: Krigen er et grovt folkerettsbrudd! (De britiske deltagere tok ikke ordet i debatten.)

http://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikk...ticle533026.ece

 

Spørsmålet har blitt stilt mange andre eksperter også:

 

Does the U.S. have the right to invade Iraq?

 

No. The UN resolution passed in November 2002 sent arms inspectors back into Iraq to verify Iraq's disarmament, the final requirement before lifting sanctions. The resolution says there will be "serious consequences" if there is a "material breach" of the resolution, but it specifically does not identify what those consequences should or might be. The resolution states that a finding of "material breach" requires both omissions or lies in Iraq's arms declaration and non-compliance with inspectors. It reserves for the Council as a whole, not any individual country, authority to make those determinations.

 

When the resolution was passed, every Council ambassador other than Washington's made clear the resolution provides no authorization for war. According to Mexico's Ambassador, Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, force could only be valid, "with the prior, explicit authorization of the Security Council." The U.S. may decide to go to war without the Security Council's OK, and regardless of what the UN inspectors find or don't find. But the terms of the UN resolutions are very important considerations for Security Council countries such as France, Mexico, Germany and others, whose governments must balance their desire to join Bush's war with widespread public anti-war sentiment.

 

Does the U.S. have the right of self-defense against Iraq?

 

According to the United Nations Charter, no nation has the right to attack another. The only exceptions are 1) if the Security Council specifically authorizes a military strike, or 2) in self-defense. "Self-defense" is defined very narrowly. Article 51 of the Charter says a country has the right of self-defense only "IF an armed attack occurs." Iraq has not attacked the U.S. (see section 5 on "no-fly" zones), so self-defense does not apply. The U.S. claims it has the right of "preemptive self-defense" to go to war against Iraq, without any further authorization from the United Nations. But the UN Charter does not authorize such a claim. Some scholars believe that stopping an imminent attack would also give a country the right to use military force in a kind of self-defense. But even that argument fails, because no one, even the Bush super-hawks, claims that an Iraqi attack of any sort, especially on the United States, is "imminent."

http://www.ips-dc.org/iraq/primer2.htm

 

Eller denne:

 

War On Iraq Was Illegal, Say Top Lawyers

http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/attack/law/2003/0525warillegal.htm

 

Denne også:

 

Last November, the Security Council passed Resolution 1441. It warned that Iraq would "face serious consequences" if it were to remain in "material breach" of its disarmament obligations. Employing the Resolution's language, the Bush Administration has argued that Iraq is in "material breach" and that war is thus justified.

 

However, as I explained in an earlier column, Resolution 1441 implies that the Security Council itself will decide if a material breach has occurred, and expressly states that the Security Council itself, in the event of such a breach, will "consider the situation and the need for full compliance with all of the relevant Council resolutions in order to secure international peace and security."

 

We know that the Security Council does not think that a serious breach warranting all-out war has occurred. Perhaps the Security Council, under veto threat from France (and possibly Russia as well), has behaved unreasonably and irresponsibly in this respect, as suggested by American and British diplomats. But if so, that still does not alter the fact that the Security Council did not authorize war. At most, it bolsters the moral case for war, not the legal case.

http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20030319.html

 

 

Kofi Annan om krigen:

"I have indicated it was not in conformity with the UN charter from our point of view, from the charter point of view, it was illegal."

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3661134.stm

 

Det offisielle juridiske rådet gitt til Blair, som ikke ble offentliggjort før etter masse press, inneholdt en rekke viktige forbehold, og mer enn antydet at det tryggeste ville være å ha en UNSC-resolusjon som autoriserte bruk av makt. (det skrivet som først ble offentliggjort var kjemisk rensket for disse invendingene). Og dette kommer fra en av de illegale aggressorstatene..

 

Blant annet stod det:

 

In these circumstances, I remain of the opinion that the safest legal course would be to secure the adoption of a further resolution to authorise the use of force. I have already advised that I do not believe that such a resolution need be explicit in its terms. The key point is that it should establish that the Council has concluded that Iraq has failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441, as in the draft which has already been tabled.

