Russlands invasjon av Ukraina [Ny tråd, les førstepost]

[Windfarmer]

skaftetryne32 skrev (32 minutter siden):

Hva skjer om et nato land angriper et nato land ? Kan landet som blir angrepet aktivere artikkel 5 ? 

Det problemet er ikke løst i NATO pakten.

Problemstillingen løses på ukentlig basis ved at hvis noen NATO - land, eksempelvis Tyrkia, truer med å angripe et annet NATO - land, eksempelvis Hellas. Så blir den angrpende part truet fra å gjøre dette, og det på et nivå at de blir økonomisk ødelagt.

Og dette har fungert bra i ca. 75 år.

Der ligger en grunnleggende forutsetning i NATO pakten om at det er USA som skal bestemme dette, det i seg selv er et demokratisk problmem, men det har fungert bra hittil.

NATO - Official text: The North Atlantic Treaty, 04-Apr.-1949

 

[TAC-2]

Dersom det ikke spesifikt ble sagt GLSDB så finnes det et par andre muligheter for hva han snakker om, f.eks. enkelte type amerikanskproduserte droner. Men det er nok sannsynligvis GLSDB.

Jeg har lest forskjellig om hvor de spanske Patriotbatteriene er stasjonert, både Tyrkia og Romania har blitt nevnt, og at ett brukes til opplæring av ukrainere. Jeg har ikke sett noen offisiell kilde diskutere det. Men det er fremdeles altfor dårlig at større europeiske land som ikke noen umiddelbare trusler ikke klarer å levere et system til Ukraina. Etter Covid ble sikkert epidemi-beredskapen forbedret, noen år etter at krigen i Ukraina er over så kan det hende at europeiske land får et brukbart forsvar. Beredskap er noe man helst skulle hatt før katastrofen inntreffer, ikke etterpå.

Endret 27. april av TAC-2

[Windfarmer]

TAC-2 skrev (1 minutt siden):

Dersom det ikke spesifikt ble sagt GLSDB så finnes det et par andre muligheter for hva han snakker om, f.eks. enkelte type amerikanskproduserte droner. Men det er nok sannsynligvis GLSDB.

Jeg har lest forskjellig om hvor de spanske Patriotbatteriene er stasjonert, både Tyrkia og Romania har blitt nevnt, og at et brukes til opplæring av ukrainere. Jeg har ikke sett noen offisiell kilde diskutere det. Men det er fremdeles altfor dårlig at større europeiske land som ikke noen umiddelbare trusler ikke klarer å levere et system til Ukraina. Etter Covid ble sikkert epidemi-beredskapen forbedret, noen år etter at krigen i Ukraina er over så kan det hende at europeiske land får et brukbart forsvar. Beredskap er noe man helst skulle hatt før katastrofen inntreffer, ikke etterpå.

>>>>>Beredskap er noe man helst skulle hatt før katastrofen inntreffer, ikke etterpå.

Altså definisjonen på en katastrofe.

[JK22]

Ukraine’s star brigade in dire state due to lack of weapons and its own mistakes | International | EL PAÍS English (elpais.com)

Det er en trist fortelling om hvordan Donetskfronten kunne ha dels kollapset; 47. brigade har meget seriøse problemer - de har nå bare to tilbake ut av 11 Bradley stormpanservogner, mange var utslått fordi de var allerede sterkt utslitt i forveien, og en tredje som måtte ut av Ukraina for reparasjon. De var desimert under den ukrainske motoffensiven i 2023;

The 47th Brigade is the product of former commander in chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s commitment to create a flagship unit to lead the counteroffensive in June 2023.

A mechanized infantry brigade is a unit that uses armored personnel carriers. It was founded in the fall of 2022 and in the last year alone, it has had four commanders, an unprecedented turnover.

The first commander of the brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Oleksandr Sak, was relieved in September 2023 after the catastrophic offensive on the Zaporizhia front. The 47th Brigade lost 30% of its soldiers in three months, according to military sources consulted by this newspaper that summer. 

Sak was replaced by Colonel Oleksandr Pavliuk. He held the position until last January. Military members of the brigade publicly accused him of not understanding the internal workings of a structure based on NATO models and of replacing infantry casualties with soldiers who were not prepared for front-line combat operations.

Dmitro Riumshin, Pavlii’s replacement, lasted only two months as commander of the 47th Brigade, from January to March. Several sources consulted say that he was dismissed first due to the high number of casualties in Avdiivka and the second, because he was not close to the new commander in chief of the Armed Forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi.

The howitzers, donated by the United States, were no longer precise enough due to overuse and, more importantly, they no longer needed as many personnel due to the lack of ammunition.

“If we focus so much on the 47th Brigade it is because it is famous, but its problems are seen in the rest of the army,”

Personellmangel. Ammunisjonsmangel. Mangel på evne for å vedlikeholde kjøretøyer og våpen. 

This newspaper interviewed two other soldiers from the 47th Brigade in November 2023. Both have been discharged from the army. One of them, Ivan, captained an infantry squad in the northern sector of Avdiivka, where his soldiers were holed up on the railway tracks. He lost his entire unit, the 17 soldiers were either killed or captured by the enemy.

Russia took Avdiivka in February. Since then, it has advanced six miles in the direction of Pokrovsk, the rear base on the Donetsk southern front. Fear is growing in the farms of the region, which are progressively closing their facilities and moving their machinery to other provinces.

“I know of a company with 80 soldiers that suffered 65 casualties in one week. Before, for every Ukrainian casualty, there were three Russian casualties. Now we are almost on par.”

That’s according to Phoenix, who uses a pseudonym to hide his identity. He’s a civilian who works for the high command on the Pokrovsk front and for the Ukrainian intelligence services.

According to Phoenix, in the northern sector of Avdiivka, the Russians took advantage of the coordination problems between the 47th Brigade and the 25th Airborne Brigade. Magura confirms that in this northern sector, where they are now resisting in the village of Ocheretyne, “there are errors in coordination between brigades, but this is because the situation changes very quickly.”

The scenario is worsening fast for Ukraine, and adapting takes time. Phoenix gives two examples of changes in brigades with NATO armament such as the 47th, changes resulting from Russia’s dominance of airspace thanks to its fleet of reconnaissance drones and bombers:

“The usefulness of the Leopard [German tanks] on the front line is now nil, they don’t last.”

In an article published on Saturday, military officers consulted by The New York Times said that the 47th Brigade lost several U.S. Abrams tanks in Avdiivka because they do not have sufficient short-range anti-aircraft defenses against drones.

It’s not just the threat of attacks from Russian drones, like the Lancet, or smaller aerial vehicles that can destroy a tank’s turret; Magura adds that the enemy has installed anti-tank missile systems in Avdiivka that are difficult to avoid.

