Russlands invasjon av Ukraina [Ny tråd, les førstepost]

[Brother Ursus]

Ukrainsk luftkondisjonering 😄

 

 

[JK22]

Brother Ursus skrev (1 time siden):

https://themessenger.com/opinion/ukraine-proves-once-again-that-our-idea-of-war-is-all-wrong

Ukraine Proves, Once Again, That Our Idea of War Is All Wrong

Lt. Gen. (Ret.) James M. Dubik

"US. and NATO military strategists are taught that the decisive part of a war resides in the major combat operations phase. America’s post-9/11 wars and the Ukraine War have proven that’s not so. Rather, using force during major combat operations, and after, together form the necessary and sufficient conditions to achieve the strategic political objectives of a war.

For the U.S. and other Ukraine allies this means a full commitment to supplying, on time, what the Ukrainian military needs to succeed in its counteroffensive. It also means an equal commitment to orchestrating all that is necessary to move from the end of major fighting through transitional stability to a durable political, economic and security situation in the region. Without both, neither Ukraine’s nor the allies’ strategic objectives will be realized.

The Zelenskyy administration’s aims of political sovereignty and territorial integrity allowing for self-determination and economic prosperity will not be accomplished merely by fighting to eject Russian troops from Ukrainian soil. It’s also in the allies’ strategic self-interest to continue to provide the aid and support to help Ukraine defeat Russia. The assistance that the U.S., NATO and other allies are providing helps to secure NATO’s borders, deters the war from escalating or widening, prevents an anarchical world in which illegal aggression becomes a norm, and sets conditions for holding Vladimir Putin and Russia accountable for the many heinous war crimes.  

Winning in Ukraine is a form of deterrence from which both America and NATO will derive strategic benefit.

To attain Ukraine’s, America’s and NATO’s strategic political war aims, some form of international military force — that can create stability in the immediate post-major combat period, as well as establish the conditions for long-term security, diplomacy, humanitarian assistance, economic and fiscal recovery — will be necessary for a good while after major fighting ends. This international stability force also will be necessary to separate forces and monitor Russia’s withdrawal, assure a proper environment exists to investigate and document the extensive and horrendous Russian war crimes, provide unimpeded movement for returning refugees and evacuees, allow for social/political reconstitution within Ukraine and the region, assist in demining, ameliorate the potential for corruption, and prevent Russia from using “deniable” forces like its special operations units, contractors and criminal gangs to foment instability. 

The types of tasks described above are commonly misunderstood as “post-war” operations. But they are very much part of any war; they just occur after major fighting ends. The true measure of force’s utility, as Gen. Sir Rupert Smith reminds us in The Utility of Force, is “whether or not [the] death and destruction serve to achieve the … political purpose the force was intended to achieve.” 

This reality has been opaque to most American military and civilian strategists. For over three decades, the common view of war, for them, has been that war is a rapid, decisive operation, as exemplified in the Panama Invasion (December 1989-January 1990) and the First Gulf War (August 1990-February 1991). Both operations were done quickly and decisively and with minimum casualties. These operations became America’s model of war, the standard by which all war was measured. The problem is that the model is a myth. 

The technologies emerging in the mid-to-late 1990s inspired academicians, strategists and leaders — some in uniform — to promulgate the false belief that the nature of war had changed.  Some advocates even thought that information would be so accurate and ubiquitous that the fog of war would be lifted, ending uncertainty and ambiguity. The model defined war too narrowly:  major combat operations, fighting that was conventional, technology-enhanced, rapid, and decisive. All other uses of force were “not war,” and assigned euphemistic titles like Military Operations Other than War, Peacekeeping Operations, Peace Enforcement Operations, Counterterrorist Operations, Stability Operations, Nation Building, Humanitarian Assistance Operations, Grey Zone Operations, or Shadow War. 