 

Altså var begrunnelsen man brukte heller svak, og det mente man selv Like interessant er det følgende:

 

Finally, I must stress that the lawfulness of military action depends not only on the existence of a legal basis, but also on the question of proportionality. Any force used pursuant to the authorisation in resolution 678 (whether or not there is a second resolution):

 

- must have as its objective the enforcement the terms of the cease-fire contained in resolution 687 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions;

 

- be limited to what is necessary to achieve that objective; and

 

- must be a proportionate response to that objective, ie securing compliance with Iraq's disarmament obligations.

 

That is not to say that action may not be taken to remove Saddam Hussein from power if it can be demonstrated that such action is a necessary and proportionate measure to secure the disarmament of Iraq. But regime change cannot be the objective of military action. This should be borne in mind in considering the list of military targets and in making public statements about any campaign.

 

Det kan vanskelig hevdes at invasjonen kun tok sikte på disse målene.

 

http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/Page7443.asp

Bakgrunnsinfo:

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/politic...age/4492439.stm

 

Vi kan ta flere analyser, her fra ASIL Insights:

 

An issue not discussed in those Insights concerns the unsuccessful effort by the United States, the United Kingdom and Spain to secure the nine votes that would be necessary in the Security Council (in the absence of a veto by a permanent member) to obtain a further resolution that would clearly authorize the use of force. It could be argued that the effort itself shows that the proponents recognized not only that Security Council support is necessary (and that the only other permissible ground for use of force, self-defense, is inapplicable), but also that Resolution 1441 and the earlier Resolutions 678 and 687 did not clearly enough authorize the current use of force. The proponents then could be said to have regarded a clearer demonstration of support by the Security Council to be a legally significant - perhaps a necessary - authorization for the use of force under the current circumstances. The withdrawal of the proposed resolution in the face of a lack of sufficient backing from other Security Council members thus could indicate that an essential prerequisite to the use of force is lacking.

 

http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh99.htm

 

Australske jurister var heller ikke så veldig enig i konservative Howards begrunnelse:

 

The key to the Government's legal view is that Iraq's actions have somehow negated the basis of the 1991 ceasefire as expressed in Resolution 687. It has been argued the ceasefire declared by Resolution 687 was conditional on Iraq fulfilling the conditions required of it. However, the resolution makes clear the ceasefire will come into effect if Iraq simply accepts the terms of the resolution.

 

The resolution states that it is then up to the Security Council to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the resolution. No state or coalition of states acting outside the authorisation of the council retains the right to use force, even to punish Iraq for breaches of the resolution or to compel its compliance.

 

Hence, a further resolution of the Security Council is required. The closest we have come to this is resolution 1441 of November last year. It speaks in strong language of Iraq's obligations to disarm and to co-operate fully in this process. It also states that this is the final opportunity for Iraq to comply. However, in the event of non-compliance by Iraq, the resolution does not authorise the use of force. Instead, in the event of a material breach by Iraq, the Security Council should convene immediately to consider the situation. It also reminds Iraq that serious consequences will follow. Such consequences cannot be visited upon Iraq by the United States or any other country in the absence of the Security Council stating what those consequences shall be and who can enforce them.

 

http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2003/03/18/1047749768285.html

 

 

En tysk domstol har tatt opp spørsmålet om krigens lovlighet. Den fant et prima facie brudd påå FN-paktens artikkel 2.4, som ikke var rettferdiggjort under noen sikkerhetsrådsresolusjon eller FN-paktens art. 51.

 

With respect to the legality of the US led war on Iraq, the BVerwG ‘s judgement generates a somewhat odd conclusion. The BVerwG apparently took great pains to state their findings cautiously , that both the war itself and Germany’s involvement in it meet with grave concerns in terms of the rules of public international law. However, the BVerwG did not make it totally clear that, in its opinion, the war and the contributions to it by the German Federal Government were outright illegal, notwithstanding that it argued at great length that the prohibition of the use of force in international relations as provided for in Art. 2.4 of the Carter and corresponding jus cogens was prima facie violated. It further held, that this violation could not be justified by any Chapter VII SC Resolution, by Art. 51 of the Charter, or by an equivalent right to self-defence rooted in customary international law. Finally, it held that Germany’s actions taken in support of the war were also at odds with applicable international (treaty) law, thereby causing the state to commit an internationally wrongful act under the draft articles on state responsibility of the ILC.

