Russlands invasjon av Ukraina [Ny tråd, les førstepost]

[bojangles]

 

[bojangles]

 

 

chatgpt sammendrag:

Spoiler

The video discusses several key developments in the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia:

1. Destruction of Russian Ferry: A Ukrainian strike destroyed the Russian ferry "Conrad Trader" in the Port of Caucasus, loaded with oil or diesel. This ferry was vital for Russian supplies to Crimea and southern Ukraine.

2. Russian Airfield Strike: Ukraine successfully struck a Russian military airfield near Volgograd, damaging hangars and likely destroying several Su-34 fighter jets. The attack highlights Ukraine's capability to hit deep within Russian territory, potentially using drones or other long-range systems.

3. Drone Attacks: Ukraine's drones have been increasingly effective, targeting Russian infrastructure, including an oil storage facility in Rostov, which resulted in a massive fire that has been ongoing for several days.

4. Ukrainian Ground Advances: Ukrainian forces have made significant progress in the Kherson region, moving closer to key areas such as Kornuhivka. They are strategizing to cut off Russian supply routes and potentially trap Russian forces.

5. Russian Mobilization Issues: There is discussion about Russia’s potential need for further mobilization due to a lack of local resistance in occupied regions and high pessimism among Russian citizens about the war.

6. Air Force and International Support: Ukraine continues to receive international support, with the U.S. confirming that Ukraine can use Western-made weapons in its operations on Russian territory.

7. Russian Advances: Despite Ukrainian successes, Russia continues its offensive in certain areas, making gains near important locations like Tokmak and the southern part of the Luhansk region

Ifølge Dennys har Ukraina nå fått tillatelse fra USA til å benytte amerikanske våpen i russland inkl kursk. Dette var vel egentlig ikke en nyhet i seg selv da vi har sett bruk av HIMARS i kursk. Det ble ikke nevnt noe om long rane cruise eller ATACMS og det er vel strengt tatt nettopp det vi alle venter på. Siden det ikke ble nevnt er det vel trolig ikke noe som har endret seg på det punktet ennå. 

Heller ikke Noelreports sier noe om ATACMS....

Endret 22. august av bojangles

[bojangles]

 

[bojangles]

 

Chatgpt sammendrag:

Spoiler

The video provides a comprehensive overview of Ukraine’s current military situation as it continues its counteroffensive against Russian forces. The narrator, Jake, reports on day 16 of Ukraine's "special military operation" aimed at liberating the occupied territories, focusing on the significant advances made by Ukrainian forces.

Ukrainian Advances into Russian Territory

According to General Syrskyi, Ukraine has advanced 28 to 35 kilometers deep into Russian territory. The Ukrainian military now controls 93 Russian settlements, covering an area of 1,263 square kilometers. The video includes a map showing the Ukrainian-Russian border, highlighting the areas of Ukrainian control, marked in blue, and the locations of Russian and Ukrainian military units. Despite Ukraine's advances, the situation remains complex, with intense fighting still occurring in the region.

Strategic Importance of the River and Bridge Destruction

A key geographical feature in the region is a river that provides a strategic advantage to Ukrainian forces. The video details how Ukraine has systematically destroyed bridges over this river, leaving only one bridge partially intact, which is still crossable on foot. The narrator suggests that this may have been intentional, allowing Russian civilians a route to evacuate while hindering Russian military resupply efforts. Ukrainian forces have also destroyed several Russian pontoon bridges using drone strikes and HIMARS, preventing Russian troops from establishing new supply lines.

Russian Troops Trapped

Jake describes how approximately 3,000 Russian soldiers, mostly conscripts, are now trapped in the Glushkovo region, which spans around 600 to 700 square kilometers. These troops are cut off from food, water, and ammunition, making their situation increasingly desperate. Ukraine is expected to systematically clear this area, with the hope that the lack of supplies will force Russian conscripts to surrender.

Russian Military Challenges and Manpower Issues

The video discusses Russia's response to the Ukrainian advance, including the redeployment of troops from Chervonopopivka to the Kursk Oblast. Despite efforts to reinforce their positions, Russia is facing significant manpower shortages. The Kremlin is reportedly considering another wave of mobilization, which is unpopular among the Russian public and could further strain the country’s already struggling economy. The mobilization would likely involve veterans who are technically in the reserves but have not yet volunteered to fight.

The video also highlights internal debates in Russia, where there is growing frustration with the performance of conscripted soldiers. The narrator references a video plea from Russian parents whose son, a conscript, surrendered and is now in a Ukrainian POW camp. This plea contrasts with the harsh stance of some Russian ultra-nationalists, who argue that conscripts who surrender without a fight should not be exchanged.