Then reality spoke: America’s post-9/11 wars did not fit the model, though we tried to apply it nonetheless. In a relatively rapid set of major combat operations the U.S. rid Afghanistan of the Taliban government and routed al Qaeda. When those operations were completed, in the minds of many, the war was over. What followed, by definition, was “not war.” Thus, U.S. strategy and attention lost focus, and the war dragged on. Ultimately, the U.S. withdrew, and the Taliban returned. The same approach governed the initial invasion of Iraq. A campaign of rapid major combat operations destroyed Saddam Hussein’s army. Again, in the minds of too many, the war was over and what followed was “not war.” America’s strategy dithered, the troop surge of 2007-2009 prevented defeat and offered American leaders a potential success, but the U.S withdrew, only having to return several years later, leaving Iraq a fragile and unfinished success — at best.

In both cases, one of the main reasons America faltered was that its model for using force to achieve its strategic political objectives (i.e., war) was deficient. America’s faltering strategic performance in Afghanistan and Iraq mattered. These U.S. failures — and a weak U.S. response to Putin’s initial illegal invasion of Ukraine in 2014 — contributed to Putin’s belief that he could get away with his second aggression against the Ukraine government and people in 2022. 

Winning the Ukraine War matters even more. The outcome of this war will affect the kind of world that emerges: one in which respect for international norms holds or one where more “Ukraines” flare up in Europe and elsewhere. It’s in America’s long-term interest to encourage the former and prevent the latter.

War is a test of wills and requires learning. American will is being tested in the Ukraine War. And the coming months will tell whether U.S. strategists have learned from the mistakes of the post-9/11 wars or will repeat them. The stakes are too high to fail the test or fail to learn."

 

Dubik er inn på det samme som meg, at Vesten hadde gjort meget alvorlige feilvurderinger som ledet til veldige store problemer og en forverret sikkerhetspolitisk situasjon, vi har glemt hva det vil så å føre krig. Hvis irakerne hadde gjort sterk motstand i 2003 eller hvis mange flere NATO-fly var skutt ned over Jugoslavia, er det mulig at denne myten ville aldri ha fått et liv i seg selv. Dagens situasjon skyldes vestlig arroganse og innbilskhet skapt av konfliktene i 1991-2003. Vi var kommet til å tro vi var blitt uovervinnelig, urørlig og for sneversynt. 

[alperose]

aomt skrev (På 26.2.2022 den 16.31):

Kva mener du med "gjør så godt de kan"? Det er jo din subjektiv synsing, uten at du har noe fakta på kva som faktisk skjer i Ukraina. Ukritisk sitere Ukrainske kilder? Skrive om 5% av Ukrainere (korleis de villig til å dø for landet), mens droppe å skrive om 95% av de som ikkje ønskjer å dø for landet/som ikkje bryr seg om kas regjering det er i landet? Ja, eg er kritisk til slik propaganda. 
Eg bryr meg null og nada om russisk propaganda. Som sagt, det er Putin diktatur og propaganda er noe ein forventer. Eg har null sympati med den. 

For meg er det ikkje viktig å "skape en samlet front mot Russland". For meg er det viktig er færrest mulig folk dør. Hele poenget med propaganda er manipulere fakta for å "skape samlet front" - få frem sine poeng, ofte på bekostning av hundre tusen menneskjeliv. 
Mener du "Ukrainsk friheit" er viktigere enn menneskjeliv, er du hjertelig velkommen å reise til Ukraina og slåss der. Zelenskij har inveter alle som ønskjer å gjøre det. Men nei, DITT liv er viktigere enn friheit, men du er villig til å kaste andre under tanks? Er ikkje det "litt" feil?

Hvor har du fra at 95% av den ukrainske befolkning er mot krigen? Det er nytt for meg da? 