“Russian tanks are also dropping like flies, but they have hundreds; if we destroy 10, there are three others that accomplish their mission,” says Phoenix.

The U.S. M-777 howitzer, which in 2022 were key to successful Ukrainian offensives in Kharkov and Kherson, have today taken a back seat, says Phoenix, because they are not self-propelled weapons and operations with them take too long given the Russian air threat.

Doktrineproblemer som ødela den ukrainske motoffensiven da det vist seg at NATO-doktrinen er svært malplassert i en moderne mellomstatlig konflikt mellom teknologiske jevnbyrdige motstandere, har ikke blitt løst; 

“I have spoken with a thousand soldiers on this front and my conclusion is that NATO’s military theory is useless if you do not combine it with the Soviet one, which is the Russian one,” says Phoenix.

 “They are getting better and better every day, their weapons too. And we lack everything,” 

Russernes våpen bli ikke bedre. I virkeligheten er støtteapparatet som har blitt meget sterkt forbedret fordi man hadde tatt fordel av den høyteknologiske overlegenheten innenfor elektronikk - stort sett vestlige komponenter som sanksjonene skulle ha stoppet - for å skape effektiv EW som overgikk enhver ukrainerne har og som NATO er uforberedt på, å forbedre egne samband slik at "kjøttveivalsen" kunne fortsette uhindret - hvis seksti soldater på de tre gjenværende stridsvogner kom fram, er kampen over før et skudd var løst - og presisjonsegenskaper for egne ildledelse og samordning av ildstøtten for de avanserte enhetene. 

Dessuten er det russiske overtaket enormt; 

Magura — the code name of the 28-year-old sergeant, an architect by profession — shares two devastating facts: for every armored infantry vehicle that the Ukrainian army has, the enemy has 10; for every Ukrainian soldier defending the Avdiivka front, there are 30 Russians attacking them.

Det kan bare betyr at de involverte brigadene i Avdijivka-frontsnittet - som er på tre brigader - har så tynne bemannede frontstillinger at bare få hundre soldater om gang er der på flere kilometers bredde, mens russerne sender ut flere tusen menn hver dag i et til to dusin separate fremstøt med to hundre til tre hundre menn om gang. FPV-trusselen betyr dessuten at ukrainerne ikke kunne deployere sine panserkjøretøyer så liberalt, og motortrøbbel som reparasjonsbehov gjør at man har altfor få tilgjengelige kjøretøyer.

De vestligbygde kjøretøyene kunne ikke repareres på feltet; russerne derimot hadde lært seg viktigheten av å fikse opp sine kjøretøyer nærmest mulig frontlinjen, så meget at det er oppstått en "industri" med DIY-virksomhet (DIY - Do It Youself) som sett med blyatmobile-stridsvognene. De har fordel med at de har flere tusen utrangerte kjøretøyer å hente delvarer fra, de kunne bare plyndre flere tusen vrak for å reparere egne kjøretøyer på kort varsel. 

Flytrusselen betyr at man ikke kan bare frakte inn og ut stridsmateriell; mens ukrainerne knapt kunne ramme logistiske mål og mål bak russernes rygg med for lite ammunisjon - kunne russerne derimot sette infrastrukturen bak ukrainerne under effektiv ild med artilleriraketter på 30-50 km hold, glidebomber på 20-30 km hold og kryssermissiler som Iskander-K og Tornado. Ukrainerne forstyrres hele tiden i kontrast til russerne. 

Mens ukrainerne tviholdt på sine underbemannede kampenheter uten meningsfull oppbygning av erstatningsfolk med langvarig trening hadde russerne derimot klarte å bygge opp erstatningspersonell uten tap av kompetanse i løpet av 2023, og dermed kunne sette dem inn i det nye året 2024 fordi de hadde klarte å avbelaste sine styrkene med de månedlige "rekruttene" som sendes i den visse døden for å drukne ukrainerne i blod. Det var en meget stor feil av Zelenskyj å stoppe krigsmobiliseringen i oktober-november 2022! Da slaget om Bakhmut intensiveres i senvinteren, nektet han å starte på nytt og istedenfor mobilisere litt og litt, for å bringe inn dårlige trente menn. Hadde mobiliseringen vært i full styrke uten avbrudd ville personellmangelen ikke ha blitt kritisk i april 2024. 

Dessuten hadde ammunisjonsmangelen blitt katastrofalt; det var oppdaget i sjokk at mye bomull for ammunisjonsproduksjon måtte kjøpes fra Kina som har satt begrensninger på salg, og at robotautomatisering av ammunisjonsproduksjon har skapt produksjonstak som ikke kunne sprenges, da det ikke er mulig; samtidig som politikerne ikke klarte å forstå at direkte inngrep er nødvendig. Kaoset i kongressen ansporet av Trump har fulgt til et halvt år med sulteforing mens europeerne kranglet og kranglet.

Både Ukraina og Vesten hadde feil strategi med for mye arroganse og for lite virkelighetskontakt. 

I krig; all eller ingenting. 

[Brother Ursus]

1 hour ago, skaftetryne32 said:

Hva skjer om et nato land angriper et nato land ? Kan landet som blir angrepet aktivere artikkel 5 ? 

Ja og nei. De kan be om konferanse og avstemning, men alle NATO-land har i praksis vetorett. Landet som angriper kan da stemme nei.

I tilfellet Hellas og Tyrkia, så har de andre europeiske Middelhavs-stormaktene klart tatt parti med Hellas. Frankrike og Italia har sagt tydelig ifra til Erdogan at de vil gå militært til forsvar av Hellas dersom Tyrkia skulle angripe.

Jeg tviler heller ikke på at resten av Europa ville støttet Hellas mot Tyrkia. Direkte eller indirekte.

[bojangles]

1 hour ago, skaftetryne32 said:

Hva skjer om et nato land angriper et nato land ? Kan landet som blir angrepet aktivere artikkel 5 ? 

Usikker på det. Men grekerne selv sier at det har vært ondt blod mellom Tyrkia og Hellas "i over tusen år". Og Tyrkia ypper og markerer seg militær hvert eneste år mot Hellas. Grensekrenkelser med jagerfly, eller militærskip der de ikke skal være eller regelrette trusler som det har vært endel av de siste 30 år eller noe slikt etter at Hellas fant brukbart store oljeforekomster, olje som ennå ikke er pumpet opp pga at Tyrkia var raskt ute å påstod at det området oljefunnet befant seg på, historisk sett tilhører Tyrkia. Og Tyrkia truet vel indirekte med krig om feltet på slutten av 90 tallet eller der omkring fordi Tyrkia siklet etter oljen. Såvidt jeg husker var funnet greit inne på gresk sokkel og ingen andre land støttet Tyrkias syn på grensene. 