Ukrainian Drone Strikes and Russian Military Setbacks

The video reports on a series of successful Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian military targets, including airfields and defense systems. Notably, a Russian military airfield in the Voronezh region, located 440 kilometers from the front lines, was heavily damaged by Ukrainian drones. Satellite images show significant destruction, including the loss of aircraft and extensive fires.

Another significant strike occurred at an airfield in the Smolensk region, where Ukrainian forces reportedly destroyed three Russian aircraft, including a MiG-31 and two Il-76 planes. These strikes are part of Ukraine’s broader strategy to weaken Russian military capabilities far behind the front lines.

Economic and Geopolitical Context

Jake also touches on Russia’s economic and geopolitical struggles, including the failure of a key gas pipeline project with China. The "Power of Siberia 2" pipeline, which was intended to supply Russian gas to China via Mongolia, has reportedly fallen through. China has not included the project in its development plans through 2028, leaving Russia without a crucial alternative market for its gas exports following the loss of European customers.

International Support for Ukraine

On a more positive note for Ukraine, the video mentions ongoing international support, including the Czech Republic’s use of frozen Russian assets to fund artillery for Ukraine and Canada’s allocation of over $7 million to support the reintegration of Ukrainian children. The United Nations has also committed $30 million to support Ukraine’s frontline areas, while the Netherlands is providing over 50 drone detection radars to bolster Ukrainian defenses.

Fundraising Efforts for Ukrainian Forces

Jake concludes the video with an update on his fundraising efforts to support the Ukrainian military. He expresses gratitude for the nearly $600,000 raised so far and encourages viewers to continue contributing to reach the $1 million goal. The funds are being used to provide essential equipment, such as vehicles for Ukrainian soldiers, which are crucial for operations like evacuations and supply runs. The video includes a message from a Ukrainian soldier thanking viewers for their support and highlighting the impact these donations have on the ground.

Final Thoughts

The video underscores the complexity and intensity of the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia, highlighting both the strategic successes of the Ukrainian military and the challenges facing Russian forces. It also emphasizes the importance of continued international support for Ukraine as it pushes forward with its counteroffensive

 

[bojangles]

[Brother Ursus]

6 hours ago, bojangles said:

Just a note: most of those Russian VDV airborne BMDs moving toward Kursk have anywhere from 7-15mm of aluminum armor.

Very thin armor and a lot of internal ammunition does not do great things for survivability.

 

Russland har rett og slett ikke særlig mye brukbart materiell igjen. Det er også den største grunnen til at Putin ikke mobiliserer - det ville påvirke populæriteten hans uten å gi noen nevneverdig økning i kampevne.

[Brother Ursus]

 

 

Budanov bekreftet at Ukraina ødela to Il-76 (store transportfly) og en Mig-31 (supersonisk interceptor) ved en annen flybase (ikke den som ble truffet i går) for noen få dager siden. I går ble en annen base i Rostov truffet, og det har antagelig gått med en del Su-24 og Su-34 der.

[Brother Ursus]

 

[Brother Ursus]

 

 

Rylsk er et større tettsted (ca 5000) langs motorveien, og en viktig logistisk hub i området. Det vil utgjøre et stort problem for russerne i Kursk dersom Ukraina tar den.

Samtidig ønsker Russland å ta Pokrovsk i Donetsk for å gjøre mye det samme, men jeg synes det lukter felle av Pokrovsk.

[Brother Ursus]

 

Selv om begge sider er på offensiven mister Russland fortsatt suverent mest utstyr. De mister også voldsomt mange stridsvogner og IFV sammenlignet med Ukraina, som mister flest MRAP og sivile kjøretøy. Hele poenget med vestlige MRAP er dog rask transport som skal redde livene til alle soldatene inni, slik at de er nesten laget for å kollapse om de blir truffet. Det er ikke dramatisk å miste mange slike kjøretøy. Det er også det Vesten gir flest av. F.eks ga Tyskland nettopp 400 MRAP i en ny pakke.

[Brother Ursus]

[Brother Ursus]

 

Finland skal ha en NATO-brigade på drøyt 5,000 personell 200-250km unna Sankt Petersburg, med bla. norske og svenske tropper.

[romulv]

Tror ikke Russland går tom for pansrede kjøretøy de neste par årene. De har for mange på lager, kan kjøpe inn fra vennligstilte land og bygger vel noe selv. 

Flyene derimot kan de nok fort gå tom for om disse brutale bombeangrepene mot flybasene deres får fortsette.

