Russlands invasjon av Ukraina [Ny tråd, les førstepost]

[Dragavon]

Sitat

I Aftenposten 7. juni formulerer Ketil Bjørnstad på kronikkplass et langt pasifistisk opprop mot vestlig våpenstøtte til Ukraina. Innlegget er usannsynlig uopplyst. Det vitner om en nærmest total mangel på kunnskap om Ukraina, om Russlands angrepskrig i Ukraina og om ukrainsk og russisk historie. I tillegg reproduserer det klassiske narrativer fra russisk propaganda.

https://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikk/i/Oo3my3/blottlegger-manglende-kunnskap-om-russlands-angrepskrig

[JK22]

Dette er ekstraordinært fordi EW-plattformer svært sjeldent kom ut for droneangrep - og trolig er det første gang FPV-droner var benyttet. Det er ganske spesielt fordi disse Sinitsa-EW plattformer skulle være i stand til å jamme i senk helt presist disse dronene! 

[Dragavon]

Sitat

 

Ett ryskt plan av typen SU-24 kränkte svenskt luftrum. Foto: Försvarsmakten
Ett ryskt plan kränkte svenskt luftrum under fredagen. Svensk försvar anropade planet men fick inget svar.

Två Jas-plan gick upp för att mota bort det ryska planet.

– Kränkningen skedde öster om Gotland, uppger Försvarsmaktens kommunikationschef chef Therese Fagerstedt för TT.

Den stora övningen Baltops pågår just nu i Östersjön.

– Det ryska agerandet är inte acceptapelt och visar på bristande respekt för vår territoriella intergritet. Vi följde hela förloppet och var på plats för att ingripa, säger Försvarsmaktens flygvapenchef Jonas Wikman i ett pressmeddelande.

 

https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/Rr77qd/aftonbladet-direkt?pinnedEntry=1262547

[Subara]

Dragavon skrev (1 time siden):

https://www.aftenposten.no/meninger/kronikk/i/Oo3my3/blottlegger-manglende-kunnskap-om-russlands-angrepskrig

Sitat

I tillegg reproduserer det klassiske narrativer fra russisk propaganda.

Det er selvfølgelig fryktelig naivt å være pasifist.

Men tviler på Ketil Bjørnstad er utsatt for russisk propaganda. En gammel mann hører(ser) på NRK.

Endret 15. juni av Subara

[sjamanen]

Dragavon skrev (6 minutter siden):

https://www.aftonbladet.se/nyheter/a/Rr77qd/aftonbladet-direkt?pinnedEntry=1262547

Skyt de ned.

[Brother Ursus]

[Brother Ursus]

 

Opptil fire russiske fly krenket også finsk luftrom rundt samme tid. Dette er åpenbart gjort med vilje for å sjekke responsen.

Vi bør innta en langt strengere positur. De vestlige jagerflyene som avskjærer disse russiske flyene bør holde seg på lengre avstand og låse på våpen.

[Brother Ursus]

 

 

[Brother Ursus]

 

Etter planen skal fem forskjellige land overføre hvert sitt system.

[Brother Ursus]

https://www.kyivpost.com/post/34290

Kremlin Thermobaric Ammo Reportedly Explodes in Russian Suburb

According to Russian social media, the Solntsepyok, a thermobaric weapon system, exploded in a town in the Belgorod region, killing three Russian servicemembers.

“Astra’s sources in the region’s emergency services reported that in the evening, ammunition from the Russian Solntsepyok MRLS thermobaric weapon system exploded in the suburb of Shebekino,” the report said.

[JK22]

Analyzing S-200's Range: Can it Shoot Down Aircraft 300 km Away? - Militarnyi

En veldig interessant artikkel.

The recent downing of two Russian A-50 airborne early warning and control aircraft and a Tu-22M3 bomber proved the Ukrainian army’s capability to intercept large targets effectively.

According to statements by Ukrainian officials, an old Soviet S-200 system was used for long-range interception of Russian aircraft. However, it is unlikely that Ukraine had this system in 2024. So what is this system, where did it come from, and what is it capable of?