[Brother Ursus]

Dette er de samme retoriske argumentene vi ser fra Russland også. Men færrest mulig dør når Russland kastes ut av Ukraina. Inkludert russiske soldater. Det er fremdeles "low end" 3 ganger så store tap på russisk side. Sansyneligvis kanskje 4-5 ganger. Russland har fremdeles også ambisjoner om å folkemyrde Ukraina. Dersom man mener alvor at så få som mulig skal dø, så gjelder det å gi Ukraina muligheten til å gjøre jobben, slik at de kan kaste ut russerne så raskt som mulig. Russisk propaganda velger også å fokusere på og blåse opp ukrainske problemer mens man minimerer sine egne. En form for psykologisk projisering, i min oppfatning. I realiteten har Russland, til tross for at det er et langt mer folksomt land, mye større problemer med å finne nok soldater.

Endret 22. august 2023 av Brother Ursus

[Gjest Gjest slettet-ld9eg7s96q]

Brother Ursus skrev (29 minutter siden):

Dette er de samme retoriske argumentene vi ser fra Russland også. Men færrest mulig dør når Russland kastes ut av Ukraina. Inkludert russiske soldater. Det er fremdeles "low end" 3 ganger så store tap på russisk side. Sansyneligvis kanskje 4-5 ganger. Russland har fremdeles også ambisjoner om å folkemyrde Ukraina. Dersom man mener alvor at så få som mulig skal dø, så gjelder det å gi Ukraina muligheten til å gjøre jobben, slik at de kan kaste ut russerne så raskt som mulig. Russisk propaganda velger også å fokusere på og blåse opp ukrainske problemer mens man minimerer sine egne. En form for psykologisk projisering, i min oppfatning. I realiteten har Russland, til tross for at det er et langt mer folksomt land, mye større problemer med å finne nok soldater.

Alle gyldige og gode poeng, ser ikke helt vitsen med å dra frem nesten to år gamle forumposter fra tråden slik @alperose gjør, men.

[Dragavon]

Sitat

 

- Rikingene blir satt på plass, noe dette er et eksempel på, sier Jørn Holm-Hansen, Russland-ekspert og forsker ved By- og regionforskningsinstituttet NIBR ved OsloMet, til Børsen.

Nylig ble det kjent at Andrej Melnitsjenko, Russlands rikeste mann, som har tjent seg styrtrik på gjødsel og kull ved å starte selskapene EuroChem og SUEK, har fått Vladimir Putin og hans regime på nakken.

 

https://borsen.dagbladet.no/nyheter/strammer-grepet/80084011

[Dragavon]

Kanskje interresant for noen her?
 

Sitat

Interessant og dagsaktuelt frokostseminar ved Forsvarsmuseet fredag 1. september 2023 kl. 08:00. - Åpent for alle interesserte.
Det er skrevet mye om krigen i Ukraina, men mindre om moderne krigføring mer generelt. Hva kjennetegner krigføring i vår tid? Med bakgrunn i den nylig utgitte boken Krigføring – hvordan kriger planlegges, utføres og vinnes vil forskningssjef ved Forsvarets museer, oberstløytnant Harald Høiback, løfte fram noen av de viktigste læringspunktene. Deretter vil sjefen for kompani Hegra i HV-12, major Otto Løvland, redegjøre for sine observasjoner etter å ha deltatt i opptrening av ukrainske mannskaper i Norge.

https://www.flysam.no/informasjon/nyheter/vis/?T=Hva har krigen i Ukraina lært oss om krigføring%3F&ID=37861&af=1&source=li

[Brother Ursus]

https://www.nytimes.com/2023/08/22/us/politics/ukraine-counteroffensive-russia-war.html

American strategists say Ukraine’s troops are too spread out and need to concentrate along the counteroffensive’s main front in the south.

Spoiler

Rows of marines in military uniform doing planks and push-ups on a dirt road in front of a field growing plants.
Ukrainian marines training in the Zaporizhzhia region before heading to the frontline. American officials say more Ukrainian forces should be near Zaporizhzhia and in the south of the country.Credit...David Guttenfelder for The New York Times
Rows of marines in military uniform doing planks and push-ups on a dirt road in front of a field growing plants.
Eric SchmittJulian E. BarnesHelene CooperThomas Gibbons-Neff

By Eric Schmitt, Julian E. Barnes, Helene Cooper and Thomas Gibbons-Neff

Eric Schmitt, Julian E. Barnes and Helene Cooper reported from Washington, and Thomas Gibbons-Neff from Kyiv, Ukraine.
Aug. 22, 2023Updated 3:47 p.m. ET

Ukraine’s grinding counteroffensive is struggling to break through entrenched Russian defenses in large part because it has too many troops, including some of its best combat units, in the wrong places, American and other Western officials say.