 

http://www.germanlawjournal.com/article.php?id=684

 

 

Her kan man også finne mye interessant stoff:

 

http://www.eurolegal.org/iraqwar/legiraqwar.htm

 

 

 

Altså startet vi med premisset at bruk av makt i strid med FN-paktens art. 2.4 er ulovlig. Dette er for øvrig en jus cogens-regel. Argumentene som ble brukt, at man på mystisk vis kan gjenopplive autorisasjonen som ble gitt for å forsvare for å kaste Saddam tåler ikke offentlighetens lys jf. ovenfor. Og går man inn i resolusjon 1441 gir den heller ingen unilateral rett til USA og UK å gå til krig mot Irak, og selv med en ny resolusjonen hvor Irak ble funnet i strid med resolusjonen ville noe sånt være tvilsomt, men en slik resolusjon ble nedstemt. Selvforsvarsargumentet er direkte tåpelig, og forbigås primært i stillhet, selv om man kan finne masse tilbakevisning av det i litteraturen jeg har sitert.

 

Krigen var ulovlig. Skal man begrunne angrepet på Irak må det ta utgangspunkt i noe annet enn jus ad bellum. Nå holder vel heller ikke det moralske argumentet skikkelig heller, som man kan argumentere godt for at det gjorde i den folkerettsstridige NATO-bombingen av Serbia. Men det er i det minste mer plausibelt for det baserer seg på normative premisser (men mye gal teori om statsbygging og demokratisering). Men det igjen er en annen diskusjon enn hva denne tråden tar opp.

[ulrikft]

"norske eksperter" hvis man ser bort fra Fleischer vel å merke.

 

Videre Ser jeg ingen gode og tydelige argumenter som refuterer 678->687. Annet enn appell til autoritet da, det kan selvsagt også jeg gjøre (og gjorde i det første innlegget). Tolker man ordlyden i 678 og 687 og sammenholder det med senere resolusjoner er det klart at en snever tolkning vil lede til at krigen mot Irak rettferdiggjøres via disse resolusjonene (på basis av ballistiske raketter med rekkevidde over 150km).

 

Men igjen, du må gjerne vise til kilder og du må gjerne sitere teorien, men prøv å begrens deg noe. Det å i realiteten floode her, samtidig som man kommer med få, om noen selvskrevne argumenter, bringer lite nytt til debatten?

[Niskivara]

Jeg tenkte man kunne ta en litt informativ diskusjon rundt lovligheten av krigen i Irak. Det synes å være et aksiom at den IKKE er lovlig, så for å være litt Advocatus Diabolis vil jeg gjerne fremme synspunkter i motsatt retning.

 

 

Første poeng

 

http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0678.htm

 

Legg her merke til:

 

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter,

 

1. Demands that Iraq comply fully with resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions, and decides, while maintaining all its decisions, to allow Iraq one final opportunity, as a pause of goodwil, to do so;

 

Altså, at alle etterfølgende, relevante resolusjoner etterfølges.

 

Så kommer:

 

http://www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0687.htm

 

Legg her merke til:

 

8. Decides that Iraq shall unconditionally accept the destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervision, of:

 

(a) All chemical and biological weapons and all stocks of agents and all related subsystems and components and all research, development, support and manufacturing facilities;

 

(b) All ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometres and related major parts, and repair and production facilities;

 

I media blir som oftest punkt (a) hauset opp som den eneste grunnen, men her ser man tydelig av (b) at også ballistiske raketter med en gitt rekkevidde også kan ligge til grunn som brudd på resolusjonen. Kan noen si "scud"..?

 

 

Som avsluttende "innlegg" kan man se på:

 

http://www.un.int/usa/sres-iraq.htm

 

og

 

http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issue.../0307advice.htm

 

For argumenter og "logikk" rundt disse problemstillingene.