S-200VM capabilities

Documentation of the 10th Anti-Aircraft Defense Research Test Range (military unit #03080) will help us study the issue of SAM capabilities.

The S-200 uses missiles with semi-active radar homing, which are guided to a target using the system’s radar beam reflected from it. Accordingly, the radar is the “eyes” and “index finger” of the system and is a key element in determining the capabilities of the air defense system.

Depending on the size and radar cross-section of the aircraft, its detection range will vary. The larger these parameters, the more visible the aircraft will be to radar.

If we are talking about large and highly radar-contrasting objects, such as the Russian A-50s that have been known to fall suddenly, it will be useful to study practical research from military unit #03080.

In 1983, this military unit carried out the “Assessment of the characteristics of S-200V air defense systems when working with Il-76 and An-26 aircraft.” During the study, the aircraft performed multiple controlled flights around the radar at different distances and altitudes to determine practical data.

According to the results of the studies, it was concluded that the average range of stable automatic tracking of an Il-76 aircraft flying at an altitude of 9,000-10,000 meters was 303 kilometers. At the same time, the average range of issuing a “launch authorization” on the aircraft was 247.3 km.

It should be noted that the “range” parameter was averaged, because the value of the radar cross section of the aircraft, which is the key, varies depending on the angle at which the aircraft is relative to the radar.

5V28 missile potential

Since the radar can be replaced, the final potential of the anti-aircraft system is determined by its missile. The S-200VM uses a 5V28 interceptor missile, also known as the undead V-880 index.

In November 1986, military unit #03080 conducted pilot firing tests of 5V28 missiles in order to determine their real maximum range of combat use.

As a target simulator, MR-9ITs-A missiles were used, which, after reaching a certain altitude, opened the parachute and slowly descended.

Brief reports described the successful defeat of target simulators with an anti-aircraft missile 5V28TB under various conditions:

* Launch No. 572: carried out at the moment of target finding at a range of 302.1 km and an altitude of 20 km. The missile homing on the target was stable. The missile hit the target at 228 seconds of flight, at a range of 300 km and an altitude of 16.5 km. The target was destroyed.

* Launch No. 573: carried out at the moment of target finding at a range of 293 km and an altitude of 11.1 km. The missile homing on the target was stable. The missile hit target at 230 seconds of the missile flight at a range of 293 km and an altitude of 9.5 km. The target was destroyed.

* Launch No. 574: carried out at the moment of target finding at a range of 295 km and an altitude of 12.5 km. The missile homing on the target was stable. The missile hit the target at 234 seconds of the missile flight at a range of 295 km and an altitude of 10.6 km. The target was destroyed.

These experimental launches showed that the 5V28 missile is fully capable of striking objects at a distance of 300 kilometers, exceeding the previously established maximum range.

With an increase in the interception range, the radio horizon significantly limits the minimum defeat altitude. Therefore, launches No. 572 and No. 573 are particularly notable, demonstrating the capability to hit non-maneuvering targets at maximum distances at altitudes of 16,500 and 9,500 meters.

Such results became available due to the changes in the ballistics tables of the digital obstructing machine of the target illumination radar.

According to the results of mathematical calculations, the maximum capabilities of guided flight of 5V28 missiles in ideal conditions are limited to 250 seconds – this is how long the rocket motor and on-board electronics of the missile can operate. Therefore, when shooting at large aerodynamic targets due to a possible increase in the missile flight time to the point of meeting more than 250 seconds, it is recommended to limit the range of combat use by 275 kilometers.

Ukrainian S-200

After the collapse of the USSR, the Ukrainian army had a significant number of modernized S-200VM systems and hundreds of 5V28 missiles. As of 2012, the Armed Forces of Ukraine had several divisions at these systems: they covered industrial facilities in Crimea, Odesa, Lviv, Kherson, and Kyiv.

In 2013, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense declared the S-200 SAM obsolete and decided to withdraw them from service with subsequent disposal. Despite official assessments, this decision is considered biased, since it was made by the then Minister of Defense, Pavlo Lebedev, who is now accused of treason.