The main goal of the counteroffensive is to cut off Russian supply lines in southern Ukraine by severing the so-called land bridge between Russia and the occupied Crimean Peninsula. But instead of focusing on that, Ukrainian commanders have divided troops and firepower roughly equally between the east and the south, the U.S. officials said.

As a result, more Ukrainian forces are near Bakhmut and other cities in the east than are near Melitopol and Berdiansk in the south, both far more strategically significant fronts, officials say.

American planners have advised Ukraine to concentrate on the front driving toward Melitopol, Kyiv’s top priority, and on punching through Russian minefields and other defenses, even if the Ukrainians lose more soldiers and equipment in the process.

Only with a change of tactics and a dramatic move can the tempo of the counteroffensive change, said one U.S. official, who like the other half a dozen Western officials interviewed for this article spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss internal deliberations.

Another U.S. official said the Ukrainians were too spread out and needed to consolidate their combat power in one place.

Nearly three months into the counteroffensive, the Ukrainians may be taking the advice to heart, especially as casualties continue to mount and Russia still holds an edge in troops and equipment.

In a video teleconference on Aug. 10, Gen. Mark A. Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; his British counterpart, Adm. Sir Tony Radakin; and Gen. Christopher Cavoli, the top U.S. commander in Europe, urged Ukraine’s most senior military commander, Gen. Valeriy Zaluzhnyi, to focus on one main front. And, according to two officials briefed on the call, General Zaluzhnyi agreed.
Image
Sir Tony Radakin wearing a formal British military uniform with many medals pinned to his chest and a white and gold hat.
Adm. Sir Tony Radakin of Britain has developed close ties with his Ukrainian counterparts during multiple trips to the country.Credit...Pool photo by Andrew Milligan
Sir Tony Radakin wearing a formal British military uniform with many medals pinned to his chest and a white and gold hat.

Admiral Radakin’s role has been especially important and not widely appreciated until now, the officials said. General Milley speaks to General Zaluzhnyi every week or so about strategy and Ukrainian military needs. But the Biden administration has prohibited senior U.S. officers from visiting Ukraine for security reasons and to avoid increasing tensions with Moscow. Britain, however, has imposed no such constraints, and Admiral Radakin, a polished officer who served three tours in Iraq, has developed close ties with his Ukrainian counterpart during multiple trips to the country.

American officials say there are indications that Ukraine has started to shift some of its more seasoned combat forces from the east to the south. But even the most experienced units have been reconstituted a number of times after taking heavy casualties. These units rely on a shrinking cadre of senior commanders. Some platoons are mostly staffed by soldiers who have been wounded and returned to fight.
The State of the War

    A Staggering Toll: The total number of Ukrainian and Russian troops killed or wounded since the war began is nearing 500,000, U.S. officials said.
    On the Front Line: Despite grueling fighting, Ukrainian commanders say their forces are in better shape now than just months ago, while Russian troops appear worse off.
    F-16 Fighter Jets: The Netherlands and Denmark said they would donate F-16s to Ukraine — the first countries to do so. The procurement of the American-made fighter jets has been a priority for Kyiv.

Ukraine has penetrated at least one layer of Russian defenses in the south in recent days and is increasing the pressure, U.S. and Ukrainian officials said. It is close to taking control of Robotyne, a village in the south that is near the next line of Russian defenses. Taking the village, American officials said, would be a good sign.

A spokesman for the Ukrainian military did not respond to text messages or phone calls on Tuesday.