 

 

Som et lite forbehold: Jeg ser gjerne at "USA er jo slemme!"-tendenser holdes ute og at rent saklige, rasjonelle og godt begrunnede innlegg blir lagt inn her. Har man ikke kjennskap til folkerett på noe vis kan man heller lese og lære. Håper det kommer matnyttige innspill!

7957368[/snapback]

Ingen argumenterer mot resolusjonen.

 

Men det var Sikkerhetsrådet sin jobb å bestemme om resolusjonen var brutt eller ikke.

 

USA bestemte seg for å ikke vente på deres bestemmelse, og gikk til krig uten tillatelse fra sikkerhetsrådet, altså gikk de til en ulovlig krig.

[ulrikft]

Ingen argumenterer mot resolusjonen.

 

Men det var Sikkerhetsrådet sin jobb å bestemme om resolusjonen var brutt eller ikke.

 

USA bestemte seg for å ikke vente på deres bestemmelse, og gikk til krig uten tillatelse fra sikkerhetsrådet, altså gikk de til en ulovlig krig.

7959490[/snapback]

 

 

Det er vel det spesielt storbritannia argumenterer med at IKKE var nødvendig. Ser man på en av de to siste linkene jeg viste til følger argumentasjonen. Det er som sagt over to ting som legaliserer en krig rent folkerettslig, selvforsvar og en sikkerhetsresolusjon. Det England (og andre allierte i denne sammenhengen) mener er at resolusjon 678 og 687 tolket i lys av disputten før disse ble vedtatt hjemler også senere aksjon, uten videre drøfting/vedtak i sikkerhetsrådet.

[Niskivara]

Det er vel det spesielt storbritannia argumenterer med at IKKE var nødvendig. Ser man på en av de to siste linkene jeg viste til følger argumentasjonen. Det er som sagt over to ting som legaliserer en krig rent folkerettslig, selvforsvar og en sikkerhetsresolusjon. Det England (og andre allierte i denne sammenhengen) mener er at resolusjon 678 og 687 tolket i lys av disputten før disse ble vedtatt hjemler også senere aksjon, uten videre drøfting/vedtak i sikkerhetsrådet.

7959505[/snapback]

Og det mener Kofi Annan, Hans Blix, og FNs sikkerhetsråd er en feil tolkning. Ergo, en ulovlig krig.

[JuGeun]

"norske eksperter" hvis man ser bort fra Fleischer vel å merke.

 

Videre Ser jeg ingen gode og tydelige argumenter som refuterer 678->687. Annet enn appell til autoritet da, det kan selvsagt også jeg gjøre (og gjorde i det første innlegget). Tolker man ordlyden i 678 og 687 og sammenholder det med senere resolusjoner er det klart at en snever tolkning vil lede til at krigen mot Irak rettferdiggjøres via disse resolusjonene (på basis av ballistiske raketter med rekkevidde over 150km).

 

Men igjen, du må gjerne vise til kilder og du må gjerne sitere teorien, men prøv å begrens deg noe. Det å i realiteten floode her, samtidig som man kommer med få, om noen selvskrevne argumenter, bringer lite nytt til debatten?

7959487[/snapback]

Velg gjerne en av kildende. Jeg siterte dem for innholdet, ikke hvem de var men jeg skjønner det er en enkelt løsning å antyde det sistnevnte. Pussig at du trekker frem det som argument mot meg men bruker det som argument selv i første setning.

 

En rekke av sitatene behandler resolusjon 678 og 687. Takk for din ærlighet i å innrømme at du ikke har lest dem.

[ulrikft]

Det er vel det spesielt storbritannia argumenterer med at IKKE var nødvendig. Ser man på en av de to siste linkene jeg viste til følger argumentasjonen. Det er som sagt over to ting som legaliserer en krig rent folkerettslig, selvforsvar og en sikkerhetsresolusjon. Det England (og andre allierte i denne sammenhengen) mener er at resolusjon 678 og 687 tolket i lys av disputten før disse ble vedtatt hjemler også senere aksjon, uten videre drøfting/vedtak i sikkerhetsrådet.

7959505[/snapback]

Og det mener Kofi Annan, Hans Blix, og FNs sikkerhetsråd er en feil tolkning. Ergo, en ulovlig krig.