However, despite the abovementioned facts, as of 2024, it is known about the use of these systems by the Ukrainian side in the war against Russia. Footage of this system launcher’s use with the 5V28 missile was released on the web.

Presumably, Poland could become a donor to these systems. At the Defence24 Days conference, which was held in Poland in May, 2024, a representative of Polish Armed Forces Command said that the 3rd ‘Warsaw’ Anti-Aircraft Missile Brigade no longer has these systems in service.

In the 1980s, Poland received two such systems in the export version of the S-200VE from the Soviet Union. In 1999-2001, one of them was upgraded to the S-200C variant. As part of the modernization, the system was divided into two independent batteries. Due to the replacement of a large number of analog systems with digital ones, as well as the replacement of the command post, the degree of automation and reliability of this systems were significantly increased.

However, the possibility of restoring decommissioned Ukrainian systems cannot be discounted. There are several noticeable differences when comparing the control units of the Polish and, as assured by representatives of the Defence Intelligence of Ukraine, the Ukrainian S-200 systems, suggesting that they are two distinct systems.

The Ukrainian outpost is distinct from any other, suggesting that it may have been established during this war. The Chief of Intelligence, Kyrylo Budanov, probably meant the same:

“This time we used, let’s just say, what we pieced together from scratch using old components, and so forth. We’ve upgraded some things; the engineers have done a commendable job, trust me,” Budanov remarked regarding the downing of the Russian Tu-22M3 bomber.

In this case, relying on video that shows the system’s usage, we can confidently say that the old Soviet system was switched to a modern digital element base with a new command post’s integration.

To increase the range of operation, the updated system could also receive upgraded radar illumination of 5N62V targets and one of the Ukrainian surveillance radars capable of detecting targets at a distance of up to 400 km.

The video depicts moments of the Ukrainian system in action, with the operator specifying the parameters of the detected air object: “Azimuth 125, distance 356, altitude 8,” indicating the distance to the Russian Tu-22M3 at 356 km and its flight altitude at 8 km.

Despite any upgrades, operating S-200 systems remains extremely challenging. The 5D12 liquid fuel rocket motor, with its complex design and numerous components, requires regular inspections, repairs, and replacements. Therefore, after decades of storage, these missiles will require mandatory repair, which will significantly limit their mass use.

Another problem with S-200 operation is fuel. 5V28 uses two-component fuel: TG-02 and AK27I oxidizing agent. After decommissioning, Ukraine disposed of all its reserves, so even if missiles return from storage depots, it will be necessary to look for alternative fuel sources for them abroad.

Rocket fuel to the missiles of the complex is extremely toxic, and the oxidizer is a concentrated 70% nitric acid. Accordingly, aggressive components are filled into the missile tanks only during the deployment of the complex. The antiaircraft installation service does this in military protective gear. All this makes exploitation difficult, time consuming and real only in the deep rear.

Det er mye lærerikt om S-200 våpenet som har en maks. rekkevidde på presist 250 sekunder. Opplysningen om at S-200 kan motta impulser fra et nytt ildledelsessystem basert på tilgjengelige radarfasiliteter for å finne sine mål på 400 km hold kan forklarer litt av hvert; et S-300 radarkjøretøy har nemlig en A-50 påmalt på seg, som tyder på at dette radarbatteriet hadde spilt en viktig rolle.

U.S. Army Officer Confirms Russian A-50 Radar Jet Was Shot Down With Patriot Missile (yahoo.com)

A U.S.-made Patriot air defense system was responsible for shooting down a Russian A-50 Mainstay airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft over the Sea of Azov on January 14, according to a U.S. Army officer. The high-value aircraft, one of only a handful immediately available to Russia, was the first of two brought down in the space of five weeks. Previously, a Ukrainian official confirmed to TWZ that the second A-50 was brought down by a Soviet-era S-200 (SA-5 Gammon) long-range surface-to-air missile.