But some analysts say the progress may be too little too late. The fighting is taking place on mostly flat, unforgiving terrain, which favors the defenders. The Russians are battling from concealed positions that Ukrainian soldiers often see only when they are feet away. Hours after Ukrainians clear a field of mines, the Russians sometimes fire another rocket that disperses more of them at the same location.

Under American war doctrine, there is always a main effort to ensure that maximum resources go to a single front, even if supporting forces are fighting in other areas to hedge against failure or spread-out enemy defenses.

But Ukraine and Russia fight under old Soviet Communist doctrine, which seeks to minimize rivalries among factions of the army by providing equal amounts of manpower and equipment across commands. Both armies have failed to prioritize their most important objectives, officials say.
Image
Two men hold the arms of an elderly woman as she cries and touches a coffin draped in a Ukrainian flag.
Valentyna Kovalova’s son, a Ukrainian officer, was killed in combat in the southern frontline with Russia.Credit...Finbarr O'Reilly for The New York Times
Two men hold the arms of an elderly woman as she cries and touches a coffin draped in a Ukrainian flag.

Ukraine’s continued focus on Bakhmut, the scene of one of the bloodiest battles of the war, has perplexed U.S. intelligence and military officials. Ukraine has invested huge amounts of resources in defending the surrounding Donbas region, and Ukraine’s president, Volodymyr Zelensky, does not want to appear as though he is giving up on trying to retake lost territory. But U.S. officials say politics must, at least temporarily, take a back seat to sound military strategy.
Updates: Russia-Ukraine War
Updated
Aug. 22, 2023, 3:49 p.m. ET2 hours ago
2 hours ago

    Russia says one attack was near a gas platform and one was near Snake Island.
    Putin tells the BRICS summit that the West is to blame for the collapse of the Black Sea grain deal.
    A Russian bomber was destroyed by a Ukrainian drone, satellite images suggest.

American strategists say that keeping a small force near the destroyed city is justified to pin down Russian troops and prevent them from using it as a base for attack. But Ukraine has enough troops there to try to retake the area, a move that U.S. officials say would lead to large numbers of losses for little strategic gain.

American officials have told Ukrainian leaders that they can secure the land around Bakhmut with far fewer troops and should reallocate forces to targets in the south.

Ukrainian leaders have defended their strategy and distribution of forces, saying they are fighting effectively in both the east and the south. The large number of troops is necessary to pressure Bakhmut and to defend against concerted Russian attacks in the country’s northeast, they say. Ukrainian commanders are competing for resources and have their own ideas of where they can succeed.

American officials’ criticisms of Ukraine’s counteroffensive are often cast through the lens of a generation of military officers who have never experienced a war of this scale and intensity.

Moreover, American war doctrine has never been tested in an environment like Ukraine’s, where Russian electronic warfare jams communications and GPS, and neither military has been able to achieve air superiority.

American officials said Ukraine has another month to six weeks before rainy conditions force a pause in the counteroffensive. Already in August, Ukraine has postponed at least one offensive drive because of rain.

“Terrain conditions are always fundamental drivers” of military operations, General Milley said in an interview with reporters on Sunday. “Fall and spring are not optimal for combined arms operations.”
Image
Ukrainian soldiers in camouflage uniforms and helmets climbing atop an armored vehicle in a forest.
Members of the Third Separate Assault Brigade in Bakhmut last month. Ukraine’s continued focus on Bakhmut, the scene of one of the bloodiest battles of the war, has perplexed U.S. intelligence and military officials.Credit...Tyler Hicks/The New York Times
Ukrainian soldiers in camouflage uniforms and helmets climbing atop an armored vehicle in a forest.

Wet weather will not stop the fighting, but if Ukraine breaks through Russian lines in the coming weeks, the mud could make it more difficult to capitalize on that success and quickly seize a wide swath of territory, officials said.

More important than the weather, some analysts say, is that Ukraine’s main assault forces may run out of steam by mid- to late September. About a month ago, Ukraine rotated in a second wave of troops to replace an initial force that failed to break through Russian defenses.