7959578[/snapback]

 

Kofi Annan er ingen sensur for sikkerhetsrådet og deres resolusjoner, ei heller Hans Blix..

 

Du må gjerne vise meg at et samstemmig sikkerhetsråd fordømmer krigen dog?

[Niskivara]

Kofi Annan er ingen sensur for sikkerhetsrådet og deres resolusjoner, ei heller Hans Blix..

 

Du må gjerne vise meg at et samstemmig sikkerhetsråd fordømmer krigen dog?

7959587[/snapback]

Sikkerhetsrådet blir aldri enstemmig uten Stor-Britannia og USA. Ergo vil det aldri være enstemmig mot Stor-Britannia eller USA.

 

Men det viktigste som Sikkerhetsrådet ikke var enstemmig for er krigen mot Irak. Noe som gjør at krigen er ulovlig. Enn hvordan du vrir det.

 

Det kan godt hende at krigen hadde blitt lovlig hvis USA hadde ventet, eller at USA og England kunne lage en sak ut av at Sikkerhetsrådet sviktet i sine oppgaver med å opprettholde sine resolusjoner, men så lenge de gikk til krig uten tillatelse så er krigen ulovlig.

[ulrikft]

Kofi Annan er ingen sensur for sikkerhetsrådet og deres resolusjoner, ei heller Hans Blix..

 

Du må gjerne vise meg at et samstemmig sikkerhetsråd fordømmer krigen dog?

7959587[/snapback]

Sikkerhetsrådet blir aldri enstemmig uten Stor-Britannia og USA. Ergo vil det aldri være enstemmig mot Stor-Britannia eller USA.

 

Men det viktigste som Sikkerhetsrådet ikke var enstemmig for er krigen mot Irak. Noe som gjør at krigen er ulovlig. Enn hvordan du vrir det.

 

Det kan godt hende at krigen hadde blitt lovlig hvis USA hadde ventet, eller at USA og England kunne lage en sak ut av at Sikkerhetsrådet sviktet i sine oppgaver med å opprettholde sine resolusjoner, men så lenge de gikk til krig uten tillatelse så er krigen ulovlig.

7959625[/snapback]

 

Jeg kan gjerne gjenta meg selv: Storbritannia og USA mener at resolusjonene nevnt over GIR dem rett til å gå til krig, tolket i lys av debatten i forkant OG av ordlyden. Selv om forarbeider ikke tillegges stor vekt i folkeretten kan man ikke gå helt på tvers av dem heller. Så hvordan begrunner du at ditt syn?

[Niskivara]

Jeg kan gjerne gjenta meg selv: Storbritannia og USA mener at resolusjonene nevnt over GIR dem rett til å gå til krig, tolket i lys av debatten i forkant OG av ordlyden. Selv om forarbeider ikke tillegges stor vekt i folkeretten kan man ikke gå helt på tvers av dem heller. Så hvordan begrunner du at ditt syn?

7959637[/snapback]

Det er ikke USA eller Stor-Britannia sin jobb å bedømme dette. Enkelt og greit.

 

Krigen var ulovlig. Hvor ulovlig den var og om uklarhet fra sikkerhetsrådet var en grunn for krigen er opp til en internasjonal domstol å bedømme.

 

Dessverre vil det nok aldri skje.

[Kubin]

Jeg kan gjerne gjenta meg selv: Storbritannia og USA mener at resolusjonene nevnt over GIR dem rett til å gå til krig

7959637[/snapback]

 

De fleste andre land som skrev under sier at dette ikke var ment å gi noen rett til å gå til krig.

 

De fleste vil vel si at det avgjør saken.

[ulrikft]

Jeg kan gjerne gjenta meg selv: Storbritannia og USA mener at resolusjonene nevnt over GIR dem rett til å gå til krig

7959637[/snapback]

 

De fleste andre land som skrev under sier at dette ikke var ment å gi noen rett til å gå til krig.

 

De fleste vil vel si at det avgjør saken.

7959710[/snapback]

 

Det at de i ETTERKANT sier det, hjelper lite når det i forkant av undertegningen ble sagt klart fra av de dominerende stormakter som truet med "andre midler" at de ikke ville støtte en slik resolusjon. Etterpåklokskapen hjelper lite, når man beviselig IKKE har kommet med disse uttalelsene i forkant.. eller hva?

