Russlands invasjon av Ukraina [Ny tråd, les førstepost]

[Brother Ursus]

4 hours ago, Kahuna said:

Det er et veldig viktig poeng. Selv om *vi* ikke er i krig med russland så har russland vært i krig med oss lenge.

Nettopp. Det er samme problem vi har med Kina og enkelte andre autoritære land og folk. Vi er ikke i krig med Kina, men Kina er i krig med oss. Alt de gjør er å kjøpe tid før de vil forsøke å etablere seg som den nye verdenshegemon, eller i det minste, forsøke å ta kontroll over Asia og Stillehavet. Og de er mer enn villige til å gjøre det med makt. Det er en type tenkning vi i Vesten ikke lengre forstår.

[Brother Ursus]

 

 

 

Mange polske bønder som også har sidejobb for den russiske ambassaden, gitt. Må være tøft jobbmarked i Polen om dagen.

[Brother Ursus]

 

 

[Brother Ursus]

[Brother Ursus]

https://uk.news.yahoo.com/nato-crush-weak-russia-putin-184441233.html

NATO would crush weak Russia and Putin knows it, says UK defence chief

Britain’s top Armed Forces official has said the world is not on the brink of World War Three because Vladimir Putin knows Nato would beat Russia in any conflict.

 

 

https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/west-must-help-ukraine-more-prevent-spillover-polish-fm-says-2024-02-26/

Poland warns US House speaker: you're to blame if Russia advances in Ukraine

WASHINGTON, Feb 26 (Reuters) - Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski on Monday urged U.S. House Speaker Mike Johnson to allow a vote on new U.S. aid for Ukraine, saying Johnson would be to blame if the bill failed and Russia advances on the battlefield.

 

 

[Brother Ursus]

https://www.ft.com/content/f18e6e1f-5c3d-4554-aee5-50a730b306b7

Leaked Russian military files reveal criteria for nuclear strike

Vladimir Putin’s forces have rehearsed using tactical nuclear weapons at an early stage of conflict with a major world power, according to leaked Russian military files that include training scenarios for an invasion by China.

The classified papers, seen by the Financial Times, describe a threshold for using tactical nuclear weapons that is lower than Russia has ever publicly admitted, according to experts who reviewed and verified the documents.

The cache consists of 29 secret Russian military files drawn up between 2008 and 2014, including scenarios for war-gaming and presentations for naval officers, which discuss operating principles for the use of nuclear weapons.

Criteria for a potential nuclear response range from an enemy incursion on Russian territory to more specific triggers, such as the destruction of 20 per cent of Russia’s strategic ballistic missile submarines.

“This is the first time that we have seen documents like this reported in the public domain,” said Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin. “They show that the operational threshold for using nuclear weapons is pretty low if the desired result can’t be achieved through conventional means.”

Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons, which can be delivered by land or sea-launched missiles or from aircraft, are designed for limited battlefield use in Europe and Asia, as opposed to the larger “strategic” weapons intended to target the US. Modern tactical warheads can still release significantly more energy than the weapons dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 1945. Although the files date back 10 years and more, experts claim they remain relevant to current Russian military doctrine. The documents were shown to the FT by western sources.

The defensive plans expose deeply held suspicions of China among Moscow’s security elite even as Putin began forging an alliance with Beijing, which as early as 2001 included a nuclear no-first-strike agreement.

In the years since, Russia and China have deepened their partnership, particularly since Xi Jinping took power in Beijing in 2012. The war in Ukraine has cemented Russia’s status as a junior partner in their relationship, with China throwing Moscow a vital economic lifeline to help stave off western sanctions.

Yet even as the countries became closer, the training materials show Russia’s eastern military district was rehearsing multiple scenarios depicting a Chinese invasion.

The exercises offer a rare insight into how Russia views its nuclear arsenal as a cornerstone of its defence policy — and how it trains forces to be able to carry out a nuclear first strike in some battlefield conditions.

One exercise outlining a hypothetical attack by China notes that Russia, dubbed the “Northern Federation” for the purpose of the war game, could respond with a tactical nuclear strike in order to stop “the South” from advancing with a second wave of invading forces.

“The order has been given by the commander-in-chief . . . to use nuclear weapons . . . in the event the enemy deploys second-echelon units and the South threatens to attack further in the direction of the main strike,” the document said.