Det er så mye ondt blod mellom Tyrkia og Hellas at at på tidlig 2000 tall under den relativt raske  utvidelsen av EU sa grekerne rett ut at Tyrkia kom aldri til å bli medlem av EU fordi grekerne ville legge ned veto direkt og dermed blokkere medlemskap, og de lovte Tyrkia at de aldri ville endre standpunkt.  

Sålangt ser det jo ut til at de lever greit med å hate hverandre uten at det eskalerer og da er det vel egentlig greit? Men skulle Tyrkia angripe Helles må en vel anta at artikkel 5 ville bli anvendt selv om Tyrkia også er et NATO land?  Evt. at Hellas får direkte støtte fra individuelle NATO land. For Tykria ville jo vært den aggressive og angripende part. Men vi får håpe det aldri går så langt. 

Endret 27. april av bojangles

[JK22]

"Orlan" is one of the main Russian reconnaissance drones in the war against Ukraine

Among scientists and analysts studying changes within the russian army and their weapon systems during the military conflicts of recent decades, 2014 is considered a turning point. It can be argued that as early as 2008, after the invasion of Georgia, the russian invaders drew conclusions in preparation for further expansion against their neighbours. Alongside the adoption of the new military doctrine, they realised the opportunities of the intense use of aerial reconnaissance.

In 2013, the “Orlan-10” aircraft-type unmanned aerial system (UAS) was taken into service by the russian armed forces. Although it can hardly be called a technological crown in the industry, nevertheless, in 2014, during the active warfare in Donbas, the system allowed russians to achieve a striking advantage over Ukrainian forces, which, at a certain point, were close to eliminating the russian enclave in the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk regions.

With the help of these systems, the russians constantly conducted reconnaissance of the Ukrainian territory and, most likely, corrected artillery that fired at our units. Later, “Orlan” became a mass solution for the russian army. Today, its various versions (such as "Orlan-10", "Orlan-30", "Mosquito", etc.) operate on a daily basis on the battlefields of russia's full-scale war against Ukraine.

Despite that fact, one can often find quite strange technical solutions in devices that were shot down or captured by the AFU. For example, a Canon SLR camera or a plastic bottle used as a gas tank. (Yes, these things fly on gasoline). Because of this, "Orlans" became the object of many jokes, kind of, “look, the russians are feeding them with junk”. Looking ahead, I would say there are not so many reasons to laugh about. "Orlan" is a tool widely and often effectively used against us.

Versatility of application

Let's skip the technical characteristics which can be easily found in the open source, except for specific modifications and what the military conveyor of the occupiers is supplying now. At least 5 km of flight altitude, 120 km of video signal transmission distance, and the ability to fly autonomously for hundreds of kilometres along a defined route (here, the Japanese SLR camera allows obtaining excellent reconnaissance material) make this, far from the most perfect in the world of UAVs thing, an effective and even formidable weapon against us.

"Orlan" is a multi-purpose complex. It is used as a target designator, providing intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, as an aerial photographer, and as EW/ES when needed. For instance, the Leer-3 EW system includes up to three “Orlan” UAVs which carry reconnaissance and GSM jamming equipment on board.

Many missile attacks and shelling of Kyiv during the battle for the capital were carried out based on the results of reconnaissance, conducted by these UAVs. According to various estimations, at the beginning of the full-scale invasion, the number of these UAVs, owned by the russians, ranged from 1500 to several thousand vehicles.

Production and UAV special features

There is no doubt that the production of “Orlans” continues today. That is because, firstly, "Orlans" are being lost. Sometimes, they are being shot down, captured, as was in the case of the Kharkiv offensive operation. In other cases, they fall due to technical reasons. There is nothing new or surprising here, as in this war, UAVs are nothing more than consumables. So they are needed in large quantities and literally everywhere.

Secondly, the russians are exporting “Orlans” which may also indicate that production has been running in one way or another. As for the production itself, today, it is known that the russians are able to produce an aerodynamic body without any problems. (Like us, by the way.) Another issue is its “filling” with the components, such as electronics, chips, communication, payload (camera modules, etc.), anti-jamming, and more.

Despite Western sanctions, the russians somehow continue receiving components on which this equipment depends. From the open sources, one can learn that the UAVs contain components from the U.S., Japan, China, and a number of European countries. However, it is necessary to understand that the crucial thing is the possibility of using this equipment for its intended purpose.

"Kometa", an invention of the russian engineers, can serve as a simple example. One of its modifications is installed on the UAV’s board. It is known that "Kometa" has the details designed by U.S. and Taiwanese companies. This so-called CRPA (controlled radiation pattern antenna) has a clearly defined and very important function - to protect the device from the effects of EW measures, which, in turn, attempt to jam the drone's navigation signal and knock the drone off the course.

Imagine you are the operator of such a UAV. To control it from a long distance, you need to have both navigation and video signal. When one of these things is jammed, you still can return the drone (the mode known as RTL, or Return to Launch mode). But if there is neither one nor the other, you are dealing with a big problem. In case you need to work out a UAV mission for a distance of hundreds of kilometres deep into the enemy's rear, where it has to work in autonomous mode, the lack of navigation simply makes it impossible to conduct the mission.

That is why russians seek to gear up their equipment with modules to protect this signal. This allows "Orlan" to perform the function of an aerial photographer for hundreds of kilometres deep into our territory, bringing back the data that the enemy uses, among all, for the conduction of missile strikes.

Proven by years of experience

A lot can be said about the pros and cons of this UAS. However, a few facts are indisputable:

* "Orlan-10" and its other modifications should be considered a massive and fairly effective solution which, at various stages of the confrontation between the russian federation and Ukraine, either gave the russians a complete advantage in the aerial reconnaissance component, or did not allow to lose it.

* The enemy has a significant number of the “Orlan” UAVs and vast opportunities for their use both at the frontline and in Ukraine’s rear.

* The use of “Orlan” type UAVs by the russians in Ukraine (since 2014) and in Syria allowed them to gain a lot of practical experience in such application which was significantly expanded during the full-scale war against Ukraine. This enables russians to make not only military but also engineering decisions. This is especially important given the fact that the enemy possesses large resources and an extensive system of companies and design bureaus that implement and improve these solutions, often quite quickly.

*  There are still no sufficiently effective solutions to protect Ukraine against the activity of these UAVs and the consequences of this activity.

What to oppose?