[Niskivara]

Jeg kan gjerne gjenta meg selv: Storbritannia og USA mener at resolusjonene nevnt over GIR dem rett til å gå til krig

7959637[/snapback]

 

De fleste andre land som skrev under sier at dette ikke var ment å gi noen rett til å gå til krig.

 

De fleste vil vel si at det avgjør saken.

7959710[/snapback]

Enhver mangel på enstemmig Sikkerhetsråd avgjør saken. Og her var det ikke noe enstemmig Sikkerhetsråd.

Endret 16. februar 2007 av Niskivara

[JuGeun]

Jeg kan gjerne gjenta meg selv: Storbritannia og USA mener at resolusjonene nevnt over GIR dem rett til å gå til krig, tolket i lys av debatten i forkant OG av ordlyden. Selv om forarbeider ikke tillegges stor vekt i folkeretten kan man ikke gå helt på tvers av dem heller. Så hvordan begrunner du at ditt syn?

7959637[/snapback]

Nå har du riktignok vist lite interesse for kilder som eksplisitt har omhandlet det du har spurt om, men jeg kan godt repetere noe av det som der ble skrevet:

 

Furthermore, the obligations imposed on Iraq under Resolution 687 do not appear to be linked to authorisation of the use of force under Resolution 678 in that the former resolution gives the UNSC the power to decide ‘uch further steps as may be required for the implementation of the present resolution and to secure peace and security in the area’. This resolution therefore, makes no provision for the consequences of failure to comply with the resolution. Rather, it implies that further UNSC consideration will be exercised if and when required under international law. Moreover, it is noteworthy that neither Resolution 687 nor 1441 contain the phrase ‘all necessary means’ as Resolution 678 does. This observation alone provides considerable support for the proposition that neither Resolution 687 nor 1441 authorised the use of force by the coalition against Iraq.

 

Og

 

The key to the Government's legal view is that Iraq's actions have somehow negated the basis of the 1991 ceasefire as expressed in Resolution 687. It has been argued the ceasefire declared by Resolution 687 was conditional on Iraq fulfilling the conditions required of it. However, the resolution makes clear the ceasefire will come into effect if Iraq simply accepts the terms of the resolution.

 

The resolution states that it is then up to the Security Council to take such further steps as may be required for the implementation of the resolution. No state or coalition of states acting outside the authorisation of the council retains the right to use force, even to punish Iraq for breaches of the resolution or to compel its compliance.

 

Hence, a further resolution of the Security Council is required. The closest we have come to this is resolution 1441 of November last year. It speaks in strong language of Iraq's obligations to disarm and to co-operate fully in this process. It also states that this is the final opportunity for Iraq to comply. However, in the event of non-compliance by Iraq, the resolution does not authorise the use of force. Instead, in the event of a material breach by Iraq, the Security Council should convene immediately to consider the situation. It also reminds Iraq that serious consequences will follow. Such consequences cannot be visited upon Iraq by the United States or any other country in the absence of the Security Council stating what those consequences shall be and who can enforce them.

 

Altså har ikke UK, USA eller noen andre rett til å unilateralt avgjøre noe slikt. En autorisasjon måtte kommet fra sikkerhetsrådet.

 

Og selv om man legger den britiske tolkningen til grunn sier det britiske juridiske grunnlaget det ganske så eksplisitt:

 

Finally, I must stress that the lawfulness of military action depends not only on the existence of a legal basis, but also on the question of proportionality. Any force used pursuant to the authorisation in resolution 678 (whether or not there is a second resolution):

 

- must have as its objective the enforcement the terms of the cease-fire contained in resolution 687 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions;

 

- be limited to what is necessary to achieve that objective; and

 

- must be a proportionate response to that objective, ie securing compliance with Iraq's disarmament obligations.

 

That is not to say that action may not be taken to remove Saddam Hussein from power if it can be demonstrated that such action is a necessary and proportionate measure to secure the disarmament of Iraq. But regime change cannot be the objective of military action. This should be borne in mind in considering the list of military targets and in making public statements about any campaign.