China’s foreign ministry denied there were any grounds for suspicion of Moscow. “The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation between China and Russia has legally established the concept of eternal friendship and non-enmity between the two countries,” a spokesperson said.

“The ‘threat theory’ has no market in China and Russia.”

The Kremlin did not respond to a request for comment.

A separate training presentation for naval officers, unrelated to the China war games, outlines broader criteria for a potential nuclear strike, including an enemy landing on Russian territory, the defeat of units responsible for securing border areas, or an imminent enemy attack using conventional weapons.

The slides summarise the threshold as a combination of factors where losses suffered by Russian forces “would irrevocably lead to their failure to stop major enemy aggression”, a “critical situation for the state security of Russia”.

Other potential conditions include the destruction of 20 per cent of Russia’s strategic ballistic missile submarines, 30 per cent of its nuclear-powered attack submarines, three or more cruisers, three airfields, or a simultaneous hit on main and reserve coastal command centres.

Russia’s military is also expected to be able to use tactical nuclear weapons for a broad array of goals, including “containing states from using aggression […] or escalating military conflicts”, “stopping aggression”, preventing Russian forces from losing battles or territory, and making Russia’s navy “more effective”.

Putin said last June that he felt “negatively” about using tactical nuclear strikes, but then boasted that Russia had a larger non-strategic arsenal than Nato countries. “Screw them, you know, as people say,” Putin said. The US has estimated Russia has at least 2,000 such weapons.

Putin said last year that Russian nuclear doctrine allowed two possible thresholds for using nuclear weapons: retaliation against a first nuclear strike by an enemy, and if “the very existence of Russia as a state comes under threat even if conventional weapons are used”.

But Putin himself added that neither criteria was likely to be met, and dismissed public calls from hardliners to lower the threshold.

The materials are aimed at training Russian units for situations in which the country might want the ability to use nuclear weapons, said Jack Watling, a senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute, rather than setting out a rulebook for their use.

“At this level, the requirement is for units to maintain — over the course of a conflict — the credible option for policymakers to employ nuclear weapons,” Watling added. “This would be a political decision.”

While Moscow has drawn close to Beijing since the war games and moved forces from the east to Ukraine, it has continued to build up its eastern defences. “Russia is continuing to reinforce and exercise its nuclear-capable missiles in the Far East near its border with China,” said William Alberque, director of strategy, technology and arms control at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “A lot of these systems only have the range to strike China.”

Russia was still behaving in accordance with the “theory of use” of nuclear weapons set out in the documents, Alberque said. “We have not seen a fundamental rethink,” he said, adding that Russia is probably concerned that China may seek to take advantage of Moscow being distracted “to push the Russians out of Central Asia”.

The documents reflect patterns seen in exercises the Russian military held regularly before and since Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Alberque, who previously worked for Nato and the US defence department on arms control, pointed to examples of Russian exercises held in June and November last year using nuclear-capable Iskander missiles in two regions bordering China.

While Russia’s president has the sole authority to launch a first nuclear strike, the low threshold for tactical nuclear use set out in the documents conforms with a doctrine some western observers refer to as “escalating to de-escalate”.

Under this strategy a tactical weapon could be used to try to prevent Russia from becoming embroiled in a sprawling war, particularly one in which the US might intervene. Using what it calls “fear inducement”, Moscow would seek to end the conflict on its own terms by shocking the country’s adversary with the early use of a small nuclear weapon — or securing a settlement through the threat to do so.

“They talk about ‘soberising’ their adversaries — knocking them out of the drunkenness of their early victories by introducing nuclear weapons,” said Alberque. “The best way that they think they can do that is to use what they call a lower ‘dosage’ of nuclear weapons at a much lower level of combat to prevent escalation.”

Ukrainian officials argued that Putin’s nuclear threats convinced US and other allies not to arm Kyiv more decisively early in the conflict, when advanced Nato weaponry could have turned the tide in Ukraine’s favour.

Alberque said Russia would probably have a higher threshold for using tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine, which does not have its own nuclear capability or the ability to launch a ground invasion on the same scale, than against China or the US.

Russian leaders believe that, whereas a nuclear strike against China or the US could be “soberising”, a nuclear strike on Ukraine would be likely to escalate the conflict and lead to direct intervention by the US or UK, Alberque said. “That is absolutely the last thing Putin wants.”