Speaking on a panel at the United States Field Artillery Association’s Fires Symposium 2024 last week, Col. Rosanna Clemente, Assistant Chief of Staff at the 10th Army Air and Missile Defense Command, confirmed that the first A-50 fell to a German-provided Patriot system, in what she described as a “SAMbush,” or surface-to-air missile ambush.

“They have probably about a battalion of Patriots operating in Ukraine right now,” Col. Clemente explained. “Some of it’s being used to protect static sites and critical national infrastructure. Others are being moved around and doing some really, really historic things that I’ve haven’t seen in 22 years of being an air defender, and one of them is a SAMbush … they’re doing that with extremely mobile Patriot systems that were donated by the Germans, because the systems are all mounted on the trucks. So they’re moving around and they’re using these types of systems, bringing them close to the plot … and stretching the very, very edges of the kinematic capabilities of that system to engage the first A-50 C2 [command and control] system back in January.”

Fifteen crew members were reportedly killed aboard the A-50.

Col. Clemente also provided some other interesting details of how the Ukrainians worked up their capabilities with these particular systems, which included a period of validation training involving the U.S. Army in Poland in April 2023.

According to Col. Clemente, the German soldiers tasked with training the Ukrainians on the mobile Patriot systems woke up the Ukrainian battery in the middle of the night, marched them to a location where they fought a simulated air battle, and then made them march again. “I was like, ‘Huh, wonder why they did that?’ And it was a month later, they conducted some of their first ambushes where they’re shooting down Russian Su-27s along the Russian border.”

As we reported at the time, the use of Patriot to engage the radar plane over the Sea of Azov seemed likely, especially as it followed the pattern of an anti-access counter-air campaign that Ukraine was already waging against Russian military aircraft using the same air defense system.

Accordingly, in May 2023, Ukraine began pushing forward Patriot batteries to reach deep into Russian-controlled airspace. Most dramatically, a string of Russian aircraft was downed over Russian territory that borders northeastern Ukraine. Among them may have been the Su-27s (or perhaps another Flanker-variant aircraft) that Col. Clemente mentioned.

While the use of German-supplied weapons within Russian territory previously led to friction between Berlin and Kyiv, German officials more recently approved the use of Patriot to target aircraft in Russian airspace.

In December 2023, similar tactics were used against tactical jets flying over the northwestern Black Sea.

These kinds of highly mobile operations were then further proven with the destruction of the first A-50, on the night of January 14.

A Russian Il-22M radio-relay aircraft was also apparently engaged by Ukrainian air defenses the same night, confirmed by photo evidence of the aircraft after it had made it back to a Russian air base. It’s not clear whether the Patriot system was also responsible for inflicting damage on this aircraft, but it’s certainly a probable explanation.

Both incidents appear to have taken place in the western part of the Azov Sea and, as we discussed at the time, the distances involved suggested that, if Patriot was used, it was likely at the very limits of its engagement envelope.

Based on Col. Clemente’s account, it seems likely that the Patriot system in question was not only being pushed to the limits of its capabilities but was likely being deployed very far forward in an especially bold tactical move.

As we wrote at the time: “Considering risking a Patriot system or even a remote launcher right at the front is unlikely, and these airborne assets were likely orbiting at least some ways out over the water, this shot was more likely to have been around 100 miles, give or take a couple dozen miles.”

Of course, all this also depends on exactly where the targeted aircraft were at the time of the engagement.

Once again, the A-50 shootdown may be the most important single victory achieved so far by Ukrainian-operated Patriot systems, but it was part of a highly targeted campaign waged against the Russian Aerospace Forces which has seemingly included multiple long-range downings of tactical aircraft.

The Ukrainian tactics first found success in pushing back Russian airpower and degrading its ability to launch direct attacks and even those using standoff glide bombs, which have wreaked havoc on Ukrainian towns.

