Brother Ursus

Så vidt jeg forstår så snakker nesten alle ukrainere en kombinasjon av de to, og alle forstår hverandre. Nesten litt som dialekter eller norsk/nynorsk eller i hvert fall norsk/dansk å regne? Dette er vel også resultatet av drøyt 400 år med russifisering og nesten 300 år med okkupasjon? Én av grunnleggerne av Azov-bataljonen er også jødisk. Det er også flere andre medlemmer. Atter andre medlemmer er kommunister, LHBT osv. Bataljonen tiltrakk seg mange nasjonalister i 2014 fordi det hovedsakelig var de som ønsket å kjempe. Men at de skal være nazister, enten det er snakk om 2014 eller 2024, er bare tull. Imidlertid har Putin kopiert Nazi-Tyskland på nesten alle måter, og sendte tom. ekte nynazister som betrodde seg til nazismen og hadde SS-tatoveringer osv. (folk som Dmitry Utkin) etter president Zelensky i 2022. Både elektornikken og drivstoffet i disse rakettene er suspekte. I Kina, som har mye bedre vedlikeholdsrutiner enn Russland, fant man at noen av ICBM'ene var fyllt med vann i stedet drivstoff. Atomvåpen er tross alt ganske tullete. De funker bare som politisk avskrekning. Et lite flisespikk, bare Ingenting i Ukraina er å regne som legitime mål. Krigen er ulovlig og det er ingen erklært krig eller militære mål i Ukraina. Absolutt alt Russland foretar seg der er statlig sponset terror. Alle land som ønsker, inkludert Norge, kan sende hva de enn ønsker til Ukraina, uten at det finnes noen rimelig eller legitim russisk militær responst. Angriper Russland norske borgere og representater for forsvaret eller forsvarsindustrien inne i Ukraina, så har Norge rett til å konsultere om og påkalle Artikkel 5 av NATO-traktaten. Om angrepet på NATO-styrker skjer i internasjonalt farvann eller i et annet land er egentlig ikke relevant så lenge det skjer i NATOs ansvarsområde i Nord-Amerika eller Europa og den nordlige vendekrets (tropic of cancer).

Modi er antagelig i Ukraina for å forsøke å skaffe seg ukrainsk (og vestlig) våpenteknologi til India. Ser ikke bort ifra at han også er der for å be om "fredsavtalesamtaler" på vegne av Putler.

https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/37794 OPINION: Russians Hear Polish Language in Kursk Region Once Again – Or Do They? A video posted on line includes a clip where two Russian women living in the Kursk region saying they were told that Polish mercenaries were fighting for Ukraine. A sign placed on the Ukrainian side at the border with Belarus showing four words that have similarities in Ukrainian, Polish, and Belarusian, but differ from the Russian. Photo: Author Jeg var faktisk ikke klar over at også Belarus har sitt eget språk, eller i det minste en dialekt, som tidvis skiller seg kraftig ut fra russisk.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/08/22/7471444/ Germany investigating possible Russian involvement in drone flights over nuclear power plant in country's north – Bild Prosecutors in the northern German city of Brunsbüttel are investigating an incident involving unidentified drones flying over a shutdown nuclear power plant. Bild reports that since at least 8 August, drones have been flying at high speed over the area where the shutdown nuclear power plant, liquefied natural gas terminal and chemical plants are located in Brunsbüttel. A drone flying at over 100 km/hour was spotted in the sky above the nuclear power plant late on 20 August. An internal police report stated that "the no-fly zone had been violated several times". The most recent drone incident occurred on 22 August, prompting police in Schleswig-Holstein, the federal state where the city is located, to put some officers on alert. Special services believe that the drones over Brunsbüttel may have been launched by Russian agents from ships in the North Sea for sabotage purposes. They suspect the drones are Orlan-10 models, capable of a range of 500-600 kilometres and speeds over 100 km/h. Hvis dette faktisk er russere er det utvilsomt en "advarsel" om hva Russland kan ha intensjoner om å gjøre. Dette er også noe de har drevet med i veldig lang tid, som del av den lenge pågående kalde hybridkrigen, mot Vesten, og ligner det de gjorde i bla. Sverige.

https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/2024/08/people-murmansk-are-starting-ask-about-bomb-shelters People in Murmansk are starting to ask about bomb shelters The Ukrainian drone attacks on the Kola Peninsula spark fear among Russian northerners. This week’s drone attack on the Olenya airbase was one of several recent Ukrainian strikes against the far northern Russian region. Almost at the same time, a big number of drones attacked targets in the Moscow region, as well as more southern regions of Volgograd, Voronezh, Rostov, Bryansk, Belgorod and Kursk. Latterlig at folk på Kola og i Murmansk, altså nesten i Nord-Norge og Arktis, må være redde for ukrainske droner. Dette viser hvor totalt russisk luftforsvar har feilet i denne krigen.