 

 

 

Jeg tror dokumentene er ekte. Jeg tror også de er lekket med overlegg. Men av hvem og med hvilken motivasjon er ikke godt å si. Putin og Kreml vet utmerket godt at NATO ikke har noen planer om å angripe eller invandere. Lekkasjen gjentar at en invasjon av russisk territorium kan bli møtt med atomvåpen. Frykter russerne at Ukraina planlegger å gå nordover? (det er nemlig det jeg ville gjort) Eller er dette 5D-sjakk for å lette på trykket ift. NATO og Macrons uttalelse, betrygge usikre republikanere om at dette er en lokal konflikt mellom Russland og Ukraina, eller å legge press på Kina?

[<generisk_navn>]

Og der kom nyhetene om at "myndighetene" i Transnistria vil ha russisk beskyttelse mot Moldova.

Ikke overraskende, og langt over grensen til provoserende av typen "in your face, NATO/EU/USA/anybody"

[Casey]

Brother Ursus skrev (2 timer siden):

https://www.ft.com/content/f18e6e1f-5c3d-4554-aee5-50a730b306b7

Leaked Russian military files reveal criteria for nuclear strike

Vladimir Putin’s forces have rehearsed using tactical nuclear weapons at an early stage of conflict with a major world power, according to leaked Russian military files that include training scenarios for an invasion by China.

The classified papers, seen by the Financial Times, describe a threshold for using tactical nuclear weapons that is lower than Russia has ever publicly admitted, according to experts who reviewed and verified the documents.

The cache consists of 29 secret Russian military files drawn up between 2008 and 2014, including scenarios for war-gaming and presentations for naval officers, which discuss operating principles for the use of nuclear weapons.

Criteria for a potential nuclear response range from an enemy incursion on Russian territory to more specific triggers, such as the destruction of 20 per cent of Russia’s strategic ballistic missile submarines.

“This is the first time that we have seen documents like this reported in the public domain,” said Alexander Gabuev, director of the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center in Berlin. “They show that the operational threshold for using nuclear weapons is pretty low if the desired result can’t be achieved through conventional means.”

Russia’s tactical nuclear weapons, which can be delivered by land or sea-launched missiles or from aircraft, are designed for limited battlefield use in Europe and Asia, as opposed to the larger “strategic” weapons intended to target the US. Modern tactical warheads can still release significantly more energy than the weapons dropped on Nagasaki and Hiroshima in 1945. Although the files date back 10 years and more, experts claim they remain relevant to current Russian military doctrine. The documents were shown to the FT by western sources.

The defensive plans expose deeply held suspicions of China among Moscow’s security elite even as Putin began forging an alliance with Beijing, which as early as 2001 included a nuclear no-first-strike agreement.

In the years since, Russia and China have deepened their partnership, particularly since Xi Jinping took power in Beijing in 2012. The war in Ukraine has cemented Russia’s status as a junior partner in their relationship, with China throwing Moscow a vital economic lifeline to help stave off western sanctions.

Yet even as the countries became closer, the training materials show Russia’s eastern military district was rehearsing multiple scenarios depicting a Chinese invasion.

The exercises offer a rare insight into how Russia views its nuclear arsenal as a cornerstone of its defence policy — and how it trains forces to be able to carry out a nuclear first strike in some battlefield conditions.

One exercise outlining a hypothetical attack by China notes that Russia, dubbed the “Northern Federation” for the purpose of the war game, could respond with a tactical nuclear strike in order to stop “the South” from advancing with a second wave of invading forces.

“The order has been given by the commander-in-chief . . . to use nuclear weapons . . . in the event the enemy deploys second-echelon units and the South threatens to attack further in the direction of the main strike,” the document said.

China’s foreign ministry denied there were any grounds for suspicion of Moscow. “The Treaty of Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation between China and Russia has legally established the concept of eternal friendship and non-enmity between the two countries,” a spokesperson said.

“The ‘threat theory’ has no market in China and Russia.”

The Kremlin did not respond to a request for comment.

A separate training presentation for naval officers, unrelated to the China war games, outlines broader criteria for a potential nuclear strike, including an enemy landing on Russian territory, the defeat of units responsible for securing border areas, or an imminent enemy attack using conventional weapons.