The same anti-access tactics extended to Russia’s small yet vital AEW&C fleet have arguably had an even greater effect. After all, these aircraft offer a unique look-down air picture that extends deep into Ukrainian-controlled territory. As well as spotting incoming cruise missile and drone attacks, and low-flying fighter sorties, they provide command and control and situational awareness for Russian fighters and air defense batteries. According to Ukrainian officials, the radar planes are also used to direct Russian cruise missile and drone strikes.

The importance of these force-multipliers has seen earlier efforts to disable them, with A-50s in Belarus having been targeted by forces allied with Ukraine.

The recent appearance of a photo showing a Ukrainian S-300PS (SA-10 Grumble) air defense system marked with an A-50 symbol also indicates that previous attempts were made to bring these aircraft down using this Soviet-era surface-to-air missile, too.

With all this in mind, it’s not surprising that Ukraine’s highly valued, long-reaching Patriot air defense system was tasked against the A-50.

In demonstrating the vulnerability of Russian aircraft patrolling over the Sea of Azov, the January 15 shootdown might have been expected to push these assets back. That may have happened, but another example was then shot down at an even greater distance from the front line, on February 23. The fact that the second A-50 came down over the Krasnodar region fueled speculation that it may have been a ‘friendly fire’ incident.

However, Lt. Gen. Kyrylo Budanov, the head of the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense’s Main Directorate of Intelligence (GUR), subsequently confirmed to TWZ that the second A-50 — as well as a Tu-22M3 Backfire bomber, in a separate incident — were brought down by the Soviet-era S-200 long-range surface-to-air missile system.

Undoubtedly, there are more details still to emerge about the shootdowns of the two A-50s, not to mention other engagements that the Ukrainian Patriot has been involved in.

However, Col. Rosanna Clemente’s comments confirm that the Ukrainian Air Force is using these critical systems in a sometimes-daring manner, using limited numbers of assets not only to protect key static infrastructure but also to maraud closer to the front lines and bring down high-profile Russian aerial targets. Not only does this force Russia to adapt its airpower tactics for its own survival, reducing its effectiveness, but it also provides another means for Ukraine to fight back against numerical odds that are stacked against it.

Det er mulig at ukrainerne har utviklet et effektiv system der man kunne samordne ulike radarsystemer med forskjellige kapasiteter for å angripe høyprioritetsmål dypt inn i Russland, Radarkjøretøyet med den påmalte A-50 kan være en "Flap lid" 30N6 som har en rekkevidde på "bare" 200 km, da man foretrakk det mye større "Tin Shield" radarsystemet av type 36D6 med en rekkevidde på 360 km. Men her er det oppdaget at de har radar som kan se mye lengre vekk på 8 km høyde da et Tu-22M3 ble skutt ned, og da kan det ikke være snakk om vanlige S-300PS radarutstyr. Patriot-radar har en "offisiell" rekkevidde på 100 km, men det er en åpen hemmelighet at de når mye lengre ut. 

Category:5N62 - Wikimedia Commons

Den eneste kandidaten er monsterradaren 5N62V "Square Pair" som er så svær, at den minner om et radioteleskop og er høy som et treetasjes bygg, med en samlet vekt på 25 til 30 tonn. Den er... semimobilt? 5N62V kan finne større fly på minst 450 km hold. Og det kunne få assistanse av gammeldaglige P-14 radar som ser minst lik langt vekk, og som er populært i dag for sivilflykontroll selv etter å ha blitt oppfunnet i 1959. 

Ukrainerne kan få meget forskjellige radarsystemer til å "snakke sammen" og samordne disse i et enslig system for målrettede angrep dypt inn i Russland - som et resultat mistet russerne to A-50 fly og et Tu-22M3, og har siden den gang nektet å flytte sine gjenværende AEW&C fly og strategiske bombefly nærmere enn 350 km. Som et resultat er luftvernsforsvaret over Krim-halvøya sterkt svekket og bruk av store kryssermissilvåpen har opphørt. 

Russerne som realisert at de ikke kunne skyte ned ATACMS med sine S-300 og S-400 missiler, sendt et enslig verdifullt våpensystem til Kertsjstredet - S-500. Det eneste de har. 