https://edition.cnn.com/2024/08/22/europe/russia-cnn-paton-walsh-investigation-intl/index.html Russia opens criminal investigation into CNN correspondent for reporting in Ukrainian-occupied Russia En CNN journalist passerte altså grensen deres "ulovlig". Vi kan ta tilbake CNN-teamet, i gjengjeld mot at dere tar tilbake de flere hundre tusen terroristene dere ulovlig har sendt inn i Ukraina

https://cepa.org/article/ukraine-has-its-foot-on-gazproms-throat/ Ukraine Has its Foot on Gazprom’s Throat Sergiy Makogon was CEO of GasTSO of Ukraine (2019-2022) and is an energy expert with extensive experience in the European and Ukrainian gas markets. Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the position or views of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. As an expert in gas transit and former head of Ukraine’s gas transmission network, I have closely observed decision-making over Gazprom’s continued use of pipelines through Ukraine, especially since Kyiv’s armed forces seized the critical Sudzha gas metering station inside Russia’s Kursk region two weeks ago. Understanding Gazprom’s approach requires recognition of Sudzha’s strategic significance. It is the only remaining route to deliver gas directly to Europe and became even more crucial after the Yamal and Nord Stream 1 pipelines ceased operations in 2022. At present, the gas flow through Sudzha is 40-42 million cubic meters per day, making it an indispensable link in the chain of Russian gas exports to Europe. It is even more important to Gazprom, the once money-spinning gas giant financially humbled by the continent’s turn away from Kremlin energy. Given its importance, the lack of control over Sudzha introduces substantial risks for the Russian company. Gazprom now has no oversight of the metering station where gas flow is measured, creating the risk of third-party interference with metering equipment and preventing Gazprom personnel from performing standard maintenance procedures. In short, Gazprom can no longer trust the system that proves and details a large part of its exports and therefore its revenues. The company is also obliged to provide metering documentation to Russian Customs and Fiscal Services so that it can pay tax. These issues alone could justify the declaration of force majeure and the halting of gas flows, yet Gazprom has not taken this step, leaving analysts and industry experts wondering why. Since the company’s employees are no longer there, and anyone can interfere with the metering equipment, its executives can no longer rely on the accuracy of the data produced. So why do they persist? The financial implications for Gazprom are a major factor. The company reported a loss of 0.5tn rubles ($5.4bn) in the first half of 2024 alone, and maintaining $5bn a year in revenue from gas sales to the European Union (EU) is crucial to its balance sheet. There are no technical alternatives to redirect the gas to other markets and, with every day of transit generating $14m in revenue, it serves as a lifeline for the company. Gazprom is acutely aware that even a brief interruption in transit could make its customers switch to alternative gas supply routes, potentially permanently. The minimal volatility in EU gas prices in response to the recent Ukrainian military operation in the Kursk region suggests the European market is increasingly able to function without Russian gas and Ukrainian transit. There are also domestic political considerations. Export revenues have provided the primary source of funding for subsidized gas prices to ordinary Russians, and the loss of the European gas market could force the government to increase prices for consumers. That would add to inflation and stoke social tensions. Outside Russia, the primary recipients of its gas are Slovakia, Austria, and Italy, with Hungary receiving a share indirectly via the Turkstream pipeline since 2021. The Kremlin needs Gazprom to maintain supplies to pro-Russian Slovakia and Hungary, where it offers cheaper gas as a quid pro quo to politically sympathetic governments. This is a central element of Russian foreign policy as it seeks to split the EU and block military and financial support for Ukraine. Without Russian gas, their leaders would have fewer incentives to support Russian interests. Maintaining gas transit to the separatist region of Transnistria is also crucial for the Kremlin. Without the provision of free gas, the reintegration of this region with Moldova might become possible. If Gazprom were to cease transit, it would not only lose revenue from gas sales but also face substantial legal claims from its European customers for failure to deliver. The firm is contractually obliged to provide gas to Slovakia and Austria for its European off-takers, and failure to do so could result in massive claims for damages. Germany-based Uniper, for example, has already won a $14.5bn arbitration case against Gazprom, with many other claims still pending. Austria’s OMV has a contract extending until 2040, and a claim for non-delivery could amount to billions of dollars. Even Moldova would have legal grounds to sue Gazprom. Given these considerations, it is likely Gazprom will continue to operate under the current circumstances for as long as possible. However the military and commercial threats of transit interruption remain significant. Neither Ukraine nor Europe faces substantial risks if the transit were to be interrupted. In fact, it may be more prudent to end it during the summer rather than in January when the demand for gas is at its peak.

https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2024/08/22/7471446/ Hungary's government wants Ukraine to cease fire in Kursk Oblast Gergely Gulyás, Chief of Staff of the Hungarian Prime Minister, has called for a ceasefire in the operation of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Kursk Oblast, Russia. "Ukraine is no longer just defending itself but is on the offensive. We want a ceasefire and peace," he said. Jævla forrædere. Sånn i tilfelle det fremdeles hersket noen tvil om hvem Ungarn faktisk jobber for.