The slides summarise the threshold as a combination of factors where losses suffered by Russian forces “would irrevocably lead to their failure to stop major enemy aggression”, a “critical situation for the state security of Russia”.

Other potential conditions include the destruction of 20 per cent of Russia’s strategic ballistic missile submarines, 30 per cent of its nuclear-powered attack submarines, three or more cruisers, three airfields, or a simultaneous hit on main and reserve coastal command centres.

Russia’s military is also expected to be able to use tactical nuclear weapons for a broad array of goals, including “containing states from using aggression […] or escalating military conflicts”, “stopping aggression”, preventing Russian forces from losing battles or territory, and making Russia’s navy “more effective”.

Putin said last June that he felt “negatively” about using tactical nuclear strikes, but then boasted that Russia had a larger non-strategic arsenal than Nato countries. “Screw them, you know, as people say,” Putin said. The US has estimated Russia has at least 2,000 such weapons.

Putin said last year that Russian nuclear doctrine allowed two possible thresholds for using nuclear weapons: retaliation against a first nuclear strike by an enemy, and if “the very existence of Russia as a state comes under threat even if conventional weapons are used”.

But Putin himself added that neither criteria was likely to be met, and dismissed public calls from hardliners to lower the threshold.

The materials are aimed at training Russian units for situations in which the country might want the ability to use nuclear weapons, said Jack Watling, a senior research fellow for land warfare at the Royal United Services Institute, rather than setting out a rulebook for their use.

“At this level, the requirement is for units to maintain — over the course of a conflict — the credible option for policymakers to employ nuclear weapons,” Watling added. “This would be a political decision.”

While Moscow has drawn close to Beijing since the war games and moved forces from the east to Ukraine, it has continued to build up its eastern defences. “Russia is continuing to reinforce and exercise its nuclear-capable missiles in the Far East near its border with China,” said William Alberque, director of strategy, technology and arms control at the International Institute for Strategic Studies. “A lot of these systems only have the range to strike China.”

Russia was still behaving in accordance with the “theory of use” of nuclear weapons set out in the documents, Alberque said. “We have not seen a fundamental rethink,” he said, adding that Russia is probably concerned that China may seek to take advantage of Moscow being distracted “to push the Russians out of Central Asia”.

The documents reflect patterns seen in exercises the Russian military held regularly before and since Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Alberque, who previously worked for Nato and the US defence department on arms control, pointed to examples of Russian exercises held in June and November last year using nuclear-capable Iskander missiles in two regions bordering China.

While Russia’s president has the sole authority to launch a first nuclear strike, the low threshold for tactical nuclear use set out in the documents conforms with a doctrine some western observers refer to as “escalating to de-escalate”.

Under this strategy a tactical weapon could be used to try to prevent Russia from becoming embroiled in a sprawling war, particularly one in which the US might intervene. Using what it calls “fear inducement”, Moscow would seek to end the conflict on its own terms by shocking the country’s adversary with the early use of a small nuclear weapon — or securing a settlement through the threat to do so.

“They talk about ‘soberising’ their adversaries — knocking them out of the drunkenness of their early victories by introducing nuclear weapons,” said Alberque. “The best way that they think they can do that is to use what they call a lower ‘dosage’ of nuclear weapons at a much lower level of combat to prevent escalation.”

Ukrainian officials argued that Putin’s nuclear threats convinced US and other allies not to arm Kyiv more decisively early in the conflict, when advanced Nato weaponry could have turned the tide in Ukraine’s favour.

Alberque said Russia would probably have a higher threshold for using tactical nuclear weapons against Ukraine, which does not have its own nuclear capability or the ability to launch a ground invasion on the same scale, than against China or the US.

Russian leaders believe that, whereas a nuclear strike against China or the US could be “soberising”, a nuclear strike on Ukraine would be likely to escalate the conflict and lead to direct intervention by the US or UK, Alberque said. “That is absolutely the last thing Putin wants.”