 

Du er ganske ekstrem hvis du mener invasjonen av Irak med eksplisitte krav om at Saddam må gå av og en påfølgende okkupasjon, er en proporsjonal handling i forhold til å fjerne eventuelle ballistiske raketter. Disse var vel ikke engang noe undermål for aggressorene. Dette gjelder altså om man legger den høyst diskutable britiske argumentasjonen til grunn.

Endret 16. februar 2007 av Cybbe

[ulrikft]

Jeg kan gjerne gjenta meg selv: Storbritannia og USA mener at resolusjonene nevnt over GIR dem rett til å gå til krig

7959637[/snapback]

 

De fleste andre land som skrev under sier at dette ikke var ment å gi noen rett til å gå til krig.

 

De fleste vil vel si at det avgjør saken.

7959710[/snapback]

Enhver mangel på enstemmig Sikkerhetsråd avgjør saken. Og her var det ikke noe enstemmig Sikkerhetsråd.

7959724[/snapback]

 

Først og fremst: Nei, sikkerhetsrådet må på ingen måte være enstemmig, hvor har dud et fra?

 

Så: Du unngår å kommentere resolusjonene og lese rettskildene som analyserer disse, likefullt kommer du med bastante påstander.. det var denne typen poster jeg ville unngå. Cybbe gjør det jeg ønsket, han kommer med en saklig, innsiktsfull post. Det du gjør er å gjenta det du har hørt, uten at du ANER hva du prater om, det jeg ville unngå. Kan du la være å gjøre dette?

[Kubin]

Etterpåklokskapen hjelper lite, når man beviselig IKKE har kommet med disse uttalelsene i forkant.. eller hva?

7959720[/snapback]

 

Du mener at det burde vært presisert i resolusjonen at det ikke skulle komme til krig?

 

Er det ikke heller slik at hvis resolusjonen skulle gjøre det klart for krig, så måtte det stått i resolusjonen, at hvis ikke "sånn og sånn" så står USA/England fritt til å gå til krig?

[Niskivara]

Et interresant sitat fra Ulrikft sin link fra Britiske Statsadvokaten:

36. Finally, I must stress that the lawfulness of military action depends not only on the existence of a legal basis, but also on the question of proportionality. Any force used pursuant to the authorisation in resolution 678 (whether or not there is a second resolution):

 

    * must have as its objective the enforcement the terms of the cease-fire contained in resolution 687 (1990) and subsequent relevant resolutions;

    * be limited to what is necessary to achieve that objective; and

    * must be a proportionate response to that objective, ie securing compliance with Iraq's disarmament obligations.

 

That is not to say that action may not be taken to remove Saddam Hussein from power if it can be demonstrated that such action is a necessary and proportionate measure to secure the disarmament of Iraq. But regime change cannot be the objective of military action. This should be borne in mind in considering the list of military targets and in making public statements about any campaign.

Et uttalt mål var å få regimeskifte i Irak, noe som gjør krigen ulovlig selv etter de premissene lagt av de som Ulrikft sier at beviser at krigen var lovlig.

[ulrikft]

Etterpåklokskapen hjelper lite, når man beviselig IKKE har kommet med disse uttalelsene i forkant.. eller hva?

7959720[/snapback]

 

Du mener at det burde vært presisert i resolusjonen at det ikke skulle komme til krig?

 

Er det ikke heller slik at hvis resolusjonen skulle gjøre det klart for krig, så måtte det stått i resolusjonen, at hvis ikke "sånn og sånn" så står USA/England fritt til å gå til krig?

7959758[/snapback]

 

Resolusjonen sier da ganske tydelig:

"Authorizes Member States co-operating with the Government of Kuwait, unless Iraq on or before 15 January 1991 fully implements, as set forth in paragraph 1 above, the above-mentioned resolutions, to use all necessary means to uphold and implement resolution 660 (1990) and all subsequent relevant resolutions and to restore international peace and security in the area;"

 

jeg vet ikke helt hvordan DU tolker "all necessary means" og "all subsequent relevant resolutions", men du må gjerne utdype?