Despite anything, as of today, we have no analogues of even such an imperfect UAS. It refers to both the technical specifications of this technical solution and the scale, that is, the number of UAVs produced. The point here is that it is not enough to just create a working sample that would bring results. The functioning of mass production and the ability to supply troops and carry out standardisation are necessary. The latter is specifically needed to make it a rather pleasant bonus out of the existing "zoo" of various UAS within the AFU than a problem.

All this should encourage the Ukrainian Defence forces, designers, manufacturers, and state bodies to intensify their work in the direction of design, deployment, and production of their own mass technical solution which would be competitive and able to properly cover the needs of the AFU and other Defence forces participating in the repulsion of russian aggression. In addition, there is a need to speed up the development of tools that would be capable of systematically countering the penetration of enemy UAVs deep into our territory, to our airfields, enterprises, etc.

So, it can be said we are rather dealing with the "working horse" of the aggressor's army, not with an object for jokes. Despite the certain obsolescence and dependence of "Orlan" on Western-made components, it continues performing significant work on the frontline and in the rear, posing a great danger to us. It is a multi-purpose product, capable of correcting the enemy’s artillery on the battlefield, directing missiles and drones at our infrastructure, logistics and military facilities in the rear, as well as carrying out EW/ES tasks. The mass character allows the russians to keep “Orlan” in their arsenal as a "staff" UAS that fits into the system and forms the system itself. This enables maintenance standardisation, operators training, and, at the same time, prevents shortages in UAVs. No UAV of this kind in Ukraine is so massive in numbers.

Saken omkring de russiske dronene som settes i masseproduksjon - vi kan snakker om flere tusen - avslører at noe må gjøre med det globale delvaremarkedet som ingen har kontroll over, ettersom vestlige komponenter er blitt et våpen ikke bare mot ukrainerne, men også må Vesten selv - i en russisk-vestlig krig risikere man at millioner av mennesker kunne bli rammet med våpen med essensielle vestligbygde komponenter. 

no one limits the russians in their ability to fire missiles at Ukraine, which largely consist of Western components. instead, a lot of restrictions were imposed on Ukraine regarding its self-defense. it seems that many would prefer that russia destroy Ukraine and get its resources for further aggression against the West. suicidal logic

Denne logikken kan også omfatte OSS! Jeg vil ikke være overrasket om det er flere titalls millioner elektroniske komponenter fra vestlige land som kan benyttes for produksjon av enhver fra et ICBM til en drone i Russland, Nord-Korea og Iran for minst et par tiår! Det har kommet rapporter om overdrevne salgstall og mangel på elektroniske basisvarer som kom meget overraskende på amerikanske militære som først i vinteren 2023-24 begynte å innse hva det var som hendt; selve reservelagre, ledige produksjon og annet som fantes i tredjelagring har forsvunnet verden rundt. 

Vår liv og sikkerhet er satt i direkte fare som et resultat av delvaremarkedet, som kan ha bidratt sterkt til å hemme den militære opprustningen. 

[Windfarmer]

JK22 skrev (54 minutter siden):

Ukraine’s star brigade in dire state due to lack of weapons and its own mistakes | International | EL PAÍS English (elpais.com)

Det er en trist fortelling om hvordan Donetskfronten kunne ha dels kollapset; 47. brigade har meget seriøse problemer - de har nå bare to tilbake ut av 11 Bradley stormpanservogner, mange var utslått fordi de var allerede sterkt utslitt i forveien, og en tredje som måtte ut av Ukraina for reparasjon. De var desimert under den ukrainske motoffensiven i 2023;

The 47th Brigade is the product of former commander in chief of Ukraine’s Armed Forces Valerii Zaluzhnyi’s commitment to create a flagship unit to lead the counteroffensive in June 2023.

A mechanized infantry brigade is a unit that uses armored personnel carriers. It was founded in the fall of 2022 and in the last year alone, it has had four commanders, an unprecedented turnover.

The first commander of the brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Oleksandr Sak, was relieved in September 2023 after the catastrophic offensive on the Zaporizhia front. The 47th Brigade lost 30% of its soldiers in three months, according to military sources consulted by this newspaper that summer. 

Sak was replaced by Colonel Oleksandr Pavliuk. He held the position until last January. Military members of the brigade publicly accused him of not understanding the internal workings of a structure based on NATO models and of replacing infantry casualties with soldiers who were not prepared for front-line combat operations.

Dmitro Riumshin, Pavlii’s replacement, lasted only two months as commander of the 47th Brigade, from January to March. Several sources consulted say that he was dismissed first due to the high number of casualties in Avdiivka and the second, because he was not close to the new commander in chief of the Armed Forces, Oleksandr Syrskyi.

The howitzers, donated by the United States, were no longer precise enough due to overuse and, more importantly, they no longer needed as many personnel due to the lack of ammunition.

“If we focus so much on the 47th Brigade it is because it is famous, but its problems are seen in the rest of the army,”

Personellmangel. Ammunisjonsmangel. Mangel på evne for å vedlikeholde kjøretøyer og våpen. 

This newspaper interviewed two other soldiers from the 47th Brigade in November 2023. Both have been discharged from the army. One of them, Ivan, captained an infantry squad in the northern sector of Avdiivka, where his soldiers were holed up on the railway tracks. He lost his entire unit, the 17 soldiers were either killed or captured by the enemy.

Russia took Avdiivka in February. Since then, it has advanced six miles in the direction of Pokrovsk, the rear base on the Donetsk southern front. Fear is growing in the farms of the region, which are progressively closing their facilities and moving their machinery to other provinces.

“I know of a company with 80 soldiers that suffered 65 casualties in one week. Before, for every Ukrainian casualty, there were three Russian casualties. Now we are almost on par.”

That’s according to Phoenix, who uses a pseudonym to hide his identity. He’s a civilian who works for the high command on the Pokrovsk front and for the Ukrainian intelligence services.

According to Phoenix, in the northern sector of Avdiivka, the Russians took advantage of the coordination problems between the 47th Brigade and the 25th Airborne Brigade. Magura confirms that in this northern sector, where they are now resisting in the village of Ocheretyne, “there are errors in coordination between brigades, but this is because the situation changes very quickly.”

The scenario is worsening fast for Ukraine, and adapting takes time. Phoenix gives two examples of changes in brigades with NATO armament such as the 47th, changes resulting from Russia’s dominance of airspace thanks to its fleet of reconnaissance drones and bombers:

“The usefulness of the Leopard [German tanks] on the front line is now nil, they don’t last.”

In an article published on Saturday, military officers consulted by The New York Times said that the 47th Brigade lost several U.S. Abrams tanks in Avdiivka because they do not have sufficient short-range anti-aircraft defenses against drones.