Russia Has One S-500 Air-Defense System. It Just Arrived In Crimea. (forbes.com)

After apparently losing parts of several of its best S-400 air-defense batteries to Ukraine’s American-made Army Tactical Missile System rockets—the vaunted ATACMS—Russia got desperate.

S-500 er ekstraordinært dyrt og ekstraordinært ressurskrevende. Dette er i stand til å engasjere fiendtlige mål høyere opp i atmosfæren mindre enn 180 km over bakken, men var opprinnelig utviklet for å ta ut ICBM missiler og MRBM missiler, så det kan bli interessant i møte med et kortlegget ballistisk missil som vil kom fra oven. Kanskje kan S-500 få has på ATACMS, men ammunisjon vil være meget problematisk. Bare to missil per rakettrampe. Det hadde vist seg at 40N6 missilvåpenet for både S-400 og S-500 ment mot fly var utilstrekkelig mot ATACMS, en ekstra booster vil ikke være til stor hjelp så det finnes bare et alternativ tilbake; 77N6 missilvåpenet. 

According to Ukrainian intelligence chief Kyrylo Budanov, the Russians recently deployed part of their first, and apparently only, new S-500 air-defense system.

The S-500 protects the Kerch Strait from a site in Russian-occupied Crimea, Budanov told Ukrainian media. The Kerch Bridge, which spans the strait, is one of the Kremlin’s main supply lines into occupied southern Ukraine.

The S-500 has been in development for more than a decade—and the timeline for completion keeps getting extended as wartime demands sap resources from the Kremlin’s research and development budgets. Full-scale use is currently slated for 2025.

The deployment of the incomplete S-500 battery to Crimea underscores how dire Russia’s air-defense problem is on the peninsula. Budanov was kind in his own assessment. “This will be an experimental use,” he said.

Don’t expect great results. The S-500, as it exists right now, is a modest improvement over the older S-400. Lately, Ukraine’s ATACMS have been taking out S-400 batteries once a month or so—steadily chipping away at the Russian air force’s pre-war inventory of around 50 such batteries.

On paper, an S-500 battery includes three radars—two of which are identical to the radars that cue an S-400. The third radar, the 77T6, is optimized for detecting fast-moving ballistic missiles—like ATACMS. But the 77T6 is just a few years old and shrouded in mystery.

The 77T6’s capabilities “remain unknown,” Thomas Withington explained in a 2022 report for the Royal United Services Institute in London.

The 77T6-cued S-500 probably works best with a special missile that the Russians also optimized for ballistic targets like the American-made ATACMS. This 77N6 was originally meant to be a “hit to kill” missile—that is, a missile without a warhead that destroys its target by literally running into it.

The principle behind a hit-to-kill missile is that, by removing the warhead, you make the missile lighter, more maneuverable and more accurate. Many of the U.S. Army latest air-defense missiles are hit-to-kill models.

But according to Defense News, Russian industry has struggled to source the precision electronics it would need to produce hit-to-kill missiles. So while the prototype S-500 has test-fired at least one 77N6 missile, the 77N6 currently has a warhead. It’s not a hit-to-kill missile, so it’s not the specialized anti-missile interceptor the Kremlin promised to deliver.

In other words, the S-500 is probably not as effective as it could be against the very weapon that’s been harrying Russian air-defense batteries in Crimea—and which compelled the Kremlin to do something, anything, to reinforces its aerial defenses on the peninsula: the 1.5-ton, precision-guided ATACMS, each of which scatters hundreds of lethal submunitions over a wide area.

Any one of those submunitions can disable a delicate system like an S-400 ... or S-500.

ATACMS vil helt sikkert bli holdt tilbake inntil videre, men en dag vil det fatale møtet mellom ATACMS og S-500 skjer. 

[Brother Ursus]

 

Dette er vel og merke et fredsmøte uten russisk deltagelse. Målet for møtet er så vidt jeg forstår fremdeles å snakke om hvordan oppnå fred - som i øyeblikket fremdeles betyr å drive Russland ut av Ukraina.