Synes også nato burde ordne et anslag på Kerchbrua slik at den ødelegges. Det ville mer enn noe annet styrke Ukraina i evt fredssamtaler.

[Brother Ursus]

3 minutes ago, romulv said:

Tror ikke Russland går tom for pansrede kjøretøy de neste par årene. De har for mange på lager, kan kjøpe inn fra vennligstilte land og bygger vel noe selv. 

Flyene derimot kan de nok fort gå tom for om disse brutale bombeangrepene mot flybasene deres får fortsette.

Synes også nato burde ordne et anslag på Kerchbrua slik at den ødelegges. Det ville mer enn noe annet styrke Ukraina i evt fredssamtaler.

Det er aldri slik at man plutselig slipper helt opp. Det går i rykk og napp. Men før man går tom så vil man vel forvente å se en lang periode med desperasjon etter å få tak i fler. Og det har vi sett ganske lenge nå. De har tømt store deler av deponiene sine (mye var nok ubrukelig), har gammelt skrap de fremdeles forsøker å sette i stand, har økt produksjon til et punkt hvor det går utover helsen til arbeiderne på fabrikkene som må jobbe doble skift (ofte uten overtidslønn), og Putin og andre har flydd rundt på tiggeturer til allierte og nøytrale makter. Jeg mistenker at han også har lagt ekstremt press på Lukasjenko for å få ting derfra. Og jeg lurer på om turen til Azerbaidjan og andre steder også var for å forhøre seg om muligheter til å få tak i materiell.

[Brother Ursus]

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/08/22/7471446/

Hungary's government wants Ukraine to cease fire in Kursk Oblast

Gergely Gulyás, Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Prime Minister, has called for a ceasefire in the operation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Kursk Oblast, Russia.

"Ukraine is no longer just defending itself but is on the offensive. We want a ceasefire and peace," he said.

 

Jævla forrædere. Sånn i tilfelle det fremdeles hersket noen tvil om hvem Ungarn faktisk jobber for.

[Brother Ursus]

https://cepa.org/article/ukraine-has-its-foot-on-gazproms-throat/

Ukraine Has its Foot on Gazprom’s Throat

Sergiy Makogon was CEO of GasTSO of Ukraine (2019-2022) and is an energy expert with extensive experience in the European and Ukrainian gas markets.

Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis.

 

As an expert in gas transit and former head of Ukraine’s gas transmission network, I have closely observed decision-making over Gazprom’s continued use of pipelines through Ukraine, especially since Kyiv’s armed forces seized the critical Sudzha gas metering station inside Russia’s Kursk region two weeks ago.

Understanding Gazprom’s approach requires recognition of Sudzha’s strategic significance. It is the only remaining route to deliver gas directly to Europe and became even more crucial after the Yamal and Nord Stream 1 pipelines ceased operations in 2022.

At present, the gas flow through Sudzha is 40-42 million cubic meters per day, making it an indispensable link in the chain of Russian gas exports to Europe. It is even more important to Gazprom, the once money-spinning gas giant financially humbled by the continent’s turn away from Kremlin energy.

Given its importance, the lack of control over Sudzha introduces substantial risks for the Russian company. Gazprom now has no oversight of the metering station where gas flow is measured, creating the risk of third-party interference with metering equipment and preventing Gazprom personnel from performing standard maintenance procedures.

In short, Gazprom can no longer trust the system that proves and details a large part of its exports and therefore its revenues.

The company is also obliged to provide metering documentation to Russian Customs and Fiscal Services so that it can pay tax.

These issues alone could justify the declaration of force majeure and the halting of gas flows, yet Gazprom has not taken this step, leaving analysts and industry experts wondering why.

Since the company’s employees are no longer there, and anyone can interfere with the metering equipment, its executives can no longer rely on the accuracy of the data produced. So why do they persist?

The financial implications for Gazprom are a major factor. The company reported a loss of 0.5tn rubles ($5.4bn) in the first half of 2024 alone, and maintaining $5bn a year in revenue from gas sales to the European Union (EU) is crucial to its balance sheet.

There are no technical alternatives to redirect the gas to other markets and, with every day of transit generating $14m in revenue, it serves as a lifeline for the company.

Gazprom is acutely aware that even a brief interruption in transit could make its customers switch to alternative gas supply routes, potentially permanently. The minimal volatility in EU gas prices in response to the recent Ukrainian military operation in the Kursk region suggests the European market is increasingly able to function without Russian gas and Ukrainian transit.

There are also domestic political considerations. Export revenues have provided the primary source of funding for subsidized gas prices to ordinary Russians, and the loss of the European gas market could force the government to increase prices for consumers. That would add to inflation and stoke social tensions.