It’s not just the threat of attacks from Russian drones, like the Lancet, or smaller aerial vehicles that can destroy a tank’s turret; Magura adds that the enemy has installed anti-tank missile systems in Avdiivka that are difficult to avoid.

“Russian tanks are also dropping like flies, but they have hundreds; if we destroy 10, there are three others that accomplish their mission,” says Phoenix.

The U.S. M-777 howitzer, which in 2022 were key to successful Ukrainian offensives in Kharkov and Kherson, have today taken a back seat, says Phoenix, because they are not self-propelled weapons and operations with them take too long given the Russian air threat.

Doktrineproblemer som ødela den ukrainske motoffensiven da det vist seg at NATO-doktrinen er svært malplassert i en moderne mellomstatlig konflikt mellom teknologiske jevnbyrdige motstandere, har ikke blitt løst; 

“I have spoken with a thousand soldiers on this front and my conclusion is that NATO’s military theory is useless if you do not combine it with the Soviet one, which is the Russian one,” says Phoenix.

 “They are getting better and better every day, their weapons too. And we lack everything,” 

Russernes våpen bli ikke bedre. I virkeligheten er støtteapparatet som har blitt meget sterkt forbedret fordi man hadde tatt fordel av den høyteknologiske overlegenheten innenfor elektronikk - stort sett vestlige komponenter som sanksjonene skulle ha stoppet - for å skape effektiv EW som overgikk enhver ukrainerne har og som NATO er uforberedt på, å forbedre egne samband slik at "kjøttveivalsen" kunne fortsette uhindret - hvis seksti soldater på de tre gjenværende stridsvogner kom fram, er kampen over før et skudd var løst - og presisjonsegenskaper for egne ildledelse og samordning av ildstøtten for de avanserte enhetene. 

Dessuten er det russiske overtaket enormt; 

Magura — the code name of the 28-year-old sergeant, an architect by profession — shares two devastating facts: for every armored infantry vehicle that the Ukrainian army has, the enemy has 10; for every Ukrainian soldier defending the Avdiivka front, there are 30 Russians attacking them.

Det kan bare betyr at de involverte brigadene i Avdijivka-frontsnittet - som er på tre brigader - har så tynne bemannede frontstillinger at bare få hundre soldater om gang er der på flere kilometers bredde, mens russerne sender ut flere tusen menn hver dag i et til to dusin separate fremstøt med to hundre til tre hundre menn om gang. FPV-trusselen betyr dessuten at ukrainerne ikke kunne deployere sine panserkjøretøyer så liberalt, og motortrøbbel som reparasjonsbehov gjør at man har altfor få tilgjengelige kjøretøyer.

De vestligbygde kjøretøyene kunne ikke repareres på feltet; russerne derimot hadde lært seg viktigheten av å fikse opp sine kjøretøyer nærmest mulig frontlinjen, så meget at det er oppstått en "industri" med DIY-virksomhet (DIY - Do It Youself) som sett med blyatmobile-stridsvognene. De har fordel med at de har flere tusen utrangerte kjøretøyer å hente delvarer fra, de kunne bare plyndre flere tusen vrak for å reparere egne kjøretøyer på kort varsel. 

Flytrusselen betyr at man ikke kan bare frakte inn og ut stridsmateriell; mens ukrainerne knapt kunne ramme logistiske mål og mål bak russernes rygg med for lite ammunisjon - kunne russerne derimot sette infrastrukturen bak ukrainerne under effektiv ild med artilleriraketter på 30-50 km hold, glidebomber på 20-30 km hold og kryssermissiler som Iskander-K og Tornado. Ukrainerne forstyrres hele tiden i kontrast til russerne. 

Mens ukrainerne tviholdt på sine underbemannede kampenheter uten meningsfull oppbygning av erstatningsfolk med langvarig trening hadde russerne derimot klarte å bygge opp erstatningspersonell uten tap av kompetanse i løpet av 2023, og dermed kunne sette dem inn i det nye året 2024 fordi de hadde klarte å avbelaste sine styrkene med de månedlige "rekruttene" som sendes i den visse døden for å drukne ukrainerne i blod. Det var en meget stor feil av Zelenskyj å stoppe krigsmobiliseringen i oktober-november 2022! Da slaget om Bakhmut intensiveres i senvinteren, nektet han å starte på nytt og istedenfor mobilisere litt og litt, for å bringe inn dårlige trente menn. Hadde mobiliseringen vært i full styrke uten avbrudd ville personellmangelen ikke ha blitt kritisk i april 2024. 

Dessuten hadde ammunisjonsmangelen blitt katastrofalt; det var oppdaget i sjokk at mye bomull for ammunisjonsproduksjon måtte kjøpes fra Kina som har satt begrensninger på salg, og at robotautomatisering av ammunisjonsproduksjon har skapt produksjonstak som ikke kunne sprenges, da det ikke er mulig; samtidig som politikerne ikke klarte å forstå at direkte inngrep er nødvendig. Kaoset i kongressen ansporet av Trump har fulgt til et halvt år med sulteforing mens europeerne kranglet og kranglet.

Både Ukraina og Vesten hadde feil strategi med for mye arroganse og for lite virkelighetskontakt. 

I krig; all eller ingenting. 

>>>>>Både Ukraina og Vesten hadde feil strategi med for mye arroganse og for lite virkelighetskontakt.

Men dette sa jo jeg allerede våren 2022.

Vi hadde tidligere øverstkommanderende i NATO - General Ben Hodges - som hevdet at Krym ville bli erobret senhøsten 2022.

Det vesten har undervurdert, er at Russland er en nasjon som er basert på krig, død og konflikt, og der krig er en helt naturlig del av dagliglivet. Så dagligdags, at selv barn i fem - seks års alderen får kjenne på en AK - 47, og blir fortalt at dette er hva du skal tenke på, konsentrere deg om, og hva du skal benytte ditt yrkesaktive liv med for å lykkes.

Det er dette svinepakket vi står overfor, og da hjelper det lite å sende noen hjelmer og skuddsikre vester.

At Europa nå er i ferd med å våkne er jo et lyspunkt, og at USA i følge Winston Churchill også er i ferd med å våkne er jo enda et lyspunkt:

"Americans Will Always Do the Right Thing — After Exhausting All the Alternatives."

 

   

Endret 27. april av Windfarmer

[JK22]

Some thoughts about the supplemental bill. This is good news, but it will primarily help Ukraine defend in 2024 and into 2025. Russia will still likely make further gains this year, and it doesn't fix all of Ukraine's issues. It should be seen as one part of a long-term strategy.

Ukraine has had three main problems since Russia seized the initiative in October: ammunition, manpower, and fortifications. Ukraine is making progress building fortifications and multiple defensive lines, but defenses on many of the key parts of the front are still underdeveloped, contributing to Russian advances.