[Brother Ursus]

https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2024/06/russia-rushes-to-complete-huge-new-defenses-of-kerch-bridge/

Russia Rushes To Complete Huge New Defenses Of Kerch Bridge

Russia continues to bulk up its defenses of the vital Crimean bridge in Kerch. The bridge has been attacked twice already, and is undoubtedly high on Ukraine's target list. With such importance, it appears unlikely that these new defenses will be sufficient.

 

[Brother Ursus]

https://mil.in.ua/en/news/by-the-end-of-the-year-the-eu-will-produce-1-7-million-shells-per-year/

By the end of the year, the EU will produce 1.7 million shells per year

The defense industry of the EU countries is actively increasing the production of ammunition and plans to match the number of shells fired by Russia by 2025.

Thierry Breton, EU Commissioner for the Internal Market, announced this.

The European Commissioner responsible for the defense industry spoke about the rapid growth in the production of artillery ammunition, which has already surpassed the volume of production in the United States.

“We have accelerated the production of ammunition. In March 2023, we were producing 500,000 shells a year in Europe and were already better than the Americans, who were producing only 300,000. But since then, we have doubled this capacity,” the Commissioner said.

According to Breton, the European Defense Fund is largely responsible for scaling up production, and Europe must continue to rearm in the coming years.

 

[Brother Ursus]

• India skal ha arrestert fire personer som rekrutterte for den russiske hæren
• Putin sier han er klar for våpenhvile "i morgen" dersom Russland får beholde det de har tatt - utvilsomt et tegn på økende desperasjon og et forsøk på å splitte støtten for Ukraina
• Putin sier også at Russland har 700.000 soldater i Ukraina. Andre estimat ahr vel ligget på 400-500 tusen
• EU begynner medlemsskapssamtaler med både Ukraina og Moldova. Tildels fordi Ungarn tar over formannskapet neste måned.
• NATO skal ha 300.000 soldater i beredskap.
• Zelensky sier Xi Jinping personlig lovet ham at Kina ikke ville sende Russland våpen. Så får vi se hva den lovnaden er verdt etter hvert. Jeg tipper Xi Jinping støtter at Nord-Korea sender masse våpen. Heldigvis har de lav kvalitet.
• G7-landene sier Russland må kompensere Ukraina for skadene det har påført landet - på nåværende tidspunkt nesten 500 milliarder dollar

[Brother Ursus]

https://e24.no/naeringsliv/i/25395l/russere-hamstret-luksuschampagne-i-kirkenes?referer=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vg.no

Russere hamstret luksuschampagne i Kirkenes

Ingen steder i landet har det blitt solgt flere flasker av Dom Perignon og Cristal i år enn i Kirkenes.

Da Russland gikk til fullskala invasjon av Ukraina i 2022, innførte EU og Norge forbud mot å eksportere en rekke luksusvarer til landet. Blant disse var champagne.

Det har gjort at tilgangen til de franske dråpene har blitt veldig begrenset inne i Russland.

På Vinmonopolet i Kirkenes, bare kilometer fra grensen, har imidlertid salget av dyr alkoholholdig drikke skutt i været.

[sjamanen]

Homba skrev (15 timer siden):

Fredsforhandlinger. 

Utfordringen her er at ukrainerne vet at Putin kommer tilbake for mer på et senere tidspunkt. 

Nettopp. Så det du tror er at amerikanerne, og vesten forøvrig, bedriver en nøye planlagt balansering av våpenstøtte, på en måte som bestemmer krigens gang. Samtidig legger denne strategien til rette for at det russiske regimet ikke bare overlever, men får anledning og tid til å bygge seg opp til fremtidige aggressive handlinger og angrep. Dette høres ikke ut som en veldig smart strategi, hvilket betyr at amerikanerne enten strategisk er helt ute å kjøre eller at de ikke vet hva de holder på med/gjør pågående store feil i forholdet til deres egen strategi. Sistnevnte blemme eller strategiske feiltrinn er lite forenlig med påstanden din nevnt innledningsvis i dette innlegget, som legger til grunn en nøye planlagt og balansert strategi som styrer krigens gang. Dette henger ikke sammen. Hvorfor amerikanerne og/eller vesten skulle følge en strategi som ved tilfeldighet, eller ikke, medfører det endgamet du mener det vil føre til, gir ikke mening.