Outside Russia, the primary recipients of its gas are Slovakia, Austria, and Italy, with Hungary receiving a share indirectly via the Turkstream pipeline since 2021.

The Kremlin needs Gazprom to maintain supplies to pro-Russian Slovakia and Hungary, where it offers cheaper gas as a quid pro quo to politically sympathetic governments. This is a central element of Russian foreign policy as it seeks to split the EU and block military and financial support for Ukraine. Without Russian gas, their leaders would have fewer incentives to support Russian interests.

Maintaining gas transit to the separatist region of Transnistria is also crucial for the Kremlin. Without the provision of free gas, the reintegration of this region with Moldova might become possible.

If Gazprom were to cease transit, it would not only lose revenue from gas sales but also face substantial legal claims from its European customers for failure to deliver. The firm is contractually obliged to provide gas to Slovakia and Austria for its European off-takers, and failure to do so could result in massive claims for damages.

Germany-based Uniper, for example, has already won a $14.5bn arbitration case against Gazprom, with many other claims still pending. Austria’s OMV has a contract extending until 2040, and a claim for non-delivery could amount to billions of dollars. Even Moldova would have legal grounds to sue Gazprom.

Given these considerations, it is likely Gazprom will continue to operate under the current circumstances for as long as possible. However the military and commercial threats of transit interruption remain significant.

Neither Ukraine nor Europe faces substantial risks if the transit were to be interrupted. In fact, it may be more prudent to end it during the summer rather than in January when the demand for gas is at its peak.

[Brother Ursus]

https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/22/europe/russia-cnn-paton-walsh-investigation-intl/index.html

Russia opens criminal investigation into CNN correspondent for reporting in Ukrainian-occupied Russia

En CNN journalist passerte altså grensen deres "ulovlig". Vi kan ta tilbake CNN-teamet, i gjengjeld mot at dere tar tilbake de flere hundre tusen terroristene dere ulovlig har sendt inn i Ukraina

[Brother Ursus]

https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2024/08/people-murmansk-are-starting-ask-about-bomb-shelters

People in Murmansk are starting to ask about bomb shelters

The Ukrainian drone attacks on the Kola Peninsula spark fear among Russian northerners.

This week’s drone attack on the Olenya airbase was one of several recent Ukrainian strikes against the far northern Russian region.

Almost at the same time, a big number of drones attacked targets in the Moscow region, as well as more southern regions of Volgograd, Voronezh, Rostov, Bryansk, Belgorod and Kursk.

 

Latterlig at folk på Kola og i Murmansk, altså nesten i Nord-Norge og Arktis, må være redde for ukrainske droner. Dette viser hvor totalt russisk luftforsvar har feilet i denne krigen.

[Brother Ursus]

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/08/22/7471444/

Germany investigating possible Russian involvement in drone flights over nuclear power plant in country's north – Bild

Prosecutors in the northern German city of Brunsbüttel are investigating an incident involving unidentified drones flying over a shutdown nuclear power plant.

Bild reports that since at least 8 August, drones have been flying at high speed over the area where the shutdown nuclear power plant, liquefied natural gas terminal and chemical plants are located in Brunsbüttel.

A drone flying at over 100 km/hour was spotted in the sky above the nuclear power plant late on 20 August. An internal police report stated that "the no-fly zone had been violated several times".

The most recent drone incident occurred on 22 August, prompting police in Schleswig-Holstein, the federal state where the city is located, to put some officers on alert.

Special services believe that the drones over Brunsbüttel may have been launched by Russian agents from ships in the North Sea for sabotage purposes. They suspect the drones are Orlan-10 models, capable of a range of 500-600 kilometres and speeds over 100 km/h.

 

Hvis dette faktisk er russere er det utvilsomt en "advarsel" om hva Russland kan ha intensjoner om å gjøre. Dette er også noe de har drevet med i veldig lang tid, som del av den lenge pågående kalde hybridkrigen, mot Vesten, og ligner det de gjorde i bla. Sverige.

Endret 23. august av Brother Ursus

[Brother Ursus]

https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/37794

OPINION: Russians Hear Polish Language in Kursk Region Once Again – Or Do They?

A video posted on line includes a clip where two Russian women living in the Kursk region saying they were told that Polish mercenaries were fighting for Ukraine.

 

A sign placed on the Ukrainian side at the border with Belarus showing four words that have similarities in Ukrainian, Polish, and Belarusian, but differ from the Russian. Photo: Author

 

Jeg var faktisk ikke klar over at også Belarus har sitt eget språk, eller i det minste en dialekt, som tidvis skiller seg kraftig ut fra russisk.