The bill and first PDA aid package announced this week will provide a quick boost to Ukraine's defenses. But it is important to keep in mind that the limitations aren't just appropriated funds but also production capacity and size of stockpiles. Greater artillery ammunition deliveries will help reduce Russia's 5-6:1 artillery advantage, but it will not give Ukraine parity.

The PDA package will also provide other critical ammunition like anti-tank mines and Javelin/TOW ATGMs. Recent Russian advances have demonstrated that increased numbers of FPVs cannot replace artillery, mines, and ATGMs. Russia's assault on Vuhledar in 2023 and Ukraine's offensive last summer demonstrated how effective mines can be for defending forces.

Further deliveries of armored vehicles will also be important. Many Ukrainian brigades don't have sufficient armored vehicles, and combat losses often aren't replaced. This leads to higher casualties. Bradleys are very popular, armored humvees will help, and further M113 would be very useful for CASEVAC.

Air defense is another critical Ukrainian need. Russia has resumed its missile campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and UMPK glide bombs, which played a key role in Russia's seizure of Avdiivka, are a serious problem. More recently, Russian Su-25 attack aircraft have been operating closer to the front than normal, which indicates a lack of SHORAD and MANPADS.

The USAI package announced today includes Patriot and NASAMS missiles and the PDA included Stinger MANPADS and RIM-7/AIM-9M missiles reportedly for FrankeSAM systems. Stingers could help push Su-25 further from the front line, and Patriots are critical both for defending cities and infrastructure from Russian ballistic missiles and also to counter Russian Su-34 bombers that drop UMPK glide bombs.

The question is whether production of these missiles is sufficient to meet Ukraine's continued air defense needs over time, especially with increased Russian production of Shahed UAS and missiles. F-16 fighters and their airbases will be another priority target for Russian missiles that will require air defense coverage. It also depends how successful the various FrankenSAM programs prove to be.

Manpower has become the most pressing issue though, which was exacerbated by reduced deliveries of ammunition and equipment over the winter. Ukraine's summer offensive primarily culminated when it ran out of infantry, and Ukraine has struggled to replace combat losses since then.

This means that Ukrainian brigades are understrength, and Ukraine lacks sufficient reserves to respond to Russian advances, so units are pulled from one part of the front to attempt to stop advances elsewhere. Ukrainian infantry need to be rotated more often or there will be a growing risk of exhaustion.

Ukraine has passed a new mobilization bill that provides incentives for volunteers and increases the pool of men available to be drafted. Hopefully, this will improve the manpower situation, but it will take time to mobilize and train soldiers/units.

More concerning is that the manpower issue has been known for some time, but has not been fixed. The longer it takes to improve the manpower situation, the less likely it becomes that Ukraine can conduct a offensive in 2025. The new NATO-trained/equipped brigades last summer did not have enough time to train together, and Russian defenses will still be strong. New soldiers/units need to be mobilized to replace current losses and trained for 2025.

At the same time, one of the most important factors in the war last year was that Russia was able to significantly improve its manpower situation, recruiting more than 300,000 volunteers.

It isn't just involuntary mobilized soldiers and prisoners, they are mostly getting volunteers who are willing to go into costly assaults. The quality, of course, varies, but the quantitative advantage is a serious problem.

Without this manpower advantage, Russia's artillery and airpower advantage would not be sufficient for Russia to make gains on the battlefield. The relative manpower situation is likely the most important factor that will determine the war's trajectory, particularly if Russia can sustain recruiting 20-30k a month.

The immediate problem is that Russia continues to advance on the battlefield, and has reached important locations while Ukraine faced ammunition shortages. Russia is bringing up reserves to Chasiv Yar, and will likely soon begin an assault on the city.

Russian forces are also expanding their foothold in Ocheretyne, which threatens Ukrainian positions nearby, and they have advanced into Krasnohrivka and have made recent gains on the Marinka-Novomykhailivka front.

Even with increased ammunition deliveries/expenditure, Ukraine might not be able to hold Chasiv Yar and other of these towns/cities, and Russia faces more favorable terrain once they get past Chasiv Yar, which could lead to an increase in the rate of advance. If Chasiv Yar falls, it will also put Ukrainian positions south of the city at risk. This is true for further Russian advances elsewhere. The delays in aid/mobilization have been costly.

If Ukraine can stabilize the front and fix the manpower situation in 2024 when Russia has a number of advantages, 2025 could be more favorable because Western production capacity will increase and Russian equipment losses could become a greater issue. If the manpower situation does not improve, then the second half of 2024 will likely be more difficult for Ukraine than the first half.

This bill will be vital, but it needs to be part of a broader long-term strategy for Ukraine. Western countries need to consider how to help Ukraine compensate for Russia's current advantages, including increased deliveries of long-range missiles.

Rob Lee har talt; Ukraina har kommet ut i meget seriøse trøbbel pga. mangel på menn og ammunisjon. Demografisk sett hadde Ukraina nådd den kritiske grensen på 250,000 (døde, skadde) - høyere enn dette vil få alvorlige samfunnskonsekvenser og de trenger en halv million nye soldater i 2024 og eventuelt 2025. Det er en million avmønstrede soldater i Ukraina, men de kan ikke settes inn i aktiv tjeneste på nytt, da disse må erstattes. Mange hadde dessuten avmønstret i nyere tid pga. moralfall og ønsker ikke å slåss på nytt, de er i ferd med å komme i den samme stemningen som de franske soldatene under Nivelleoffensiven i 1917, som sluttet med et mytteri. 

De mange opptakene fra Donetskfronten vist at de russiske tapene har kraftig forminsket i de siste uker - i en krig hvor 90 % av tapene skyldes artilleri mener uteblivelse av ukrainsk artilleri at russerne ikke lenge mistet så mange menn som i november-februar. Til gjengjeldelse er de materielle tapene så enormt, at russerne mer og mer fant seg tom for tilgjengelige kjøretøyer, man deretter forsøkt å ta vare på etter best evne. 

Sullivan, Biden, McConnell, Trump og Jackson kan ha kostet oss enhver i slutten, på mer enn et halvt år kan 100,000 soldater ha blitt drept, tatt til fange, skadet og avmønstret sammen med tapet av meget strategiske viktige territorier. Dessuten er det oppstått et stort etterslep som Lee skildrer, som gjør at det kan ta hele året for å returnere til en fordelaktig situasjon på nytt. 