Ukraine also shifted its battlefield tactics then, returning to its old ways of wearing down Russian forces with artillery and long-range missiles instead of plunging into minefields under fire. In recent days, Ukraine has started tapping into its last strategic reserves — air mobile brigades intended to exploit any breakthrough. While fighting could continue for months, U.S. and other Western officials say Ukraine’s counteroffensive would not have enough decisive firepower to reclaim much of the 20 percent of the country that Russia occupies.

U.S. officials say they do not believe the counteroffensive is doomed to failure but acknowledge that the Ukrainians have not had the success that they or their allies hoped for when the push began.

“We do not assess that the conflict is a stalemate,” Jake Sullivan, the White House’s national security adviser, said on Tuesday. “We continue to support Ukraine in its effort to take territory as part of this counteroffensive, and we are seeing it continue to take territory on a methodical systematic basis.”

While a smaller, dug-in Russian force has performed better in the south than American officials and analysts anticipated, the Kremlin still has systemic problems. Russian troops suffer from poor supply lines, low morale and bad logistics, a senior U.S. military official said.

But Russia is keeping with its traditional way of fighting land wars in Europe: performing poorly in the opening months or years before adapting and persevering as the fighting drags on.

By contrast, Ukrainian troops, in launching the counteroffensive, have the steeper hill to climb, the official said. It took them more than two months — rather than the week or so that officials initially thought — to get through the initial Russian defenses.

Several U.S. officials said they expect Ukraine to make it about halfway to the Sea of Azov by winter, when cold weather may dictate another pause in the fighting. The senior U.S. official said that would be a “partial success.” Some analysts say the counteroffensive will fall short of even that more limited goal.

Even if the counteroffensive fails to reach the coast, officials and analysts say if it can make it far enough to put the coastal road within range of Ukrainian artillery and other strikes, it could cause even more problems for Russian forces in the south who depend on that route for supplies.

Speaking to reporters on a flight to Rome on Sunday, General Milley said the past two months of the counteroffensive have been “long, bloody and slow.”

“It’s taken longer than Ukraine had planned,” he said. “But they are making limited progress.”

Lang artikkel, men ærlig talt, dette tror jeg ukrainerne vet og bestemmer best selv. Jeg synes det er litt dårlig gjort å si slikt med tanke på at det hovedsakelig er vestlig doktrine som har feilet så langt, ikke ukrainsk. Derfor fortsetter ukrainerne å sondere linjene og krige på en måte som koster russerne mest.

Vesten har demonstrert at vi ikke forstår hvordan vi skal utkjempe en "klassisk" militær konflikt mot en "near peer" (jevn fiende?). Våre doktriner er basert på lynrask nedkjemping av veldig dårlige styrker med ekstremt overlegne flyvåpen.

Det får meg også til å tenke på hvor nyttig det kunne ha vært for en del generaler og krigsplanleggere å se mer på science fiction, hvor aliens og andre krefter setter luftvåpnene våre ut av spill og tvinger mennesker til å gå "tilbake til basics", eller til å bli mer kreative, slik ukrainerne har gjort.

Endret 22. august 2023 av Brother Ursus

[Brother Ursus]

 

 

“Akhmat special forces officer reveals that Ukrainian drones with claws are kidnapping the wounded.”

“The same large drones, only slightly more modernized, were previously used by the enemy in the Zaporozhzhia front to steal our wounded. The drone has special devices that visually resemble claws with which it captures a person who is unable to escape, hide or flee.”

Høres ut som en jævlig dårlig forklaring fra troppene til Kadyrov for å forklare hvorfor de ikke har med seg sine sårede tilbake men forlater dem på slagmarken for å dø 😄

[Brother Ursus]

LLC "Ukrainian Armored Equipment" has established a joint production of 120 mm mortar ammunition with two NATO member countries at once.

The Ukrainian Defense Forces are already receiving thousands of new mortar rounds.