 

 

 

Jeg tror dokumentene er ekte. Jeg tror også de er lekket med overlegg. Men av hvem og med hvilken motivasjon er ikke godt å si. Putin og Kreml vet utmerket godt at NATO ikke har noen planer om å angripe eller invandere. Lekkasjen gjentar at en invasjon av russisk territorium kan bli møtt med atomvåpen. Frykter russerne at Ukraina planlegger å gå nordover? (det er nemlig det jeg ville gjort) Eller er dette 5D-sjakk for å lette på trykket ift. NATO og Macrons uttalelse, betrygge usikre republikanere om at dette er en lokal konflikt mellom Russland og Ukraina, eller å legge press på Kina?

Det der er enkelt å forholde seg til. Man tilbyr simpelthen ikke russerne mulighet for en eksalerende kjernefysisk konflikt, men tvert i mot garanterer ar Russsland vil bli utslettet med en gang av et fullt kjernefysisk angrep hvis de bruker atomvåpen.

[torbjornen]

Gjest slettet-ld9eg7s96q skrev (5 timer siden):

 

Bare i tilfelle det skulle være noen tvil om hvem som er de virkelige nazistene

Kva konkret dreier dette seg om?

Er det ikkje betre at russarar får lov å søkje tilflukt i andre land framfor å bli sendt tilbake til Russland og potensielt ende i kjøtkverna i Ukraina?

[torbjornen]

Casey skrev (12 minutter siden):

Det der er enkelt å forholde seg til. Man tilbyr simpelthen ikke russerne mulighet for en eksalerende kjernefysisk konflikt, men tvert i mot garanterer ar Russsland vil bli utslettet med en gang av et fullt kjernefysisk angrep hvis de bruker atomvåpen.

Det som har leke ut til no er vel at eit atomvåpenangrep på Ukraina vil kunne bli besvart med eit konvensjonelt angrep som set svartehavsflåten og/eller dei russiske styrkane inne i Ukraina ut av spel. Om russarane skulle finne på noko så dumt kan det vere dette som skal til for at Vesten får ei unnskyldning for endeleg å setje hardt mot hardt og avslutte krigen.

[aklla]

torbjornen skrev (15 minutter siden):

Kva konkret dreier dette seg om?

Er det ikkje betre at russarar får lov å søkje tilflukt i andre land framfor å bli sendt tilbake til Russland og potensielt ende i kjøtkverna i Ukraina?

At de har en "whites only"-policy kanskje? Feil hudfarge og du får ikke f.eks handle eller hva de nå driver med..

Edit:

Artikkelen:
https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/south-asia/sri-lanka-tourist-visa-russia-ukraine-war-b2503665.html

De driver vistnok ulovlige bedrifter, f.esk barer, restauranter.
Samt er der langt ut over tillat 30 dagers turistvisum-periode.
Litt googling viser at de har reklamert med "white only"-fester der kravet er både hvite klær og hvitt ansikt.

 

Endret 28. februar av aklla

[torbjornen]

Sitat

Unge tilsette rømmer frå Forsvaret: For Eirik (31) er ikkje arbeidsplassen lenger attraktiv

https://www.nrk.no/vestland/forsvaret-mistar-hundrevis-av-unge-tilsette-_-eirik-ostby-onskjer-fritid_-pensjon-og-mindre-pendling-1.16773313

[Brother Ursus]

Litt morro er det at det lett kunne vært ungått ved at man hadde kalt det noe annet, eller hatt det gående på invitasjon eller andre kriterier, slik andre grupper gjør det i Vesten for å ha private eller etnisk ekskluderende arrangement, men neida, russerne fornekter seg ikke, selv når de er i et land hvor folk ikke er hvite. Vi får også tro at dette er eksilrussere, eller såkalt "gode russere", som har flyktet Russland. Men eplet faller ikke langt fra stammen, gitt

[Brother Ursus]

42 minutes ago, torbjornen said:

Det som har leke ut til no er vel at eit atomvåpenangrep på Ukraina vil kunne bli besvart med eit konvensjonelt angrep som set svartehavsflåten og/eller dei russiske styrkane inne i Ukraina ut av spel. Om russarane skulle finne på noko så dumt kan det vere dette som skal til for at Vesten får ei unnskyldning for endeleg å setje hardt mot hardt og avslutte krigen.

Jepp. USA har via proxyer, hovedsakelig tidligere generaler, forklart for Russland hva som kommer til å skje. I hovedsak angrep mot Svartehavsflåten (om det er noe igjen av den på det tidspunktet), og strategiske russiske militære mål i Ukraina.