I Kyiv har det blitt klart at Zelenskyjs aggresjonslinje har vist seg altfor kostbart der man hadde gamblet sterkt på motoffensiven, men hans motvilje mot å tappe ut de menneskelige ressursene i en meget blodig krig og Zaluzjnyjs valg av strategi om størst mulig press i bredde for å tappe russerne for menn og våpen skyldes at man hadde vært i troen om at et avgjørende slag og etterfølgende tap for Putin ville tvinge fram politiske innrømmelser. Zaluzjnyj var dessuten ikke, som det var sett i ettertiden, en tilhenger av passiv-defensiv strategi i motsetning til Syrskyj. 

Det har i ettertiden vist seg at man hadde overfokus på Krim-halvøya med sin "strategisk plafring" som så langt har produsert lite annet enn en voksende regningsliste for Putin, som kan betale det samt betale i gull for alle menn som melder seg til krig takket være gulfaraberne og kineserne - (og Vesten) - og selv om raffinerier tas ut, vist det seg at det ikke vil ha rask virkning i det korte løpet. 

Ukraina kan ikke vinne i dette året. Det eneste som da gjenstår, er å selge seg så dyrt som mulig mens NATO går inn for å finne ut hvordan å stanse bruk av vestlige komponenter i russiske systemer og nøytralisere all EW-virksomhet, ettersom det på sikte er en meget stor trussel mot dem om Ukraina taper eller tvinges til kapitulasjon. 

Den politiske ledelsen i Vesten er apekatter med spikepistoler!!!! 

Endret 27. april av JK22

[Windfarmer]

JK22 skrev (29 minutter siden):

Some thoughts about the supplemental bill. This is good news, but it will primarily help Ukraine defend in 2024 and into 2025. Russia will still likely make further gains this year, and it doesn't fix all of Ukraine's issues. It should be seen as one part of a long-term strategy.

Ukraine has had three main problems since Russia seized the initiative in October: ammunition, manpower, and fortifications. Ukraine is making progress building fortifications and multiple defensive lines, but defenses on many of the key parts of the front are still underdeveloped, contributing to Russian advances.

The bill and first PDA aid package announced this week will provide a quick boost to Ukraine's defenses. But it is important to keep in mind that the limitations aren't just appropriated funds but also production capacity and size of stockpiles. Greater artillery ammunition deliveries will help reduce Russia's 5-6:1 artillery advantage, but it will not give Ukraine parity.

The PDA package will also provide other critical ammunition like anti-tank mines and Javelin/TOW ATGMs. Recent Russian advances have demonstrated that increased numbers of FPVs cannot replace artillery, mines, and ATGMs. Russia's assault on Vuhledar in 2023 and Ukraine's offensive last summer demonstrated how effective mines can be for defending forces.

Further deliveries of armored vehicles will also be important. Many Ukrainian brigades don't have sufficient armored vehicles, and combat losses often aren't replaced. This leads to higher casualties. Bradleys are very popular, armored humvees will help, and further M113 would be very useful for CASEVAC.

Air defense is another critical Ukrainian need. Russia has resumed its missile campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and UMPK glide bombs, which played a key role in Russia's seizure of Avdiivka, are a serious problem. More recently, Russian Su-25 attack aircraft have been operating closer to the front than normal, which indicates a lack of SHORAD and MANPADS.

The USAI package announced today includes Patriot and NASAMS missiles and the PDA included Stinger MANPADS and RIM-7/AIM-9M missiles reportedly for FrankeSAM systems. Stingers could help push Su-25 further from the front line, and Patriots are critical both for defending cities and infrastructure from Russian ballistic missiles and also to counter Russian Su-34 bombers that drop UMPK glide bombs.

The question is whether production of these missiles is sufficient to meet Ukraine's continued air defense needs over time, especially with increased Russian production of Shahed UAS and missiles. F-16 fighters and their airbases will be another priority target for Russian missiles that will require air defense coverage. It also depends how successful the various FrankenSAM programs prove to be.

Manpower has become the most pressing issue though, which was exacerbated by reduced deliveries of ammunition and equipment over the winter. Ukraine's summer offensive primarily culminated when it ran out of infantry, and Ukraine has struggled to replace combat losses since then.

This means that Ukrainian brigades are understrength, and Ukraine lacks sufficient reserves to respond to Russian advances, so units are pulled from one part of the front to attempt to stop advances elsewhere. Ukrainian infantry need to be rotated more often or there will be a growing risk of exhaustion.

Ukraine has passed a new mobilization bill that provides incentives for volunteers and increases the pool of men available to be drafted. Hopefully, this will improve the manpower situation, but it will take time to mobilize and train soldiers/units.

More concerning is that the manpower issue has been known for some time, but has not been fixed. The longer it takes to improve the manpower situation, the less likely it becomes that Ukraine can conduct a offensive in 2025. The new NATO-trained/equipped brigades last summer did not have enough time to train together, and Russian defenses will still be strong. New soldiers/units need to be mobilized to replace current losses and trained for 2025.

At the same time, one of the most important factors in the war last year was that Russia was able to significantly improve its manpower situation, recruiting more than 300,000 volunteers.

It isn't just involuntary mobilized soldiers and prisoners, they are mostly getting volunteers who are willing to go into costly assaults. The quality, of course, varies, but the quantitative advantage is a serious problem.

Without this manpower advantage, Russia's artillery and airpower advantage would not be sufficient for Russia to make gains on the battlefield. The relative manpower situation is likely the most important factor that will determine the war's trajectory, particularly if Russia can sustain recruiting 20-30k a month.

The immediate problem is that Russia continues to advance on the battlefield, and has reached important locations while Ukraine faced ammunition shortages. Russia is bringing up reserves to Chasiv Yar, and will likely soon begin an assault on the city.

Russian forces are also expanding their foothold in Ocheretyne, which threatens Ukrainian positions nearby, and they have advanced into Krasnohrivka and have made recent gains on the Marinka-Novomykhailivka front.

Even with increased ammunition deliveries/expenditure, Ukraine might not be able to hold Chasiv Yar and other of these towns/cities, and Russia faces more favorable terrain once they get past Chasiv Yar, which could lead to an increase in the rate of advance. If Chasiv Yar falls, it will also put Ukrainian positions south of the city at risk. This is true for further Russian advances elsewhere. The delays in aid/mobilization have been costly.

If Ukraine can stabilize the front and fix the manpower situation in 2024 when Russia has a number of advantages, 2025 could be more favorable because Western production capacity will increase and Russian equipment losses could become a greater issue. If the manpower situation does not improve, then the second half of 2024 will likely be more difficult for Ukraine than the first half.

This bill will be vital, but it needs to be part of a broader long-term strategy for Ukraine. Western countries need to consider how to help Ukraine compensate for Russia's current advantages, including increased deliveries of long-range missiles.