[Brother Ursus]

Må si jeg har mine tvil, gitt. Tviler på at de fløy så veldig nær Krim. Om de nærmet seg Krim tviler jeg på at det var med Bayraktar. Eventuelt måtte da signalene sendes gjennom MQ-9 dronen. Kanskje det er et samarbeidsforsøk mellom USA og Tyrkia, og de bestemte seg for å fucke litt med Russland? Mer sansynelig er det at Russland lyver eller tar feil.

[Brother Ursus]

 

So, Putin spoke to the participants of the BRICS summit in South Africa via a video link since he was too afraid of getting arrested on that ICC warrant.

Unfortunately, due to a technical problem, Putin’s voice sounded like that of Darth Vader.

[Gjest MKII]

1 hour ago, Brother Ursus said:

Det får meg også til å tenke på hvor nyttig det kunne ha vært for en del generaler og krigsplanleggere å se mer på science fiction, hvor aliens og andre krefter setter luftvåpnene våre ut av spill og tvinger mennesker til å gå "tilbake til basics", eller til å bli mer kreative, slik ukrainerne har gjort.

+

54 minutes ago, Brother Ursus said:

“Akhmat special forces officer reveals that Ukrainian drones with claws are kidnapping the wounded.”

“The same large drones, only slightly more modernized, were previously used by the enemy in the Zaporozhzhia front to steal our wounded. The drone has special devices that visually resemble claws with which it captures a person who is unable to escape, hide or flee.”

Høres ut som en jævlig dårlig forklaring fra troppene til Kadyrov for å forklare hvorfor de ikke har med seg sine sårede tilbake men forlater dem på slagmarken for å dø 😄

Kanskje han har sett for mye på science fiction... 🤣???

[Anonym36]

Medvedev sier Russland kan annektere georgiske

Medvedev sier Russland kan annektere georgiske utbryterrepublikker

MEDVEDEV: Tidligere statsminister Dmitrij Medvedev antyder at Russland kan komme til å annektere to georgiske utbryterrepublikker.  Foto: Ekaterina Shtukina / AP / NTB

Russlands tidligere statsminister sier landet kan komme til å annektere de georgiske utbryterrepublikkene Abkhasia og Sør-Ossetia.

– Tanken om å bli en del av Russland er fortsatt populær i Abkhasia og Sør-Ossetia, skriver Dmitrij Medvedev i en artikkel som publiseres av avisen Argumenty i Fakty onsdag.

– Dette kan muligens implementeres om det er gode grunner til det, skriver Medvedev, som er nestleder i Russlands nasjonale sikkerhetsråd. (©N

utbryterrepublikkerMEDVEDEV: Tidligere statsminister Dmitrij Medvedev antyder at Russlands tidligere statsminister sier landet kan komme til å annektere de 

[Gjest MKII]

12 minutes ago, Anonym36 said:

Medvedev sier Russland kan annektere georgiske

Medvedev sier Russland kan annektere georgiske utbryterrepublikker

MEDVEDEV: Tidligere statsminister Dmitrij Medvedev antyder at Russland kan komme til å annektere to georgiske utbryterrepublikker.  Foto: Ekaterina Shtukina / AP / NTB

Russlands tidligere statsminister sier landet kan komme til å annektere de georgiske utbryterrepublikkene Abkhasia og Sør-Ossetia.

– Tanken om å bli en del av Russland er fortsatt populær i Abkhasia og Sør-Ossetia, skriver Dmitrij Medvedev i en artikkel som publiseres av avisen Argumenty i Fakty onsdag.

– Dette kan muligens implementeres om det er gode grunner til det, skriver Medvedev, som er nestleder i Russlands nasjonale sikkerhetsråd. (©N

utbryterrepublikkerMEDVEDEV: Tidligere statsminister Dmitrij Medvedev antyder at Russlands tidligere statsminister sier landet kan komme til å annektere de 

Forventer at om det ikke finnes gode grunner til det, så finner de (på) "gode" grunner til det... 🤬

[Skjelvgråt]

https://www.dagbladet.no/studio/nyhetsstudio/5?post=143698

Nei og nei, så trist. 