Endret 15. juni av sjamanen

[Homba]

sjamanen skrev (4 minutter siden):

Nettopp. Så det du tror er at amerikanerne, og vesten forøvrig, bedriver en nøye planlagt balansering av våpenstøtte, på en måte som bestemmer krigens gang. Samtidig legger denne strategien til rette for at det russiske regimet ikke bare overlever, men får anledning og tid til å bygge seg opp til fremtidige aggressive handlinger og angrep. Dette høres ikke ut som en veldig smart strategi, hvilket betyr at amerikanerne enten strategisk er helt ute å kjøre eller at de ikke vet hva de holder på med/gjør pågående store feil i forholdet til deres egen strategi. Sistnevnte blemme eller strategiske feiltrinn er lite forenlig med påstanden din nevnt innledningsvis i dette innlegget, som legger til grunn en nøye planlagt og balansert strategi som styrer krigens gang. Dette henger ikke sammen. Hvorfor amerikanerne og/eller vesten skulle følge en strategi som ved tilfeldighet, eller ikke, medfører det endgamet du mener det vil føre til, gir ikke mening.

Jeg er enig i at det virker å være en dårlig strategi sett fra vårt perspektiv. 

Men når man har fulgt med på krigen i litt over to år nå så er det jo nettopp slik det har gått. 

Eskaleringen har vært svært kalkulert fra hjelmer til ATACMS, og kun når Ukraina har mistet initiativet har man eskalert fra vestlig side. 

Sist vi så dette var når man motvillig godkjente angrep inn i Russland i avgrensede områder. 

Det er spesielt glidebombene russerne har man er bekymret for, og Ukraina kan nå true flyene som slipper disse da de har under 100 kilometers rekkevidde. 

Nå er det avgjørende å få Ukraina gjennom vinteren og de får nå over 10 patriot systemer for å beskytte energiinfrastrukturen som har blitt svært svekket de siste månedene etter russiske angrep. 

Det som har blitt påpekt og som strider mot mitt argument er overføringen av F16 fly, og jeg håper virkelig de vil gjøre en stor forskjell på slagmarken. 

Jeg tror uansett det er naivt å tro at man ikke balanserer eskaleringen nøye med tanke på russernes atomarsenal. Da hadde vi jo intervernert for lenge siden. 

 

[ForTheImperium]

Kan vesten nå innse at Kina er ikke en global samarbeidspartner, men en ussel stat som Russland?

[superrhino]

sjamanen skrev (51 minutter siden):

Nettopp. Så det du tror er at amerikanerne, og vesten forøvrig, bedriver en nøye planlagt balansering av våpenstøtte, på en måte som bestemmer krigens gang. Samtidig legger denne strategien til rette for at det russiske regimet ikke bare overlever, men får anledning og tid til å bygge seg opp til fremtidige aggressive handlinger og angrep. Dette høres ikke ut som en veldig smart strategi, hvilket betyr at amerikanerne enten strategisk er helt ute å kjøre eller at de ikke vet hva de holder på med/gjør pågående store feil i forholdet til deres egen strategi. Sistnevnte blemme eller strategiske feiltrinn er lite forenlig med påstanden din nevnt innledningsvis i dette innlegget, som legger til grunn en nøye planlagt og balansert strategi som styrer krigens gang. Dette henger ikke sammen. Hvorfor amerikanerne og/eller vesten skulle følge en strategi som ved tilfeldighet, eller ikke, medfører det endgamet du mener det vil føre til, gir ikke mening.

Hva slags interesse skulle amerikanerne ha av at det russiske regimet faller? Atomvåpen, verdens største arsenal, vil bli spredd ut over alle verdens kriker og kroker.