Rob Lee har talt; Ukraina har kommet ut i meget seriøse trøbbel pga. mangel på menn og ammunisjon. Demografisk sett hadde Ukraina nådd den kritiske grensen på 250,000 (døde, skadde) - høyere enn dette vil få alvorlige samfunnskonsekvenser og de trenger en halv million nye soldater i 2024 og eventuelt 2025. Det er en million avmønstrede soldater i Ukraina, men de kan ikke settes inn i aktiv tjeneste på nytt, da disse må erstattes. Mange hadde dessuten avmønstret i nyere tid pga. moralfall og ønsker ikke å slåss på nytt, de er i ferd med å komme i den samme stemningen som de franske soldatene under Nivelleoffensiven i 1917, som sluttet med et mytteri. 

De mange opptakene fra Donetskfronten vist at de russiske tapene har kraftig forminsket i de siste uker - i en krig hvor 90 % av tapene skyldes artilleri mener uteblivelse av ukrainsk artilleri at russerne ikke lenge mistet så mange menn som i november-februar. Til gjengjeldelse er de materielle tapene så enormt, at russerne mer og mer fant seg tom for tilgjengelige kjøretøyer, man deretter forsøkt å ta vare på etter best evne. 

Sullivan, Biden, McConnell, Trump og Jackson kan ha kostet oss enhver i slutten, på mer enn et halvt år kan 100,000 soldater ha blitt drept, tatt til fange, skadet og avmønstret sammen med tapet av meget strategiske viktige territorier. Dessuten er det oppstått et stort etterslep som Lee skildrer, som gjør at det kan ta hele året for å returnere til en fordelaktig situasjon på nytt. 

I Kyiv har det blitt klart at Zelenskyjs aggresjonslinje har vist seg altfor kostbart der man hadde gamblet sterkt på motoffensiven, men hans motvilje mot å tappe ut de menneskelige ressursene i en meget blodig krig og Zaluzjnyjs valg av strategi om størst mulig press i bredde for å tappe russerne for menn og våpen skyldes at man hadde vært i troen om at et avgjørende slag og etterfølgende tap for Putin ville tvinge fram politiske innrømmelser. Zaluzjnyj var dessuten ikke, som det var sett i ettertiden, en tilhenger av passiv-defensiv strategi i motsetning til Syrskyj. 

Det har i ettertiden vist seg at man hadde overfokus på Krim-halvøya med sin "strategisk plafring" som så langt har produsert lite annet enn en voksende regningsliste for Putin, som kan betale det samt betale i gull for alle menn som melder seg til krig takket være gulfaraberne og kineserne - (og Vesten) - og selv om raffinerier tas ut, vist det seg at det ikke vil ha rask virkning i det korte løpet. 

Ukraina kan ikke vinne i dette året. Det eneste som da gjenstår, er å selge seg så dyrt som mulig mens NATO går inn for å finne ut hvordan å stanse bruk av vestlige komponenter i russiske systemer og nøytralisere all EW-virksomhet, ettersom det på sikte er en meget stor trussel mot dem om Ukraina taper eller tvinges til kapitulasjon. 

Den politiske ledelsen i Vesten er apekatter med spikepistoler!!!! 

Jeg er ikke helt der.

Denne krigen begynner gradvis å bli følbar for den vestlige og Europeiske identitet.

Til og med Macron begynner nå å bli stor i kjeften.

[Brother Ursus]

 

Australia hoster opp MANPADS. Good on ya mate.

[Brother Ursus]

https://www.businesstoday.in/india/story/3-indian-companies-under-us-sanctions-for-illicit-trade-and-ties-with-iran-427171-2024-04-27

3 Indian companies under US sanctions for 'illicit trade' and ties with Iran

The US Department of Treasury, in an official statement, said, “These companies, individuals and vessels have played a central role in facilitating and financing the clandestine sale of Iranian UAVs to Russia’s war in Ukraine.”

 

 

https://mil.in.ua/en/news/the-construction-of-fortifications-began-in-the-east-of-latvia/

The construction of fortifications began in the east of Latvia

 

 

https://www.nytimes.com/2024/04/27/world/europe/china-spies.html?unlocked_article_code=1.nk0.Rl3k.TGh9d0jAPejX

Suddenly, Chinese Spies Seem to Be Popping Up All Over Europe

A flurry of arrests this week reflect the continent’s newly toughened response to Beijing’s espionage activities and political meddling.

 

 

https://www.kyivpost.com/post/31734

Kremlin Troops Dug Into Chornobyl’s Irradiated Dirt, Cooked Food Over Radioactive Campfires, Thousands Exposed

 

 

https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2024/04/us-army-sends-heavy-equipment-norwegian-arctic-port-narvik-transfer-finland

US Army sends heavy equipment to Norwegian Arctic port of Narvik for transfer to Finland

[Brother Ursus]

 

 

[Brother Ursus]

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/apr/27/elite-force-bucks-trend-of-ukrainian-losses-on-eastern-front

Elite force bucks trend of Ukrainian losses on eastern front

The Azov brigade, which leaders say has a culture of ‘mutual respect’, is tasked with repelling relentless Russian attacks as the invaders make most of artillery mismatch

 

[Brother Ursus]

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/04/27/7453276/

Ukrainian forces dismiss as fake information about withdrawal of Abrams tanks from battlefield due to drones

The 47th Separate Mechanised Brigade of Ukraine's Armed Forces has dismissed as fake the report by the Associated Press that the Ukrainian Defence Forces have withdrawn US-supplied Abrams tanks from the battlefield due to the threat of Russian drone attacks.

 

[Brother Ursus]

https://www.wsj.com/world/russia/alexei-navalny-death-us-intelligence-71bc95b0

Putin Didn’t Directly Order Alexei Navalny’s February Death, U.S. Spy Agencies Find

The finding, which doesn’t absolve the Russian leader of ultimate responsibility, deepens the mystery surrounding the dissident’s death at an Arctic gulag

[Thor.]

Overskrift fra Reddit: Lloyd Austin when asked if Ukraine using ATACAMS on russian territory was a concern, “It’s up to them on how and when to use it and our hopes are they’ll create some pretty good effects”. That smirk though…..

28:00-29:30

[Thor.]

russerne prøver nå å beskytte oljelagre mot droneangrep:

 

 

[Mannen med ljåen]

 

Ukrainsk popmusikk som latterliggjør Z´iske soldater i Ukraina. Det er jo lørdagskveld.

[torbjornen]

Thor. skrev (39 minutter siden):

Overskrift fra Reddit: Lloyd Austin when asked if Ukraine using ATACAMS on russian territory was a concern, “It’s up to them on how and when to use it and our hopes are they’ll create some pretty good effects”. That smirk though…..

28:00-29:30

Dette var på tide!