[Brother Ursus]

Moskva opplever nå daglige og nattlige droneangrep. Vinduer knuses langt unna og bilalarmer står og går hele natten fordi ikke alle er hjemme.

Igjen ser det ut til å være et av kontor og finans- distriktene som er rammet.

Endret 23. august 2023 av Brother Ursus

[Espen Hugaas Andersen]

Bare kom til å tenke på at nå er det lenge siden sist jeg har hørt om store strømbrudd i Ukraina. Kan virke som den strategien feilet totalt.

Jeg ville kanskje anta at strømnettet har fått betydelige reparasjoner over de siste månedene, slik at det er klart til vinteren, hvis Russland skulle forsøke å angripe det igjen.

Greit å notere seg Russlands nederlag. Det var ikke få missiler og droner Russland kastet bort på dette prosjektet, og alt de klarte å oppnå var noen dager med strømbrudd.

[Rhabagatz]

13 hours ago, Espen Hugaas Andersen said:

Påstander fra anonyme kilder har ca null vekt. Det er rykter.

Uansett, kanskje sa Musk noe som enkelte i møtet misforsto som at han hadde hatt en samtale med Putin om Starlink. Kanskje forsnakket Musk seg og sa noe som rimelig kunne tolkes som at han hadde snakket med Putin om Starlink. Kanskje løy Musk om at han hadde snakket med Putin om Starlink.

Uansett hva som ble sagt eller ikke sagt i det møtet er den offisielle bekreftede informasjonen at Musk har avvist å ha snakket med Putin om Starlink, og det er null bevis for at han skulle ha gjort det.

For meg er den mest sannsynlige forklaringen at Musk på et finurlig vis klarte å gi inntrykk av at han hadde snakket med Putin nylig, og målet var åpenbart å få høyest mulig betalt for å levere tjenestene. Typisk forretningsmann, lar den ukrainske hæren bruke systemet gratis så de ser nytten, for så å drive med tilnærmet utpressing for å få høyest mulig pris.

Det er slik man blir rik.

[<generisk_navn>]

Her er mer om F-16 til Ukraina i denne artikkelen i Teknisk Ukeblad.

Noen utvalgte sitater:

Sitat

Eksperter advarer: Det vil ta flere år før Ukraina kan operere F-16 effektivt

Én ting er å kunne fly jagerflyene, noe helt annet er å utnytte hele kampflysystemet.

Sitat

– Det tar tid med opplæring på våpen og taktikker for å kunne utnytte de ekstra kapasitetene som F-16 bringer til bordet, blant annet tilgang til vestlig våpenarsenal. Om et års tid kan kanskje Ukraina bruke F-16 til å utføre de samme oppdragene som i dag gjennomføres med MiG-29 og Su-27, og de nye flyene kan potensielt utfylle bakkebasert luftvern for å bekjempe missiler og droner. Noe helt annet er det å skulle undertrykke russisk luftvern. Dette er noe av det mest kompliserte og farlige man gjør med kampfly, der man møter våpensystemer som er designet for å drepe deg, forklarer førsteamanuensis Lars Peder Haga ved Luftkrigsskolen.

F-16 er og blir en game changer, men det er ikke noe vidundermiddel som alene vil snu krigen på femøringen. Dog vil evnen til å kunne presse fiendens fly til å avfyre sine våpen adskillig lenger bak frontlinjen ha stor betydning.

Jeg har lest et sted at Ukrainas Mig-29 kan identifisere fiendtlige fly på 20 km avstand, mens F-16 kan gjøre dette på 150 km avstand.

Jeg kan ikke gå god for tallene, men det sier seg selv at dette vil kunne nærmest eliminere trusselen fra Ka-52 helikoptrene russerne bruker og som er en av de største truslene mot ukrainsk panser.

Endret 23. august 2023 av <generisk_navn>
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