Det er aldri slik at man plutselig slipper helt opp. Det går i rykk og napp. Men før man går tom så vil man vel forvente å se en lang periode med desperasjon etter å få tak i fler. Og det har vi sett ganske lenge nå. De har tømt store deler av deponiene sine (mye var nok ubrukelig), har gammelt skrap de fremdeles forsøker å sette i stand, har økt produksjon til et punkt hvor det går utover helsen til arbeiderne på fabrikkene som må jobbe doble skift (ofte uten overtidslønn), og Putin og andre har flydd rundt på tiggeturer til allierte og nøytrale makter. Jeg mistenker at han også har lagt ekstremt press på Lukasjenko for å få ting derfra. Og jeg lurer på om turen til Azerbaidjan og andre steder også var for å forhøre seg om muligheter til å få tak i materiell.

Finland skal ha en NATO-brigade på drøyt 5,000 personell 200-250km unna Sankt Petersburg, med bla. norske og svenske tropper.

Selv om begge sider er på offensiven mister Russland fortsatt suverent mest utstyr. De mister også voldsomt mange stridsvogner og IFV sammenlignet med Ukraina, som mister flest MRAP og sivile kjøretøy. Hele poenget med vestlige MRAP er dog rask transport som skal redde livene til alle soldatene inni, slik at de er nesten laget for å kollapse om de blir truffet. Det er ikke dramatisk å miste mange slike kjøretøy. Det er også det Vesten gir flest av. F.eks ga Tyskland nettopp 400 MRAP i en ny pakke.

Rylsk er et større tettsted (ca 5000) langs motorveien, og en viktig logistisk hub i området. Det vil utgjøre et stort problem for russerne i Kursk dersom Ukraina tar den. Samtidig ønsker Russland å ta Pokrovsk i Donetsk for å gjøre mye det samme, men jeg synes det lukter felle av Pokrovsk.

Budanov bekreftet at Ukraina ødela to Il-76 (store transportfly) og en Mig-31 (supersonisk interceptor) ved en annen flybase (ikke den som ble truffet i går) for noen få dager siden. I går ble en annen base i Rostov truffet, og det har antagelig gått med en del Su-24 og Su-34 der.

Russland har rett og slett ikke særlig mye brukbart materiell igjen. Det er også den største grunnen til at Putin ikke mobiliserer - det ville påvirke populæriteten hans uten å gi noen nevneverdig økning i kampevne.

https://united24media.com/latest-news/drone-footage-reveals-russian-soldiers-mutilating-dead-body-1884 Drone Footage Reveals Russian Soldiers Mutilating Dead Body The 12th Special Operations Brigade "Azov" released drone footage where Russian soldiers cut off the hand of a dead comrade. Two Russians armed with an ax approached the body of a dead soldier and began chopping off his limbs. ... but why? Stjele en klokke, kanskje?

Flere russiske Su-24 eller mer sansynelig Su-34 ser ut til å være tatt ut i Marinovka.

Brannen i Proletarsk i Rostov nærmer seg nå flybensin-lager 😄

https://novayagazeta.eu/articles/2024/08/22/danish-rapper-conscripted-into-russian-military-wins-court-battle-to-annul-contract-en-news Danish rapper conscripted into Russian military wins court battle to annul contract A Danish rapper whose rejection of “European values” and support for Vladimir Putin led him to migrate to Russia last year, has won a legal battle to terminate a contract he signed with the Russian Defence Ministry, independent news outlet Mediazona reported on Thursday. Nicklas Hoffgaard, who performed in Denmark under the name Stanley Most before announcing his retirement in 2018, was initially granted a Russian residence permit in 2023. However, after experiencing problems trying to extend it, he decided to sign a contract with the Russian Defence Ministry in the hope of obtaining Russian citizenship. Hoffgaard, 33, had expected to become a border guard in Siberia, according to Mediazona, but was instead sent to eastern Ukraine to serve in a unit responsible for launching drone strikes, where he complained that his fellow soldiers considered him a spy and forced him to drink vodka. Roman Petrov, Hoffgaard’s lawyer, told the court that his client had not understood the terms of the contract he signed as he does not speak Russian. Despite the court ruling in his favour, Hoffgaard may still have to face another trial at a military court in Novosibirsk before being able to return home, Mediazona reported. On Monday Vladimir Putin signed a decree designed to simplify the relocation process for foreign citizens who want to move to Russia because they support “traditional Russian spiritual and moral values” and oppose the “neoliberal ideology” of their home countries.

Oioioi...

Smeller veldig mye på russisk side i dag. Er det noe i det landet som IKKE står i ild? 😄 Ser ut til at russiske brannmenn gir opp slukningsforsøk på lager i Rostov inntil videre.

Blir spennende å se nye satellittbilder fra Marinovka-flybasen når de kommer ut. Det skal altså ha vært opptil 29 russiske fly der - 14 Su-24 og 15 Su-34. Hvor mange er tatt ut? Place your bets

Dette begynner å bli svært interessant. Neptun-rakettene er nå tatt i bruk på flere mål i dag og i natt. Fergen i Kavkaz, ikke langt unna Kerch, skal ha hatt cirka 30 olje og/eller drivstofftanker.