[torbjornen]

Sitat

Moldova avviser Transnistrias «propaganda»

PUBLISERT KLOKKEN16:23 IMOLDOVA

Moldovas regjering avviser Transnistrias «propaganda», melder nyhetsbyrået AFP.

Onsdag ba den moldovske utbryterregionen Transnistria om beskyttelse fra Russland. Transnistria er del av Moldova, men har vært kontrollert av russiskstøttede separatister siden 1990. Separatistmyndighetene sier videre at Moldova skader regionens økonomi.

Moldovas visestatsminister Oleg Serebrian skrev på Telegram at Transnistrias-regionen «drar nytte av politikken for fred, sikkerhet og økonomisk integrasjon med EU, som er fordelaktig for alle borgere».

Moskva har svart på uttalelsen fra utbryterregionen, og sier at «beskyttelse» av innbyggerne i Transnistria er en «prioritet».

Eg kan uansett ikkje forstå kva Russland potensielt kan utrette i Moldova så lenge dei verken har kontroll over landevegen gjennom Ukraina, Svartehavet eller luftrommet. Men Vesten bør ruste Moldova til å stå imot ein evt. russisk invasjon medan ein enno har sjansen, og ikkje vente til det er for seint slik ein gjorde i Ukraina.

[Dragavon]

torbjornen skrev (10 minutter siden):

https://www.nrk.no/vestland/forsvaret-mistar-hundrevis-av-unge-tilsette-_-eirik-ostby-onskjer-fritid_-pensjon-og-mindre-pendling-1.16773313

Og desverre gjer idiotiske politikere det verre, ikkje betre.....

 

Sitat

Nye pensjonsregler
Ansatte i Forsvaret føler seg lurt av ny pensjon
Stabssjef Christer Johannsessen (50) har begynt å lese jobbannonser og kjenner flere som gjør det samme.
– Hvis de nye pensjonsreglene blir slik det nå ligger an til, er det bare å komme seg ut av porten her så fort som mulig! sier Christer Johannessen.

https://frifagbevegelse.no/ntlmagasinet/ansatte-i-forsvaret-foler-seg-lurt-av-ny-pensjon-6.158.984392.d942caaee7

[Brother Ursus]

Det er nok bare enda et forsøk på å spre kaos og lede oppmerksomhet vekk fra tapene og mangelen på fremgang i Ukraina.

De russiske styrkene i Transnistria står stort sett stille og får ikke gjort noe fornuftig. Dersom ukrainerne må sette av fler styrker til å sikre den vestre flanken og Odesa osv. og den siden, så er nok det til Russlands vinning.

[Brother Ursus]

Russlands hærsjef, Valery Gerasimov, har nå vært forsvunnet i 56 dager, etter det ukrainske angrepet i Sevastopol, og de første ryktene om hans død.

[Gjest Gjest slettet-ld9eg7s96q]

torbjornen skrev (1 time siden):

Kva konkret dreier dette seg om?

Er det ikkje betre at russarar får lov å søkje tilflukt i andre land framfor å bli sendt tilbake til Russland og potensielt ende i kjøtkverna i Ukraina?

Ville du infisert vårt liberale demokrati med flyktninger fra Russland som har disse holdningene? Det er på tide at Russland tar sitt kollektive ansvar for overgrepene myndighetene deres bedriver også. Jo flere flyktninger som drar fra Russland, jo mindre dissens blir igjen for å utfordre den sittende makten.

Visumnekt for alle Russere. Nå!

[Arve Synden]

28 minutes ago, torbjornen said:

Eg kan uansett ikkje forstå kva Russland potensielt kan utrette i Moldova så lenge dei verken har kontroll over landevegen gjennom Ukraina, Svartehavet eller luftrommet.

Selv om Russland ikke kan gjøre noe rent fysisk for å støtte opp under Transnistria, så kan de fremdeles lage ekstremt mye kvalm og kaos ved å si at de annekterer eller innlemmer området i Russland, og dermed i egne øyne gjør det til russisk område. For eksempel vil de kunne gjøre det for å sabotere andre politiske prosesser, og dersom Moldova eller Ukraina eller Romania eller EU eller noen andre gjør noe for å føre Transnistria tilbake under moldovisk kontroll, så vil Russland kalle det for et angrep på Russland og lage mye helvete.